

AN  
E S S A Y  
UPON THE  
PROBABLE METHODS  
Of making a  
**People Gainers**  
IN THE  
Ballance of Trade.

Treating of these Heads, *viz.*

Of the People of *England*.

Of the Land of *England*, and its Product.

Of our Payments to the Publick, and in what manner the Ballance of Trade may be thereby affected.

That a Country cannot increase in Wealth and Power but by private Men doing their Duty to the Publick, and but by a steady Course of Honesty and Wisdom, in such as are trusted with the Administration of Affairs.

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By the Author of  
*The Essay on Ways and Means.*

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*Inter quæ L. Piso ambitum fori, corrupta judicia, scitiam oratorum accusationes minitantium increpans, abire se, & cedere urbe, victurum in aliquo abdito & longinquo rure testabatur. Simul Curiam relinquebat. Tacit. lib. 2. Annal.*

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# ESSAY

ON THE

PROBABILITY OF

THE

EXISTENCE OF

A

DEITY

BY

JOHN W. FOSTER

OF THE

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Kings Revenues. IV. Whither to Farm the Revenues,  
may not, in this Juncture, be most for the Publick Service.  
V. On the Publick Debts and Engagements. By the Au-  
thor of *The Essay on Ways and Means*. Part I.

As also the Second Part. By the same Author.

Capt. Dampier's *Voyages*, Vol. II. in Three Parts. First,  
the Supplement of his *Voyage round the World*, being that part  
that relates to *Tongin*, *Achin*, *Malacca*, and other Places in  
the *East-Indies*. Second, his Voyage to the Bay of *Campearby*  
in the *West-Indies*. Third, his Observations about the Winds  
and Weather in all parts of the Ocean, between the Trop-  
icks; with a General Index to both Volumes. Octavo.  
Illustrated with particular Maps.

As also the First Part.

And all sorts of Plays.

AN  
ESSAY  
UPON THE  
PROBABLE METHODS  
Of making a  
**People Gainers**  
IN THE  
Ballance of Trade.

---

SECT. I.

---

**T**HE Writer of these Papers  
stands in a manner engag'd to  
say something upon this Sub-  
ject, having in his Discourses, publish'd  
last Year, promis'd to handle several  
Points

Points concerning the Ballance of Trade ; to which Design he was principally induc'd by the perusal of some Calculations then communicated to him by *Gregory King Esq; Lancaster Herald.*

The *Essay upon Ways and Means*, and the Discourses lately set forth *On the Revenues*, and *On the Trade of England*, did meet with so good a Reception from the best sort of Men, that he finds himself encourag'd once more to offer to the Publick his Observations of the like Nature ; from which, if any thing can be gather'd that may promote, or that will hereafter tend to the Welfare and Prosperity of his Country, he shall think his Labours well rewarded.

'Tis true, his Computations were attacked, sometime after they were publish'd, by two Pamphlets ; but so impotently, that he thinks he cannot do himself greater Right, than to desire that all People who give themselves the trouble to read his Writings, would likewise be pleas'd to peruse Mr. P. R———'s Observations, and Mr. T. E———'s Remarks upon the said Books. And he doubts not, but that any Impartial Reader, by comparing the Schemes together, and by duly weighing the Arguments of both sides, will think these Answerers have



have rather strengthen'd and confirm'd, than shaken his Foundations.

'Tis an easie matter to pick out of any Book, here and there, something to Cavil at; which is the common Method taken by the little Scriblers of the Town of Answering, as they call it, a Writer; but all Judicious Men know that an able Author proceeds quite another way; and if his Adversary has advanc'd a wrong Proposition, or a false Hypothesis, he sets up something in the room of what he would pull down, he offers another Proposition or Hypothesis, which shall visibly be truer, wiser and better founded: All other arguing (especially where any new Matter has been advanc'd) being but wretched Sophistry, that carries with it no Conviction. What has been here said, is all the Reply the Writer of these Papers designs to make to the two foremention'd Pamphlets and their Authors, who (whatever they may be good for else) have shown by their Works, that Figures and Calculations, about the King's Revenue, are very little their Province.

He thought it might be of use (in the heat of a War that had then the appearance of lasting a great while) to propose *Ways and Means* by which Taxes

might be laid more equally, and by consequence more lightly upon the People: And when the Peace was concluded, he believ'd he might do his Country Service to treat of the *Publick Revenues* and of the *Trade of England*, the quiet Times which the King's Valour and Wisdom had newly procur'd, seeming most seasonable to propose some kind of Remedy for those Disorders in the Administration, which a War of such length had undoubtedly occasion'd. In the Tracts therefore which he publish'd last Year, he handled *Credit, The King's Revenues, The Publick Debts and Engagements*; and in the second Volume several Points relating to Trade, thereby to give some View, what Improvements this Nation was capable of, under a careful and steady Management.

And having deeply imprinted in his Mind, the Notion that all our Thoughts, Endeavours and Designments should tend to the Good and Welfare of our Country; and being convinc'd, that even where Abilities are wanting, the very Intentions are commendable and virtuous, he is resolv'd to continue his Studies upon the same Subject, and to look yet farther into the Condition and Posture of this Kingdom.

He

He is now indeed call'd up to a Station, wherein he has the opportunity of delivering his Thoughts concerning the Business of *England* another way than by his Pen; but 'tis many Years since he had the Honour to sit in Parliament; and he doubts very much, whether he shall be able to arrive at any degree of expressing himself readily and well; without which, the best and most useful Matter loses all its Energy and Effect, before a great Assembly. Writing and Speaking are Talents very different; a tolerable Style may be attain'd to by great Application and Diligence, but Elocution is a Gift (and if employ'd to honest Uses) one of the greatest Bounties Nature can bestow upon a Man: He who has not the Seeds of it within him, shall never come at it by Art or Labour; and (which perhaps is not vulgarly observ'd) Writing much extinguishes the Faculty of Talking well off hand, in some Persons who would otherwise have a competent Share thereof; for if the Writer be of any Form, he accustoms himself to a Correctness and a Choice of Words: And this Nicety and Care beget a diffidency in him which is altogether inconsistent with the Happiness of Speaking well in Publick. Such

therefore, as fear they cannot deliver their Thoughts well and clearly another way, must commit them to Writing, in order to make whatever Qualities they have, of Service to their Country.

The Matters we have hitherto handled, have been in a manner intirely new, and such wherein very little Help could be had from Books; and (it being the Interest of some Persons of no small Power in the Management of Affairs, that many Truths, important for *England* to be known, should rather be conceal'd, if possible, in the Center of the Earth, than laid open) the Aids and Lights which might be gather'd from the publick Accounts and Offices, have been industriously with-held from all who are not servile Applauders of their wild and destructive Conduct; however, he will proceed on with his Work, notwithstanding the potent Malice of such Men, utterly indifferent how much his Inquiries offend them, provided they yield any Benefit to the King and Kingdom.

His Aim always has been and ever shall be, to shew how the Wealth and Strength of *England* is to be secur'd and improv'd; to set the Matters thereunto conducing in a true Light; to instill into the Minds of young Gentlemen a desire of looking  
into

into the Revenues and Trade of the Nation; that having therein an insight themselves, they may not be, in some future Reign, insnar'd by the wicked Arts of false and rapacious Ministers, who will be ever craving for large Supplies, but careless how they waste the publick Treasure; who will be always coveting new Fonds, which they will lay by as so much Lumber of the State, when they have borrow'd all they can upon 'em, not minding how any new Branch is manag'd; who will be for shearing the Sheep as many times as they can, every Year, without any care of the Flock, or how the Fleece shall grow again; and who will be for pulling down the Commonwealth, so they may build up their own Fortunes.

It shall not be here argu'd, whether the Skill of Physick be now brought to Perfection, or whether it is yet capable of further Improvements; but this may be safely pronounc'd, That the Knowledge of the Sinews, Muscles, Arteries and Veins, with the late discovery of the Circulation of the Blood and all the Parts of Anatomy, conduce very much to render this dark Science more plain and certain.

In the same manner, such as would understand the Body-Politick, its true Constitution, its State of Health, its Growth or Decay, its Strength or Weakness, and how to apply Remedies to the various Distempers to which it is incident, must study and look narrowly into all the distinct parts of the Commonwealth, its Trade, the Current Money, (which is its flowing Blood) the Arts, Labour and Manufactures, and the number of its People; with many other things which altogether are the Members of which the great Body is compos'd.

From these Topicks, to reason upon Matters of Government, has been the Method we have hitherto taken, and which we shall pursue in the following Tract; and the way we go of arguing and concluding upon things by Figures, being in a manner new, and made use of but by two or three before us, and that too but very superficially, 'tis hop'd Grains of Allowance will be made, and that we shall be look'd upon as Beginners of an Art not yet Polish'd, and which Time may bring to more Perfection.

In all Arts and Sciences, the first Inventions have been rude and unskillfull: Very antiently, the *Egyptians* knew some-

something of Geometry, and the *Affyr-ians* of Altronomy; but as well these, as all other parts of Knowledge, were but a Shapeless Body, till brought into some Form by the artfull Hands of *Pherecides*, *Thales*, *Anaximander* and *Pythagoras*; and yet Philosophy had neither Strength nor Beauty, till it was further improv'd in the three successive Schools of *Socrates*, *Plato* and *Aristotle*.

What has been here said of sublimer Things, holds as well in Speculations of an inferiour Nature, and in Arts meerly Mechanical, whose first Principles and Rudiments must be imperfect. But if this our manner of Inquiring into Matters that relate to Polity and Government, be found any ways Instructive and Beneficial to the Publick, we hope hereafter to be follow'd by abler Hands, who shall finish what we are but beginning.

We have formerly said, \* *That to find* \* *Discourses on the Publick Revenues and Trade, part 2d p. 331.*  
*out the true Ballance of Trade, in order to adapt thereunto our Laws and Form of Living, would bring as much Wealth to this Country, as is requisite to render a Nation safe and happy. That an exact Ballance between Us and every distinct Place, perhaps cannot by any humane Skill be attain'd to; and that it is not certain whether a Scrutiny so very Nice, would be of any Use. But that with-*  
 out

out doubt, a general State of this Matter, form'd upon strict Enquiry, with Deliberation and Skill; and such a one as would carry with it a Demonstration of being somewhat near the Truth, must be a great Help to the Rulers and Ministers of a Country, and a good Guide in many important Councils.

That we have been heretofore large Gainers by Trade, is manifest from the expensive War we were able to carry on for so many Years; and tho' to find out in what Particulars we got or lost, may be very difficult; yet to give some general View of the matter may not be impossible: And we shall endeavour to shew from whence such may take their Rise, who would have some Prospect of a thing so vast and that seems at such a distance.

And albeit to know the *Quantum* of our yearly Gains, may not perhaps so much import the State; yet to be watchful that we do not lose, waste and impair from time to time, must certainly be the concern of every one who loves his Country; and as it behoves private Men frequently to Ballance their Accompts, and to see how their Condition stands; so without doubt, it is a Duty incumbent upon those who are in Power, very often to contemplate the Posture of the Nation, in order to this, that  
grow,



growing Mischiefs may have a sudden Cure.

As the Wealth of all kinds stor'd up in this Kingdom was of late our chief Support, so what we are hereafter to get, must defend us against the Accidents at home and abroad, to which all Governments are liable; and upon this Account the Motions of Trade ought to be observ'd with a strict and careful Eye.

And we owe it to our Country to communicate what we think may conduce to make it flourish; and the Men in Power should encourage such Attempts, at least they should not oppress nor contrive their Ruin, who employ their whole time, and impair their own Health, in studying to promote the Common Good.

But they who Act upon a Principle are not easily dishearten'd. In this *Essay* we shall set forth some probable Methods of making a Nation Gainers in the Ballance of Trade: And we shall close the Discourse with endeavouring to show, That this Ballance is not to be put of our Side, (by which we mean that a Country cannot increase in Wealth and Power) but by private Men doing their Duty to the Publick, and but by a steady Course of Honesty, Care and Wisdom, in  
such

such as are trusted with the Administration.

The Wounds of the late War have drain'd us of so much Blood, and our Foreign Commerce has met with such a Ruffle and Interruption in all Parts of the World, and our Neighbours grow so fast upon us, some in Wealth, and others in Shipping and the Skill of Trade, that Poverty must grow upon us apace, our Naval Strength must decrease, and we must utterly lose the Dominion of the Sea, unless the Legislative Authority exert it self with Vigor, and interpose betimes to prevent our impending Ruin.

\* *Discourses on the Publick Revenues and on Trade, Part 2d, P. 15.* We have said formerly, \* *That Gold and Silver are indeed the Measure of Trade, but that the Spring and Original of it, in all Nations, is the Natural or Artificial Product of the Country; that is to say, what their Land, or what their Labour and Industry produces.*

There is no Man that can reasonably dispute this Position; and if granted, it follows from thence, That to know rightly how the Ballance of Trade stands with any Nation, a due Inspection must be made into their Natural or Artificial Product.

But

But this Natural or Artificial Product being most of it the Result of the Peoples Labour and Industry, we shall be still in the dark as to all Inquiries of this kind, without maturely considering the Numbers of the People.

In these sort of Speculations not only the Quantity but Quality of the Inhabitants must be duly ponder'd, they must be divided into their several Ranks and Classes: It must be distinguish'd who by their Arts, Labour or Industry are increasing, and who by their Expence, Poverty, or Sloth, are decreasing the Kingdom's Wealth. Of these Sub-divisions are likewise to be made, of what Numbers are employ'd in the Church, in War, in the Fleets Mercantile and Warlike, in the Law, in Offices, in Merchandize, in Shop keeping and Trades, in Handicrafts; and who both of the higher and lower Degree are Persons living upon their Estates; who are Freeholders, Farmers, Labouring People, Servants, Cottagers, Alms-People, and Vagrants.

The People being thus distributed into their proper Ranks, we are likewise to inquire into the Quality of the Land they are to cultivate and improve, in order to that Natural or Artificial Product which

is the Medium whereby a Superlucration of Wealth is to be gotten. We should examin what Proportion of it is Arable, Pasture and Meadow, Woods and Coppices, Forests, Parks and Common, Heaths, Moors, Mountains, and barren Land, Houses and Homesteads, &c. Rivers, Lakes, Meers, Roads, Ways, and waft Land.

The Land is to yield the Product, which Product is to yield the Wealth, so that we should inquire how this Product stands in every particular, but more especially in the principal constituent Parts of *England's* Strength, namely Wooll, Corn, and our Mines; for 'tis by the well ordering and wise disposition of these Branches of our Wealth, that we are to be Gainers in the Ballance of Trade.

We shall therefore handle distinctly these Heads, *viz.* the People, the Land and its Product, and shall endeavour to lay down several Matters, from whence (peradventure with good Grounds of Probability) some Conclusions may be made in relation to our present Subject; and because Taxes influence very much in the Ballance of Trade, as will be shown hereafter, we shall likewise say something concerning our Payments to the Publick.

SECT:

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S E C T. II.

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O F T H E

## People of England.

**T**H E Writer of these Papers has seen the before-mentioned Mr. *King's* Natural and Political Observations and Conclusions upon the State and Condition of *England* in Manuscript. The Calculations therein contain'd are very accurate, and more perhaps to be rely'd upon than any thing that has been ever done of the like kind. This Skilful and Laborious Gentleman has taken the right Course to form his several Schemes about the Numbers of the People; for besides many different Ways of working, he has very carefully inspected the Poll-Books, and the Distinctions made by those Acts, and the Produce in Money of the respective Polls, going every where by reasonable and discreet Mediums: Besides which Pains, he has made Observation

vations of the very Facts in particular Towns and Places, from which he has been able to judge and conclude more safely of others; so that he seems to have look'd further into this Mystery than any other Person.

With his Permission, we shall offer to the Publick such of his Computations as may be of use, and enlighten in the Matter before us.

He lays down, That if the first Peopling of *England* was by a Colony or Colonies, consisting of a Number between a Hundred and a Thousand People, (which seems probable) such Colony or Colonies might be brought over between the Year of the World 2400 and 2600, viz. about eight or nine Hundred Years after the Flood, and fourteen or fifteen Hundred Years before the Birth of Christ; at which time the World might have about a Million of Families, and four or five Millions of People.

From which Hypothesis, it will follow by an orderly Series of Increase,

That when the *Romans* invaded *England* fifty three Years before Christ's time, the Kingdom might have about 360,000 People, and at Christ's Birth about four hundred Thousand.

That

That at the *Norman Conquest*, *Ann. Christ. 1066.* the Kingdom might contain somewhat above 2,000,000.

That *Anno 1260.* or about 200 Years after the *Norman Conquest*, it might contain about 2,750,000 People, or half the present Number: So that the People of *England* may have doubled in about 435 Years last past.

That in probability the next doubling will be in about 600 Years to come, *viz.* by the Year 2300, at which time it may have about 11,000,000 of People, and the Kingdom containing about 39 Millions of Acres, there will be then about three Acres and a half *per Head*.

That the Increase of the Kingdom for every hundred Years of the last preceding Term of doubling, and the subsequent Term of doubling, may have been and in probability may be, according to the following Scheme.

C

Anno

## Of the People of England.

Anno Christi.	Number of People.	Increase every hundred Years.
1300	2,860,000	
	—	440,000.
1400	3,300,000	
	—	540,000.
1500	3,840,000	
	—	780,000.
1600	4,620,000	
	—	880,000.
1700	5,500,000	
	—	920,000.
1800	6,420,000	
	—	930,000.
1900	7,350,000	
	—	930,000.
2000	8,280,000	
	—	925,000.
2100	9,205,000	
	—	910,000.
2200	10,115,000	
	—	885,000.
2300	11,000,000.	

Whereby it may appear, That the Increase of the Kingdom being 880,000 People in the last hundred Years, and 920000 in the next succeeding hundred Years, the Annual Increase at this time may be about 9000 Souls *per Annum*.

But



But whereas the Yearly  
Births of the Kingdom } 190,000 Souls.  
are about 1 in 28:95, or

And the Yearly Buri- } 170,000 Souls.  
als 1 in 32:35 or

Whereby the Yearly } 20,000 Souls.  
Increase would be

It is to be noted,

1<sup>st</sup>. That the } p. An. 7  
Allowance for }  
Plagues and great } 4000  
Mortalities may }  
come to at a Me- }  
dium

2<sup>dly</sup>. Foreign }  
or Civil Wars at } 3500  
a Medium

3<sup>dly</sup>. The Sea } 11,000 per An.  
constantly em- }  
ploying about } 2500  
40,000 may pre- }  
cipitate the death }  
of about

4<sup>thly</sup>. The }  
Plantations (over }  
and above the Ac- } 1000  
cession of Fo- }  
reigners) may car- }  
ry away

Whereby the neat An- } 9000. Souls.  
nual Increase may be but }

*Of the People of England.*

That of these 20,000 Souls which would be the Annual Increase of the Kingdom by Procreation, were it not for the formention'd Abatements.

The Country Increases } 20,000 Souls.  
Annually by Procreation }

The Cities and Towns, }  
exclusive of *London*, by } 2000 Souls.  
Procreation }

But *London* and the }  
Bills of Mortality decrease } 2000 Souls.  
Annually }

So that *London* requires a Supply of 2000 Souls *per An.* to keep it from decreasing, besides a further Supply of about 3000 *per Annum* for its Increase at this time. In all 5000, or above a half of the Kingdoms neat Increase.

Mr. *King* further observes, That by the Assessments on Marriages Births and Burials, and the Collectors Returns thereupon, and by the Parish Registers, it appears, That the Proportions of Marriages, Births and Burials, are according to the following Scheme.

*Vide Scheme A.*

Whence it may be observ'd, That in 10,000 Co-existing Persons,

There

## Scheme A.

*People.*

530,000	<i>London</i> and Bills of Mortality	—1 in
870,000	The Cities and Market Towns	—1 in
4,100,000	The Villages and Hamlets	—1 in
<hr/>		
5,500,000		1 in

*An*

<i>London</i> and Bills of Mortality	—1 in	26½
The Cities and Market Towns	—1 in	28½
The Villages and Hamlets	—1 in	29.
<hr/>		
	1 in	28.9

Place this Scheme p. 20.

### *Annual Marriages.*


— 1 in 106.	In all— 5000.	Producing 4. Children each.
— 1 in 128.	In all— 6800.	Producing 4.5 Children each.
— 1 in 141.	In all— 29200.	Producing 4.8 Children each.
<hr/> 1 in 134.	<hr/> 41000.	<hr/> 4.64

### *Annual Births.*

1 in 26½.	In all 20000.
1 in 28½.	In all 30600.
1 in 29.4	In all 139400.
<hr/> 1 in 28.95	<hr/> 190000.

### *Annual Burials.*

1 in 24.1	In all 22000.
1 in 30.4	In all 28600.
1 in 34.4	In all 119400.
<hr/> 1 in 32.35	<hr/> 170000.



There are 71 or 72 Marriages in the Country producing 343 Children.

78 Marriages in Towns producing 351 Children.

94 Marriages in *London* producing 376 Children.

Whereby it follows,

First, That tho' each Marriage in *London* produces fewer People than in the Country, yet *London* in general having a greater Proportion of Breeders, is more prolifick than the other great Towns, and the great Towns are more prolifick than the Country.

Secondly, That if the People of *London* of all Ages were as long liv'd, as those in the Country, *London* would increase in People much faster *pro rato* than the Country.

Thirdly, That the Reasons why each Marriage in *London* produces fewer Children than the Country Marriages, seem to be

First, From the more frequent Fornications and Adulteries.

Secondly, From a greater Luxury and Intemperance.

Thirdly, From a greater Intenfness on Business.

*Of the People of England.*

Fourthly, From the unhealthfulness of the Coal Smoak.

Fifthly, From a greater Inequality of Age between the Husbands and Wives.

Sixthly, From the Husbands and Wives not living so long as in the Country.

He farther observes, Accompting the People to be 5,500,000, That the said five Millions and a half (including the Transitory People and Vagrants) appear by the Assessments on Marriages Births and Burials, to bear the following Proportions in relation to Males and Females, and other Distinctions of the People, viz.

*Vide Scheme B.*

So that the Number of Communicants is in all 3,260,000 Souls.

And the Number of Fighting Men between 16 and 60 is 1,308,000.

That the Batchelors are about 28 *per Cent.* of the whole,

Whereof those under 25 Years are 25  $\frac{1}{2}$  *per Cent.*

And those above 25 Years are 2  $\frac{1}{2}$  *per Cent.*

That the Maidens are about 28  $\frac{1}{2}$  *per Cent.* of the whole,

Whereof

## Scheme B.

	Males.	Female.
In <i>London</i> and Bills of Mortality ———	10	to 13.
In the other Cities and Market Towns ———	8	to 9.
In the Villages and Hamlets ———	100	to 99.
	27	to 28.

*That as to other Distinctions they appear by the said*

	Per Cent.	Per
Husbands and Wives at above	34 $\frac{1}{2}$ per Cent.	1,900
Widowers at above ———	14 per Cent.	90
Widows at about ———	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ per Cent.	240
Children at above ———	45 per Cent.	2,500
Servants at about ———	10 $\frac{1}{2}$ per Cent.	560
Sojourners and single Persons ———	4 per Cent.	210
	100	5,500

*And that the different Proportions in each of the said Towns, and the Villages, may the better appear,*

*London and  
Bills of Mor-*

*The other C-  
ties and gro-*



<i>Males.</i>	<i>Females.</i>	<i>Males.</i>	<i>Females.</i>
10 to 13.		230,000	300,000
8 to 9.		410,000	460,000
100 to 99.		2,060,000	2,040,000
<hr/>		<hr/>	
27 to 28.		2,700,000	2,800,000

pear by the said Assessments to bear these Pro

	<i>People.</i>	<i>Males.</i>	<i>Females.</i>
er Cent.	1,900,000	950,000	950,000
er Cent.	90,000	90,000	
er Cent.	240,000		240,000
er Cent.	2,500,000	1,300,000	1,200,000
er Cent.	560,000	260,000	300,000
er Cent.	210,000	100,000	110,000
<hr/>		<hr/>	
	5,500,000	2,700,000	2,800,000

each of the said Articles between London  
 e better appear, he has form'd the following

*The other Ci-  
 ties and great*

*The Villages*

<i>es.</i>	<i>Both.</i>
00	530,000
00	870,000
00	4,100,000
	<hr/>
00	5,500,000

### *Proportions,*

#### *Females.*

950,000  
 240,000  
 200,000  
 300,000  
 110,000  


---

 800,000

don, the Great  
 ing Scheme.

*And that the different Proportions in each of the Towns, and the Villages, may the better appe*

	London and Bills of Mor- tality.	Souls.	The cit- ties and Towns.
Husbands and Wives	37 per Cent.	196,100	36 per
Widowers —	2 per Cent.	10,600	2 per
Widows —	7 per Cent.	37,100	6 per
Children —	33 per Cent.	174,900	40 per
Servants —	13 per Cent.	68,900	11 per
Sojourners —	8 per Cent.	42,400	5 per
	100	530,000	100

*He further observes, supposing the People to be 5,500,000, and that the several*

	In all
Those under 1 year old	170,000
Those under 5 years old	820,000
Those under 10 years old	1,520,000
Those under 16 years old	2,240,000
Those above 16 years old	3,260,000
Those above 21 years old	2,700,000
Those above 25 years old	2,400,000
Those above 60 years old	600,000
Those under 16 years old	2,240,000
Those above 16 years old	3,260,000
Total of the People	5,500,000

Place this Scheme p. 22.

each of the said Articles between London, the Great  
 e better appear, he has form'd the following Scheme.

<i>The other Ci- ties and great Towns.</i>		<i>The Villages and Hamlets.</i>	
	<i>Souls.</i>		<i>Souls.</i>
36 per Cent.	313,200	34 per Cent.	1,394,000
2 per Cent.	17,400	1½ per Cent.	61,500
6 per Cent.	52,200	4½ per Cent.	184,500
40 per Cent.	348,000	47 per Cent.	1,927,000
11 per Cent.	95,700	10 per Cent.	410,000
5 per Cent.	43,500	3 per Cent.	123,000
<hr/>		<hr/>	
100	870,000	100	4,100,000

to be 5,500,000, that the yearly Births of the King-  
 e several Ages of the People may be as follows,

<i>In all</i>	<i>Males.</i>	<i>Females.</i>
170,000	88,500	81,500
820,000	413,300	406,700
520,000	762,900	757,100
240,000	1,122,000	1,118,000
<hr/>		
260,000	1,578,000	1,682,000
700,000	1,300,000	1,400,000
400,000	1,152,000	1,248,000
600,000	270,000	330,000
<hr/>		
240,000		
260,000		
<hr/>		
500,000		

## *Scheme C.*

The Husbands are aged	_____
The Wives	_____
The Widowers	_____
The Widows	_____
The Children	_____
The Servants	_____
The Sojourners	_____


At a Medium—

Place this Scheme p. 23.

# At a Medium

— 43 years apiece, which at	17½	1
40 years apiece, —	17½	
— 56 years apiece, —	1½	
— 60 years apiece, —	4½	
— 12 years apiece, —	45	
— 27 years apiece, —	10½	
— 35 years apiece, —	4	
—	—	
m— 27½	100	

			years
which at	17½	per Cent. makes	742
—	17½	—	690
—	1½	—	84
—	4½	—	270
—	45	—	540
—	10½	—	284
—	4	—	140
	—		—
	100		2750





# Scheme D.

*A Scheme*

*Number of Families.*      *RANKS, DEGR*  
*and*  
*QUALIFIC*

160	Temporal Lords
26	Spiritual Lords
800	Baronets
600	Knights
3,000	Esquires
12,000	Gentlemen
5,000	Persons in greater Offices
5,000	Persons in lesser Offices
2,000	Eminent Merchants and
8,000	Lesser Merchants and
10,000	Persons in the Law
2,000	Eminent Clergy-men
8,000	Lesser Clergy-men
40,000	Freeholders of the better
120,000	Freeholders of the lesser
150,000	Farmers
15,000	Persons in Liberal Arts
50,000	Shopkeepers and Trades
60,000	Artizans and Handicraft
5,000	Naval Officers
4,000	Military Officers
<hr/>	
500,586	
50,000	Common Seamen
364,000	Labouring People and
400,000	Cottagers and Paupers
35,000	Common Soldiers
<hr/>	

# *Scheme of the Income and Expence of the several Families of E*

GREES, TITLES, and IFICATIONS.	Heads per Family.	Number of Persons.	Tearly In- come per Family.		Tearly In- come in general.
			l.	s.	
_____	40	6,400	3,200		512,000
_____	20	520	1,300		33,800
_____	16	12,800	880		704,000
_____	13	7,800	650		390,000
_____	10	30,000	450		1,200,000
_____	8	96,000	280		2,880,000
Offices and Places _____	8	40,000	240		1,200,000
Offices and Places _____	6	30,000	120		600,000
nts and Traders by Sea _____	8	16,000	400		800,000
and Traders by Sea _____	6	48,000	198		1,600,000
w _____	7	70,000	154		1,540,000
nen _____	6	12,000	72		144,000
n _____	5	40,000	50		400,000
e better sort _____	7	280,000	91		3,640,000
e lesser sort _____	5 <sup>†</sup>	660,000	55		6,600,000
_____	5	750,000	42	10	6,375,000
l Arts and Sciences _____	5	75,000	60		900,000
Tradesmen _____	4 <sup>†</sup>	225,000	45		2,250,000
ndicrafts _____	4	240,000	38		2,280,000
_____	4	20,000	80		400,000
_____	4	16,000	60		240,000
_____	5 <sup>†</sup>	2,675,520	-68	18	34,488,800
_____	3	150,000	20		1,000,000
and Out Servants _____	3 <sup>†</sup>	1,275,000	15		5,460,000
apers _____	3 <sup>†</sup>	1,300,000	6	10	2,000,000
_____	2	70,000	14		490,000


*of the several Families of England, Calculated for the Year, 1688.*

<i>Number of Persons.</i>	<i>Yearly In- come per Family.</i>	<i>Yearly In- come in general.</i>	<i>Yearly In- come per Head.</i>	<i>Yearly Ex- pence per Head.</i>	<i>Yearly In- crease per Head.</i>	<i>Yearly In- crease in general.</i>
	<i>l. s.</i>	<i>l.</i>	<i>l. s. d.</i>	<i>l. s. d.</i>	<i>l. s. d.</i>	<i>l.</i>
6,400	3,200	512,000	80-- 0	70-- 0	10-- 0	64,000
520	1,300	33,800	65-- 0	45-- 0	20-- 0	10,400
12,800	880	704,000	55-- 0	49-- 0	6-- 0	76,800
7,800	650	390,000	50-- 0	45-- 0	5-- 0	39,000
30,000	450	1,200,000	45-- 0	41-- 0	4-- 0	120,000
96,000	280	2,880,000	35-- 0	32-- 0	3-- 0	288,000
40,000	240	1,200,000	30-- 0	26-- 0	4-- 0	160,000
30,000	120	600,000	20-- 0	17-- 0	3-- 0	90,000
16,000	400	800,000	50-- 0	37-- 0	13-- 0	208,000
48,000	198	1,600,000	33-- 0	27-- 0	6-- 0	288,000
70,000	154	1,540,000	22-- 0	18-- 0	4-- 0	280,000
12,000	72	144,000	12-- 0	10-- 0	2-- 0	24,000
40,000	50	400,000	10-- 0	9-- 4	0-- 16	32,000
280,000	91	3,640,000	13-- 0	11-- 15	1-- 5	350,000
660,000	55	6,600,000	10-- 0	9-- 10	0-- 10	330,000
750,000	42-- 10	6,375,000	8-- 10	8-- 5	0-- 5	187,500
75,000	60	900,000	12-- 0	11-- 0	1-- 0	75,000
225,000	45	2,250,000	10-- 0	9-- 0	1-- 0	225,000
240,000	38	2,280,000	9-- 10	9-- 0	0-- 10	120,000
20,000	80	400,000	20-- 0	18-- 0	2-- 0	40,000
16,000	60	240,000	15-- 0	14-- 0	1-- 0	16,000
675,520	68-- 18	34,488,800	12-- 18	11-- 15-- 4	1-- 2-- 8 <i>Decrease</i>	3,023,700 <i>Decrease</i>
150,000	20	1,000,000	7-- 0	7-- 10	0-- 10	75,000
275,000	15	5,460,000	4-- 10	4-- 12	0-- 2	127,500
300,000	6-- 10	2,000,000	2-- 0	2-- 5	0-- 5	325,000

364,000	Labouring People and Out Servants	—	3	1,200,000	20	1,200,000
400,000	Cottagers and Paupers	—	3½	1,275,000	15	5,460,000
35,000	Common Soldiers	—	2	1,300,000	6-10	2,000,000
				70,000	14	490,000
849,000	Vagrants; as Gipsies, Thieves, Beggars, &c.		3½	2,795,000	10-10	8,950,000
				30,000		60,000
So the general Account is						
500,586	Increasing the Wealth of the Kingdom	—	5½	2,675,520	68-18	34,488,800
849,000	Decreasing the Wealth of the Kingdom	—	3½	2,825,000	10-10	9,010,000
1,349,586	Neat Totals	—	4½	5,500,520	32-5	43,491,800

Place this Scheme p. 23.

275,000	15	5,460,000	4-10	4-12	0-2	127,500
300,000	6-10	2,000,000	2-0	2-5	0-5	325,000
70,000	14	490,000	7-0	7-10	0-10	35,000
795,000	10-10	8,950,000	3-5	3-9	0-4	562,500
30,000		60,000	2-0	4-0	2-0	60,000
<i>So the general Account is</i>						
675,520	68-18	34,488,800	12-18	11-15-4	1-2-8	3,023,700
825,000	10-10	9,010,000	3-3	3-7-6	0-4-6	622,500
500,520	32-5	43,491,800	7-18	7-9-3	0-8-9	2,401,200



Whereof those under 25 Years are 264  
*per Cent.*

And those above 25 Years are 2 *per Cent.*

That the Males and Females in the Kingdom in General, are aged one with another 27 Years and a half.

That in the Kingdom in General, there is near as many People living under 20 Years of Age, as there is above twenty, whereof half of the Males is under 19, and one half of the Females is under 21 Years.

That the Ages of the People, according to their several Distinctions, are as follows, *viz.*

*Vide Scheme C.*

Having thus stated the Numbers of the People, he gives a Scheme of the Income and Expence of the several Families of *England*, Calculated for the Year, 1688.

*Vide Scheme D.*

Mr. *King's* Modesty has been so far over-rul'd, as to suffer us to Communicate these his Excellent Computations, which we can the more safely commend,

having examin'd them very carefully, try'd them by some little Operations of our own upon the same Subject, and compar'd them with the Schemes of other Persons, who take Pleasure in the like Studies.

What he says concerning the Number of the People to be 5,500,000 is no positive Assertion, nor shall we pretend any where to determin in that Matter; what he lays down is by way of Hypothesis, That supposing the Inhabitants of *England* to have been, *Anno* 1300, Two Millions 860,000 Heads, by the orderly Series of Increase allow'd of by all Writers, they may probably be about *Anno* 1700 Five Millions 500,000 Heads; but if they were *An.* 1300 either less or more, the Case must proportionably alter; for as to his Allowances for Plagues, great Mortalities, Civil Wars, the Sea and the Plantations, they seem very reasonable, and not well to be contraverted.

Upon these Schemes of Mr. *King*, we shall make several Remarks, tho' the Text deserves much a better Comment.

The People being the first Matter of Power and Wealth, by whose Labour and Industry a Nation must be Gainers in the Ballance, their Increase or Decrease must be carefully observ'd by any Govern-



Government that designs to thrive; that is, their Increase must be promoted by good Conduct and wholesome Laws, and if they have been Decreas'd by War, or any other Accident, the Breach is to be made up as soon as possible, for it is a Maim in the Body Politick affecting all its Parts.

Almost all Countries in the World have been more or less Populous, as Liberty and Property have been there well or ill secur'd. The first Constitution of *Rome* was no ill founded Government, a Kingly Power limited by Laws; and the People increas'd so fast, that from a small beginning, in the Reign of their Sixth King, they were able to send out an Army of 80000 Men. And in the time of the Common-wealth, in that Invasion which the *Gauls* made upon *Italy*, not long before *Hannibal* came thither, they were grown so numerous, as that their Troops consisted of 700,000 Foot and 70,000 Horse; 'tis true, their Allies were comprehended in this Number, but the ordinary People fit to bear Arms, being Muster'd in *Rome* and *Campania*, amounted to 250,000 Foot and 23,000 Horse.

Nothing therefore can more contribute to the rendring *England* Populous and Strong,

Strong, than to have Liberty upon a right Foot, and our legal Constitution firmly preserv'd. A Nation may be as well call'd free under a limited Kingship as in a Common-wealth, and 'tis to this good Form of our Government; that we partly owe that doubling of the People, which has probably happen'd here in the 435 Years last past. And if the Ambition of some, and the Mercenary Temper of others, should bring us at any time to alter our Constitution, and to give up our ancient Rights, we shall find our Numbers diminish visibly and fast. For Liberty encourages Procreation, and not only keeps our own Inhabitants among us, but invites Strangers to come and live under the shelter of our Laws.

Machia-  
vel's *Dis-*  
*courses* on  
Livy.

The *Romans* indeed made use of an Adventitious Help to enlarge their City, which was by incorporating Foreign Cities and Nations into their Common-wealth; but this way is not without its Mischiefs. For the Strangers in *Rome* by degrees had grown so numerous, and to have so great a Vote in the Councils, that the whole Government began to totter, and decline from its old, to its new Inhabitants: Which *Fabius* the Censor observing, he apply'd a Remedy in time by reducing all the new Citizens into  
four

our Tribes, that being contracted into so narrow a space, they might not have so malignant an influence upon the City.

An Act of General Naturalization, would likewise probably Increase our Numbers very fast, and repair what Loss we may have suffer'd in our People by the late War: 'Tis a Matter that has been very warmly contended for by many good Patriots; but peradventure it carries also its Danger with it, which perhaps would have the less Influence by this Expedient, namely, If an Act of Parliament were made, That no Heads of Families, hereafter to be naturaliz'd for the first Generation, should have Votes in any of our Elections. But as the Case stands, it seems against the Nature of right Government, that Strangers (who may be Spies, and who may have an Interest opposite to that of *England*, and who at best ever join in one Link of Obsequiousness to the Ministers) should be suffer'd to intermeddle in that important Business of sending Members to Parliament. From their Sons indeed there is less to fear, who by Birth and Nature may come to have the same Interest and Inclinations as the Natives.

And tho' the Expedient of *Fabius Maximus*, to contract the Strangers into four Tribes,

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Tribes, might be reasonable where the Affairs of a whole Empire were transacted by Magistrates chosen in one City, yet the same Policy may not hold good in *England*; Foreigners cannot influence Elections here by being dispers'd about in the several Counties of the Kingdom, where they can never come to have any considerable strength. But some time or other, they may endanger the Government by being suffer'd to remain, such vast Numbers of 'em, here in *London*, where they inhabit all together, at least 30000 Persons in two Quarters of the Town, without inter-marrying with the *English*, or learning our Language, by which Means for several Years to come, they are in a way still to continue Foreigners, and perhaps may have a Foreign Interest and Foreign Inclinations: To permit this, cannot be adviseable or safe. It may therefore be proper to limit any new Acts of Naturalization, with such Restrictions as may make the Accession of Strangers not dangerous to the Publick.

An Accession of Strangers well regulated, may add to our Strength and Numbers; but then it must be compos'd of Labouring Men, Artificers, Merchants and other rich Men, and not of  
Foreign

Foreign Soldiers, since such fright and drive away from a Nation more People than their Troops can well consist of: For if it has been ever seen; that Men abound most where there is most Freedom (*China* excepted, whose Climate excels all others, and where the exercise of the Tyranny is mild and easie) it must follow, that People will in time desert those Countries whose best Flower is their Liberties, if those Liberties are thought Precarious or in Danger. That Foreign Souldiers are dangerous to Liberty, we may produce Examples from all Countries and all Ages; but we shall instance only one, because it is eminent above all the rest.

The *Carthaginians*, in their Wars, did very much use Mercenary and Foreign Troops; and when the Peace was made between them and the *Romans*, after a long Dispute for the Dominion of *Sicily*, they brought their Army home to be Paid and Disbanded, which *Gesco* their General had the Charge of Embarking, who did order all his Part with great Dexterity and Wisdom. But the State of *Carthage* wanting Mony to clear Arrears, and satisfie the Troops, was forc'd to keep them up longer than was design'd. The Army consisted of *Gauls*, *Ligurians*, *Balearians*, *Polybius, Lib. 1.*

*leareans* and *Greeks*. At first they were insolent in their Quarters in *Carthage*, and were prevail'd upon to remove to *Sicca*, where they were to remain and expect their Pay. There they grew presently corrupted with Ease and Pleasure, and fell into Mutinies and Disorder, and to making extravagant demands of Pay and Gratuities; and, in a Rage, with their Arms in their Hands, they march'd Twenty Thousand of them towards *Carthage*, incamping within 15 Miles of the City; and chose *Spendius* and *Matho*, two profligate Wretches for their Leaders, and imprison'd *Gesco* who was deputed to 'em from the Common-wealth. Afterwards they caus'd almost all the *Africans*, their Tributaries, to revolt; They grew in a short time to be 70,000 strong; They fought several Battles with *Hanno* and *Hamilcar Barca*. During these Transactions, the Mercenaries that were in Garrison in *Sardinia* mutinied likewise, murdering their Commander and all the *Carthaginians*; while *Spendius* and *Matho*, to render their Accomplices more desperate, put *Gesco* to a cruel Death, presuming afterwards to lay Siege to *Carthage* it self. They met with a Shock indeed at *Prion*, where 40,000 of them were slaughter'd; but soon after



ter this Battle, in another, they took one of the *Carthaginian* Generals Prisoner, whom they fix'd to a Cross, crucifying thirty of the principal Senators round about him. *Spendius* and *Matho* were at last taken, the one crucified and the other tormented to death: But the War lasted three Years and near four Months with excessive Cruelty; in which the State of *Carthage* lost several Battles, and was often brought within a Hairs breadth of utter Ruin.

If so great a Common-wealth as *Carthage*, though assisted at that time by *Hiero* King of *Syracuse*, and by the *Romans*,<sup>s</sup> ran the hazard of losing their Empire, City and Liberties, by the Insurrection of a handful of Mercenaries, whose first Strength was but 20,000 Men; it should be a warning to all Free Nations, how they suffer Armies so compos'd to be among them; and it should frighten a Wise State from desiring such an Increase of People, as may be had by the bringing over Foreign Souldiers.

Indeed, all Armies whatsoever, if they are over large, tend to the dispeopling of a Country, of which our Neighbour Nation is a sufficient Proof; where in one of the best Climates in *Europe*, Men are wanting to Till the Ground.

For

For Children do not proceed from the intemperate Pleasures taken loosely and at random, but from a regular way of Living, where the Father of the Family desires to rear up and provide for the Off-spring he shall beget.

Securing the Liberties of a Nation, may be laid down as a Fundamental for increasing the Numbers of its People; but there are other Politics thereunto conducting, which no Wise State has ever neglected.

No Race of Men did multiply so fast as the *Jews*, which may be attributed chiefly to the Wisdom of *Moses* their Lawgiver, in contriving to promote the State of Marriage.

The *Romans* had the same Care, paying no Respect to a Man Childless by his own Fault, and giving great Immunities and Priviledges, both in the City and Provinces, to those who had such and such a number of Children. Encouragements of the like kind are also given in *France* to such as enrich the Commonwealth by a large Issue.

But we in *England* have taken another Course, laying a Fine upon the Marriage-Bed, which seems small to those who only contemplate the Pomp and Wealth round about 'em, and in  
their

their View; but they who look into all the different Ranks of Men, are well satisfied that this Duty on Marriages and Births, is a very greivous Burthen upon the poorer Sort, whose Numbers compose the Strength and Wealth of any Nation. This Tax was introduc'd by the Necessity of Affairs. 'Tis difficult to say what may be the Event of a new thing; but if we are to take Measures from past Wisdom, which exempted Prolifick Families from Publick Duties, we should not lay Impositions upon those who find it hard enough to maintain themselves. If this Tax be such a Weight upon the Poor, as to discourage Marriage and hinder Propagation, which seems the Truth, no doubt it ought to be abolish'd; and at a convenient time we ought to change it for some other Duty, if there were only this single Reason, That 'tis so directly opposite to the Polity of all Ages and all Countries.

In order to have Hands to carry on Labour and Manufactures, which must make us Gainers in the Ballance of Trade, we ought not to deterr but rather invite Men to marry, which is to be done by Priviledges and Exemptions, for such a Number of Children, and by denying certain Offices of Trust and Dignities to

D

all

all unmarried Persons; and where 'tis once made a Fashion among those of the better Sort, 'twill quickly obtain with the lower Degree.

See  
Scheme A.

Mr. *King* in his Scheme (for which he has as Authentick Grounds, as perhaps the Matter is capable of) lays down, That the Annual Marriages of *England* are about 41,000, which is one Marriage out of every 134 Persons: Upon which we observe, that this is not a due Proportion, considering how few of our Adult Males (in comparison with other Countries) perish by War or any other Accident; from whence may be infer'd, that our Polity is some way or other Defective, or the Marriages would bear a nearer proportion with the gross Number of our People; for which Defect, if a Remedy can be found, there will be so much more Strength added to the Kingdom.

From the Books of Assessment on Births, Marriages, &c. by the nearest View he can make, he divides the 5,500,000 People into 2,700,000 Males and 2,800,000 Females; from whence (considering the Females exceed the Males in Number, and considering that the Men marry later than Women, and that many of the Males are of Necessity absent in the Wars, at Sea and upon other Business) it follows, that

a large Proportion of the Females remain unmarried, tho' at an Adult Age, which is a dead Loss to the Nation, every Birth being as so much certain Treasure; upon which Accompt, such Laws must be for the Publick Good, as induce all Men to marry whose Circumstances permit it.

From his Division of the People, it may be likewise observ'd, That the near Proportion there is between the Males and Females (which is said to hold also in other Places) is an Argument (and the strongest that can be produc'd) against Poligamy, and the Increase of Mankind, which some think might be from thence expected; for if Nature had intended to one Man a Plurality of Wives, She would have order'd a great many more Female Births than Male, her Designments being always Right and Wise.

The securing the Parish for Bastard-Children, is become so small a Punishment and so easily Compounded, that it very much hinders Marriage. The Dutch compel Men of all Ranks, to marry the Woman whom they have got with Child; and perhaps it would tend to the farther Peopling of *England*, if the Common People here, under such a certain Degree, were condemn'd by some new Law to suffer the same Penalty.

A Country that makes Provision to increase in Inhabitants, whose Situation is good, and whose People have a Genius adapted to Trade, will never fail to be Gainers in the Ballance, provided the Labour and Industry of their People be well manag'd and carefully directed.

The more any Man contemplates these Matters, the more he will come to be of Opinion, That *England* is capable of being render'd one of the strongest Nations, and the richest Spot of Ground in *Europe*.

'Tis not extent of Territory that makes a Country Powerful, but Numbers of Men well employ'd, convenient Ports, a good Navy, and a Soil producing all sort of Commodities. The Materials for all this we have, and so improveable, that if we did but second the Gifts of Nature, with our own Industry, we should soon arrive to a pitch of Greatness, that would put us at least upon an equal Foot with any of our Neighbours.

If we had the Complement of Men, our Land can maintain and nourish; If we had as much Trade as our Stock and Knowledge in Sea Affairs is capable of embracing; If we had such a Naval Strength as a Trade so extended would easily produce; and, if we had those Stores  
and

and that Wealth which is the certain Result of a large and well govern'd Traffick, what humane Strength could hurt or invade us? On the contrary, should we not be in a posture not only to resist, but to give the Law to others?

Our Neighbouring Common-wealth has not in Territory above Eight Millions of Acres, and perhaps not much above two Millions two Hundred Thousand People; and yet what a Figure have they made in *Europe* for these last hundred Years? What Wars have they maintain'd? What Forces have they resisted? and to what a height of Power are they now come, and all by good Order and wise Government?

They are liable to frequent Invasions; They labour under the Inconvenience and danger of bad Ports; They consume immense Sums every Year to defend their Land against the Sea; all which Difficulties they have subdu'd by an unwearied Industry.

We are fenc'd by Nature against Foreign Enemies; Our Ports are safe; We fear no Irruptions of the Sea; Our Land Territory at home is at least 39 Millions of Acres; We have in all likelihood not less than Five Millions and a half of People; what a Nation might we then become, if all

these Advantages were thoroughly improv'd, and if a right Application were made of all this Strength, and of these Numbers?

They who apprehend the immoderate growth of any Prince or State, may perhaps succeed by beginning first, and by attempting to pull down such a dangerous Neighbour, but very often their good Designs are disappointed. In all appearance they proceed more safely, who under such a fear make themselves strong and powerful at home. And this was the Course which *Philip*, King of *Macedon*, the Father of *Perseus*, took, when he thought to be invaded by the *Romans*.

The Greatness of *Rome* gave *Carthage* very anxious Thoughts, and it rather seems that they enter'd into the second Punick War, more for fear the *Romans* should have the Universal Empire, than out of any Ambition to Lord it themselves over the whole World. Their Design was virtuous, and peradventure wise to endeavour at some early Interruption to a Rival that grew so fast: However we see they miscarry'd, tho' their Armies were led by *Hannibal*. But Fortune which had determin'd the Dominion of the Earth for *Rome*, did perhaps lead them into the fatal Council of passing the *Eber*, contrary



trary to the Articles of Peace concluded with *Asdrubal*, and of Attacking *Saguntum*, before they had sufficiently recover'd of the Wounds they had suffer'd in the Wars about *Sicily*, *Sardinia*, and with their own Rebels. If the high Courage of *Hannibal* had not driven the Commonwealth into a new War, while it was yet faint and weak, and if they had been suffer'd to pursue their Victories in *Spain*, and to get firm footing in that Rich Warlike and then Populous Country, very probably in a few Years they might have been a more equal Match for the *Roman* People. 'Tis true, if the *Romans* had endeavour'd at the Conquest of *Spain*, and if they had disturb'd the *Carthaginians* in that Country, the War must have been unavoidable, because it was evident in that Age, and will be apparent in the Times we live in, that whatever Foreign Power already grown great, can add to its dominion the Possession of *Spain*, will stand fair for Universal Empire.

But unless some such Cogent Reason of State, as is here instanc'd, intervene, in all appearance the best way for a Nation that apprehends the growing Power of any Neighbour, is to fortifie it self within; we do not mean by Land Armies, which rather debilitate than strengthen a

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Country,

Country, but by Potent Navies, by Thrift in the Publick Treasure, Care of the Peoples Trade, and all the other honest and useful Arts of Peace.

By such an Improvement of our Native Strength, agreeable to the Laws and to the Temper of a Free Nation, *England* without doubt may be brought to so good a Posture and Condition of defending it self, as not to apprehend any Neighbour jealous of its Strength, or envious of its Greatness.

And to this end we open these Schemes, That a Wise Government under which we live, not having any Designs to become Arbitrary, may see what Materials they have to work upon, and how far our Native Wealth is able to second their good Intentions of preserving us a rich and a free People.

Having said something of the Number of our Inhabitants, we shall proceed to discourse of their different Degrees and Ranks, and to examin who are a Burthen and who a Profit to the Publick ; for by how much every Part and Member of the Common-wealth can be made useful to the whole, by so much a Nation will be more and more a Gainer in this Ballance of Trade which we are to treat of.

Mr.

Mr. *King*, from the Assessments on Births and Marriages, and from the Polls, has form'd the Scheme here incerted, of the Ranks, Degrees, Titles and Qualifications of the People. He has done it so Judiciously, and upon such Grounds, that 'tis well worth the careful Perusal of any Curious Person; from thence we shall make some Observations in order to put our present Matter in a clearer Light.

First, This Scheme detects their Error, who in the Calculations they frame, contemplate nothing but the Wealth and Plenty they see in rich Cities and great Towns, and from thence make a Judgment of the Kingdoms remaining Part; and from this View conclude, That Taxes and Payments to the Publick do mostly arise from the Gentry and better sort, by which Measures they neither contrive their Imposition aright, nor are they able to give a true Estimate what it shall produce; but when we have divided the Inhabitants of *England* into their proper Classes, it will appear that the Nobility and Gentry are but a small Part of the whole Body of the People.

Believing that Taxes fall chiefly upon the better Sort, they care not what they lay, as thinking they will not be felt; but when they come to be levy'd, they  
either

either fall short, and so run the Publick into an immense Debt, or they light so heavily upon the Poorer Sort, as to occasion insufferable Clamours; and they whose proper Business it was to contrive these Matters better, have been so unskilful, that the Legislative Power has been more than once compell'd for the Peoples ease to give new Fonds, instead of others that had been ill projected.

This may be generally said, That all Duties whatsoever upon the Consumption, of a large Produce, fall with the greatest weight upon the Common Sort: So that such as think in new Duties that they chiefly tax the Rich, will find themselves quite mistaken; for either their Fond must yield little, or it must arise from the whole Body of the People, of which the Richer Sort are but a small Proportion.

And tho' War, and National Debts and Engagements, might heretofore very rationally plead for Excises upon our Home-Consumption; yet now there is a Peace, it is the concern of every Man that loves his Country, to proceed warily in laying new ones, and to get off those which are already laid as fast as ever he can. High Customs and high Excises both together are incompatible, either of  
them

them alone are to be endur'd, but to have them co-exist is suffer'd in no well govern'd Nation. If Materials of Foreign growth were at an easie rate, a high Price might be the better born in things of our own Product, but to have both dear at once (and by reason of the Duties laid upon them) is ruinous to the inferior Rank of Men; and this ought to weigh more with us, when we consider that even of the Common People, a Sub-division is to be made, of which one part subsist from their own Havings, Arts, Labour and Industry; and the other Part subsist a little from their own Labour, but chiefly from the Help and Charity of the Rank that is above them. For according to Mr. *King's* Scheme,

The Nobility and Gentry, with their Families and Retainers, the Persons in See Scheme D. Offices, Merchants, Persons in the Law, the Clergy, Free-holders, Farmers, Persons in Sciences and Liberal Arts, Shopkeepers and Tradesmen, Handicrafts Men, Naval Officers, with the Families and Dependants upon all these altogether, make up the Number of ——— 2,675,520 Heads.

The

Brought over ——— 2,675,520 Heads.

The Common Sea- men, Comon Soldiers, Labouring People and Out-Servants, Cotta- gers, Paupers, and their Families, with the Vagrants, make up the number of ———	}	2,825,000 Heads.
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In all, 5,500,520 Heads.

So that here seems a Majority of the People, whose chief dependance and subsistence is from the other Part, which Majority is much greater, in respect of the Number of Families, because 500,000 Families contribute to the support of 850,000 Families. In Contemplation of which, great Care should be taken not to lay new Duties upon the Home-Consumption, unless upon the extreamest Necessities of the State; for tho' such Impositions cannot be said to fall directly upon the lower Rank, whose Poverty hinders them from consuming such Materials (tho' there are few Excises, to which the meanest Person does not pay something) yet indirectly, and by unavoidable Consequences, they are rather more affected by high Duties upon our Home-Consumption, than the Wealthier Degree of People, and

and so we shall find the Case to be, if we look carefully into all the distinct Ranks of Men there enumerated.

First, As to the Nobility and Gentry, they must of necessity retrench their Families and Expences, if excessive Impositions are laid upon all sorts of Materials for Consumption ; from whence follows, That the Degree below them of Merchants, Shop-keepers, Tradesmen and Artizans, must want Employment.

Secondly, As to the Manufactures, high Excises in time of Peace, are utterly destructive to that principal Part of *England's* Wealth ; for if Malt, Coals, Salt, Leather, and other things bear a great Price, the Wages of Servants, Workmen and Artificers, will consequently rise, for the Income must bear some proportion with the Expence ; and if such as set the Poor to work, find Wages for Labour, or Manufacture advance upon them, they must rise in the Price of their Commodity, or they cannot live ; all which would signify little, if nothing but our own Dealings among one another were thereby affected ; but it has a Consequence far more pernicious in relation to our Foreign Trade, for 'tis the Exportation of our own Product that must make *England* rich ; to be Gainers in the Ballance of Trade,

Trade, we must carry out of our own Product, what will purchase the Things of Foreign Growth that are needful for our own Consumption, with some Overplus either in Bullion or Goods to to be sold in other Countries; which Overplus is the Profit a Nation makes by Trade, and it its more or less according to the natural Frugality of the People that Export, or as from the low Price of Labour and Manufacture they can afford the the Commodity cheap, and at a rate not to be under-fold in Foreign Markets. The Dutch, whose Labour and Manufactures are dear, by reason of Home-Excises, can notwithstanding sell cheap abroad, because this disadvantage they labour under is ballanc'd by the Parsimonious Temper of their People: But in *England*, where this Frugality is hardly to be introduc'd, if the Duties upon our Home-Consumption are so large as to raise considerably the price of Labour and Manufacture, all our Commodities for Exportation must by degrees so advance in the prime Value, that they cannot be sold at a rate which will give 'em Vent in Foreign Markets; and we must be every where under-fold by our wiser Neighbours. But the Consequence of such Duties in times of Peace, will fall most heavily



vily upon our Woollen Manufactures, of which most have more Value from the Workmanship than the Material; and if the Price of this Workmanship be enhanced, it will in a short Course of time put a Necessity upon those we deal with of setting up Manufactures of their own, such as they can, or of buying Goods of the like Kind and Use from Nations that can afford them cheaper. And in this Point we are to consider, that the Bulk of our Woollen Exports does not consist in Draperies made of the fine Wool, peculiar to our Soil, but is compos'd of course broad Cloaths, such as *Yorkshire* Cloaths, Kerfies, which make a great part of our Exports; and may be, and are made of a courser Wool, which is to be had in other Countries: So that we are not singly to value our selves upon the Material, but also upon the Manufacture, which we should make as easie as we can, by not laying over heavy Burthens upon the Manufacturer: And our Woollen Goods being two thirds of our Foreign Exports, it ought to be the chief Object of the Publick Care, if we expect to be Gainers in the Ballance of Trade, which is what we hunt after in these Inquiries.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, As to the lower Rank of all, which we compute at 2,825,000 Heads, a Majority of the whole People, their principal Subsistence is upon the Degrees above them; and if those are render'd uneasie, these must share in the Calamity, but even of this inferiour Sort, no small Proportion contribute largely to Excises, as Labourers and Out-Servants, which likewise affect the Common Seamen, who must thereupon raise their Wages, or they will not have wherewithal to keep their Families left at Home; and the high Wages of Seamen is another Burthen upon our Foreign Traffick. As to the Cottagers, who are above a fifth Part of the whole People, some Duties reach even them, as those upon Malt, Leather and Salt, but not much because of their slender Consumption; but if the Gentry, upon whose Woods and Gleanings they live, and who employ 'em in Day Labour; and if the Manufacturers, for whom they Card and Spin, are over-burthen'd with Duties, they cannot afford to give them so much for their Labour and Handy-work; nor to yield them those other Reliefs which are their principal Subsistence, for want of which, these miserable Wretches must perish with Cold and Hunger.

Thus

Thus we see Excises either directly or indirectly, fall upon the whole Body of the People; but we do not take notice of these Matters, as receding from our former Opinion: On the contrary, we still think them the most easie and equal way of Taxing a Nation; and perhaps it is demonstrable, that if we had fallen into this Method at the beginning of the War, of raising the Year's Expence within the Year, by Excises, *England* had not been now indebted so many Millions; but what was adviseable, under such a Necessity and Danger, is not to be persued in times of Peace, especially in a Country depending so much upon Trade and Manufactures.

Our Study now ought to be how those Debts may be speedily clear'd off, for which these new Revenues are the Fonds, that Trade may again move freely as it did heretofore, without such a heavy Clogg; but this Point we shall more amply handle, when we come to speak of our Payments to the Publick.

Mr. *King* divides the whole Body of the People, into two Principal Classes, *viz.*

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*In-*

See  
Scheme D.

Increasing the  
Wealth of the } 2,675,520 Heads.  
Kingdom, ——— }

Decreasing the  
Wealth of the } 2,825,000 Heads.  
Kingdom, ——— }

By which he means, That the First Class of the People, from Land, Arts and Industry, maintain themselves, and add every Year something to the Nation's General Stock; and besides this, out of their Superfluity, contribute every Year so much to the maintainance of Others.

That of the Second Class, some partly maintain themselves by Labour (as the Heads of the Cottage Families) but that the rest, as most of the Wives and Children of these, sick and impotent People, idle Beggars and Vagrants, are nourish'd at the Cost of Others; and are a Yearly Burthen to the Publick, consuming Annually so much as would be otherwise added to the Nation's general Stock.

The Bodies of Men are without doubt the most valuable Treasure of a Country; and in their Sphere, the ordinary People are as serviceable to the Common-wealth as the rich, if they are employ'd in honest Labour

Labour and useful Arts: And such being more in Number, do more contribute to increase the Nation's Wealth, than the higher Rank.

But a Country may be Populous and yet Poor (as were the ancient *Gauls* and *Seythians*) so that Numbers, unless they are well employ'd, make the Body Politick big, but unweildy, strong but unactive, as to any Uses of good Government.

Their's is a wrong Opinion, who think all Mouths profit a Country that consume its Product: And it may be more truly affirm'd, That he who does not some way serve the Common-wealth, either by being employ'd, or by employing Others, is not only a useles, but a hurtful Member to it.

As it is Charity, and what we indeed owe to Humane Kind, to make Provision for the Aged, the Lame, the Sick, Blind and Impotent: So 'tis a Justice we owe to the Common-wealth, not to suffer such as have Health, and who might maintain themselves, to be Drones, and live upon the Labour of Others.

The Bulk of such as are a Burthen to the Publick, consists in the Cottagers and Paupers, Beggars in great Cities and Towns, and Vagrants.

Upon a Survey of the Hearth Books, made in *Michaelmas*, 1685. it was found that of the 1,300,000 Houses in the whole Kingdom, those of one Chimney amounted to 554,631; but some of these having Land about them, in all our Calculations, we have computed the Cottagers but at 500,000 Families. But of these, a large Number, may get their own Livelihood, and are no Charge to the Parish, for which Reason Mr. *King* very judiciously computes his *Cottagers and Paupers*, decreasing the *Wealth of the Nation*, but at 400,000 Families; in which Accompt, he includes the poor Houses in Cities, Towns and Villages, besides which he reckons 30,000 Vagrants; and all these together, to make up 1,330,000 Heads.

This is a very great Proportion of the People to be a Burthen upon the other Part, and is a Weight upon the Land-Interest; of which the Landed Gentlemen must certainly be very sensible.

If this vast Body of Men, instead of being Expensive, could be render'd Beneficial to the Common-wealth, it were a Work no doubt highly to be promoted by all who love their Country.

It seems evident to such as have consider'd these Matters, and who have observ'd how they are order'd in Nations  
under

under a good Polity, that the Number of such who through Age or Impotence stand in real need of Relief, is but small and might be maintain'd for very little; and that the Poor Rates are swell'd to the extravagant degree we now see 'em at, by two sorts of People, One of which, by Reason of our slack Administration, is suffer'd to remain in Sloth; and the Other, through a Defect in our Constitution, continue in wretched Poverty for want of Employment, tho' willing enough to undertake it.

All this seems capable of a Remedy, the Laws may be arm'd against voluntary Idleness, so as to prevent it; and a way may probably be found out to set those to Work who are desirous to support themselves by their own Labour: And if this could be brought about, it would not only put a stop to the Course of that Vice which is the Consequence of an idle Life, but it would greatly tend to enrich the Common-wealth; for if the Industry of not half the People maintains in some degree the other part; and besides, in times of Peace did add every Year near two Millions and a half to the general Stock of *England*; to what pitch of Wealth and Greatness might we not be brought, if one Limb were not suffer'd

to draw away the Nourishment of the other; and if all the Members of the Body Politick were render'd useful to it.

Nature, in her Contrivances, has made every part of a living Creature either for Ornament or Use; the same should be in a Politick Institution rightly Govern'd.

It may be laid down for an undeniable Truth, That where all work no body will want; and to promote this, would be a greater Charity and more Meritorious, than to build Hospitals, which very often are but so many Monuments of ill-gotten Riches, attended with late Repentance.

To make as many as possible of these 1,330,000 Persons (whereof not above 330,000 are Children too young to work) who now live chiefly upon others, get themselves a large share of their Maintenance, would be the opening a new Vein of Treasure of some Millions Sterling *per Annum*; it would be a present Ease to every particular Man of Substance, and a lasting Benefit to the whole Body of the Kingdom: For it would not only nourish but increase the Numbers of the People, of which many Thousands perish every Year, by those Diseases contracted under a slothful Poverty.



Our Laws relating to the Poor are very numerous, and this Matter has employ'd the Care of every Age for a long time, tho' but with little success, partly through the ill Execution, and partly through some defect in the very Laws.

The Corruptions of Mankind are grown so great, that, now a-days, Laws are not much observ'd, which do not in a manner execute themselves; of this Nature are those Laws which relate to bringing in the Prince's Revenue, which never fail to be put in Execution, because the People must pay, and the Prince will be paid; but where only one part of the Constitution, the People, are immediately concern'd, as in Laws relating to the Poor, the High-ways, Assizes, and other Civil Oeconomy, and good Order in the State, those are but slenderly regarded.

The Publick Good being therefore, very often, not a Motive strong enough to engage the Magistrate to perform his Duty, Law-givers have many times fortify'd their Laws with Penalties, wherein private Persons may have a Profit, thereby to stir up the People to put the Laws in Execution.

In Countries deprav'd, nothing proceeds well, wherein particular Men do not one way or other find their Accompr,

and rather than a Publick Good should not go on at all; without doubt, 'tis better to give Private Men some Interest to set it forward.

For which Reason, it may be worth the Consideration of such as study the Prosperity and Welfare of *England*, whether this great Engine of maintaining the Poor, and finding them Work and Employment, may not be put in Motion by giving some Body of Undertakers a reasonable Gain to put the Machine upon its Wheels.

In Order to which, we shall here incert a Proposal deliver'd to the House of Commons last Session of Parliament, for the better maintaining the Impotent, and employing and setting to Work the other Poor of this Kingdom.

In Matters of this Nature, 'tis always good to have some Model or Plan laid down, which thinking Men may contemplate, alter and correct, as they see occasion; And the Writer of these Papers does rather chuse to offer this Scheme, because he is satisfy'd it was compos'd by a Gentleman of great Abilities, and who has made both the Poor Rates, and their Number, more his study than any other Person in the Nation. The Proposal is as follows.

*A Scheme*

*A Scheme for setting the Poor to Work.*

**F**irst, That such Persons as shall subscribe and pay the Sum of 300,000 *l.* as a Stock for and towards the better maintaining the Impotent Poor, and for buying Commodities and Materials to employ and set at Work the other Poor, be Incorporated and made one Body Politick, &c. By the Name of the Governor and Company, for maintaining and employing the Poor of this Kingdom.

By all former Propositions, it was intended that the Parishes should advance several Years Rates to raise a Stock, but by this Proposal the Experiment is to be made by Private Persons at their Risk; and 300,000 *l.* may be judg'd a very good Stock, which added to the Poor Rates for a certain number of Years, will be a very good Fond for buying Commodities and Materials for a Million of Money at any time. This Subscription ought to be free for every Body, and if the Sum were subscrib'd in the several Counties of *England* and *Wales*, in Proportion to their Poor Rates, or the Monthly Assessment, it would be most convenient; and Provision may be made, That no Person shall transfer his Interest but to one of the same County,

County, which will keep the Interest there during the Term ; and as to its being one Corporation, 'tis presum'd this will be most beneficial to the Publick. For first, All Disputes on Removes, which are very chargeable and burthensome, will be at an end, this Proposal intending, that wherever the Poor are, they shall be maintain'd or employ'd. Secondly, It will prevent one County which shall be diligent, imposing on their Neighbours who may be negligent, or getting away their Manufactures from them. Thirdly, In Case of Fire, Plague, or loss of Manufacture, the Stock of one County may not be sufficient to support the Places where such Calamities may happen; and 'tis necessary the whole Body should support every particular Member, so that hereby there will be a general Care to administer to every Place according to their Necessities.

Secondly, That the said Corporation be establish'd for the Term of one and twenty Years.

The Corporation ought to be establish'd for one and twenty Years, or otherwise it cannot have the benefit the Law gives in Case of Infants, which is their Service for their Education ; besides, it will be some Years before a matter of this Nature can be brought into Practice.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, That the said Sum of 300,000 *l.* be paid in, and laid out for the Purposes aforesaid, to remain as a Stock for and during the said Term of one and twenty Years.

The Subscription ought to be taken at the Passing of the Act, but the Corporation to be left at liberty, to begin either the *Michaelmas* or the *Lady-Day* after, as they shall think fit. And <sup>per</sup> Cent. to be paid at the subscribing to Persons appointed for that purpose, and the remainder before they begin to Act; but so as 300,000 *l.* shall be always in Stock during the Term, notwithstanding any Dividends or other Disposition: And an Account thereof to be exhibited twice in every Year upon Oath, before the Lord Chancellor for the time being.

Fourthly, That the said Corporation do by themselves, or Agents in every Parish of *England*, from and after the Day of during the said Term of one and twenty Years, provide for the real Impotent Poor good and sufficient Maintainance and Reception, as good or better than hath at any time within the space of Years before the said Day of been provided or allow'd to such Impotent Poor, and so shall continue to provide for such Impotent

potent Poor, and what other growing Impotent Poor shall happen in the said Parish during the said Term.

By Impotent Poor is to be understood all Infants and old and decrepid Persons not able to Work; also Persons who by Sickness or any Accident are for the time unable to labour for themselves or Families; and all Persons (not being fit for Labour) who were usually reliev'd by the Money rais'd for the use of the Poor; they shall have Maintenance, &c. as good or better, as within Years they us'd to have.

This does not directly determine what that shall be, nor is it possible, by reason a Shilling in one County is as much as two in another; but it will be the Interest of the Corporation that such Poor be well provided for, by reason the contrary will occasion all the Complaints or Clamour that probably can be made against the Corporation.

Fifthly, That the Corporation do provide (as well for all such Poor which on the said Day of shall be on the Poor Books, as for what other growing Poor shall happen in the said Term, who are or shall be able to labour or do any work) sufficient Labour and Work proper for such Persons to be employ'd

ploy'd in. And that Provision shall be made for such labouring Persons according to their Labour, so as such Provision doth not exceed  $\frac{1}{4}$  parts, as much as any other Person would have paid for such Labour. And in Case they are not employ'd and set to work, then such Persons shall, until Materials or Labour be provided for them, be maintain'd as Impotent Poor; but so as such Persons who shall hereafter enter themselves on the Poor's Books, being able to Labour, shall not quit the Service of the Corporation, without leave, for the space of six Months.

The Corporation are to provide Materials and Labour for all that can work, and to make Provision for them, not exceeding  $\frac{1}{4}$  parts as much as any other Person would give for such Labour. For Example, if another Person would give one of these a Shilling, the Corporation ought to give but Nine Pence. And the Reason is plain, First, Because the Corporation will be oblig'd to maintain them and their Families in all Exigences, which others are not oblig'd to do, and consequently they ought not to allow so much as others. Secondly, In Case any Persons able to Labour, shall come to the Corporation, when their Agents are not prepar'd

par'd with Materials to employ them, by this Propofal, they are to allow them full Provision as Impotent Poor, until they find them Work, which is intirely in favour of the Poor. Thirdly, It is neither reasonable nor poffible for the Corporation to provide Materials upon every Occafion, for fuch Persons as fhall be enter'd with them, unlefs they can be fecure of fuch Persons to work up thofe Materials; befides, without this Provision, all the labouring People of *England* will play faft and loofe between their Employers and the Corporation, for as they are difoblig'd by one, they will run to the other, and fo neither fhall be fure of them.

Sixthly, That no Impotent Poor fhall be remov'd out of the Parifh where they dwell, but upon notice in Writing given to the Church-wardens or Overfeers of the faid Parifh, to what place of Provision he or fhe is remov'd.

It is judg'd the beft Method to provide for the Impotent Poor in Houfes prepar'd for that purpofe, where proper Provision may be made for feveral, with all Necefaries of Care and Maintenance. So that in fome places one Houfe will ferve the Impotent Poor of feveral Parifhes, in which Cafe the Parifh ought to know where to refort, to fee if good Provision be made for them.

Seventh-



Seventhly, That in case Provision be not made for the Poor of each Parish, in manner as aforesaid, (upon due notice given to the Agents of the Corporation) the said Parish may order their Poor to be maintain'd, and deduct the Sum by by them expended out of the next Payments to be made to the said Corporation by the said Parish.

In case any Accident happens in a Parish, either by Sickness, Fall, Casualty of Fire, or otherways; and that the Agent of the Corporation is not present to provide for them, or having notice doth not immediately do it, the Parish may do it, and deduct so much out of the next Payment; but there must be Provision made for the notice, and in what time the Corporation shall provide for them.

Eighthly, That the said Corporation shall have and receive for the said one and twenty Years, That is to say, from every Parish Yearly, so much as such Parish paid in any One Year, to be computed by a Medium of Seven Years; namely, from the 25th of *March*, 1690. to the 25th of *March*, 1697. and to be paid half Yearly; and besides, shall receive the Benefit of the Revenues of all Donations given to any Parish, or which shall be given during the said Term, and all

all Forfeitures which the Law gives to the Use of the Poor; and to all other Sums which were usually collected by the Parish, for the maintainance of the Poor.

Whatever was rais'd for or apply'd to the Use of the Poor, ought to be paid over to the Corporation; and where there are any Donations for maintaining the Poor, it will answer the Design of the Donor, by reason there will be better Provision for the maintainance of the Poor than ever; and if that maintainance be so good, as to induce further Charities, no doubt the Corporation ought to be entitled to them: But there are two Objections to this Article; First, That to make a Medium by a time of War is unreasonable. Secondly, To continue the whole Tax for One and Twenty Years, does not seem to give any Benefit to the Kingdom in that time. To the First, It is true, we have a Peace, but Trade is lower now than at any time during the War, and the Charge of the Poor greater; and when Trade will mend, is very uncertain. To the Second, It is very plain, that although the Charge may be the same to a Parish in the Total, yet it will be less to particular Persons, because those who before receiv'd Alms, will now be enabled to be Contributors; but besides,

besides, the turning so many hundred thousand Pounds a Year (which in a manner have hitherto been apply'd only to support Idleness) into Industry; and the employing so many other idle Vagrants and sturdy Beggars, with the Product of their Labour, will altogether be a present Benefit to the Lands of *England*, as well in the Rents as in the Value: And further, the accidental Charities in the Streets and at Doors, is, by a very modest Computation, over and above the Poor Rates, at least 300,000 *l. per Annum*, which will be intirely sav'd by this Proposal, and the Persons set at work; which is a further Consideration for its being well receiv'd, since the Corporation are not allow'd any thing for this Service.

The greater the Encouragement is, the better the Work will be perform'd; and it will become the Wisdom of the Parliament in what they do, to make it effectual; for should such an Undertaking as this prove ineffectual, instead of remedying it, will increase the Mischiefs.

Ninthly, That all the Laws made for the Provision of the Poor, and for punishing idle Vagrant Persons be repeal'd, and one Law made to continue such parts as are found useful, and to add such other Restrictions, Penalties and Provisions as  
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may effectually attain the End of this great Work.

The Laws hereunto relating are numerous, but the Judgment and Opinions given upon them are so various and contradictory, and differ so in sundry places, as to be inconsistent with any one general Scheme of Management.

Tenthly, That proper Persons be appointed in every County to determine all Matters and Differences which may arise between the Corporation and the respective Parishes.

To prevent any ill Usage, Neglect or Cruelty, it will be necessary to make Provision that the Poor may tender their Complaints to Officers of the Parish; and that those Officers having examin'd the same, and not finding Redress, may apply to Persons to be appointed in each County and each City for that purpose, who may be call'd Supervisors of the Poor, and may have Allowance made them for their Trouble; and their Business may be to examine the Truth of such Complaints; and in case either the Parish or Corporation judge themselves agriev'd by the Determination of the said Supervisors, Provision may be made that an Appeal lie to the Quarter Sessions.

Eleventhly,

Eleventhly, That the Corporation be oblig'd to provide for all publick Beggars, and to put the Laws in Execution against publick Beggars and idle vagrant Persons.

Such of the publick Beggars as can work must be employ'd, the rest to be maintain'd as impotent Poor; but the Laws to be severely put in Execution against those who shall ask any publick Alms.

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**T**HIS Proposal, which in most parts of it seems to be very maturely weigh'd, may be a Foundation for those to build upon, who have a publick Spirit large enough to embrace such a noble Undertaking.

But the common Obstruction to any thing of this Nature, is a malignant Temper in some who will not let a publick Work go on, if private Persons are to be Gainers by it: When they are to get themselves, they abandon all Sense of Virtue, but are cloath'd in her whitest Robe; when they smell Profit coming to another, masking themselves with a false Zeal to the Common-wealth, where their own Turn is not to be serv'd. It were better indeed, that Men would serve their Country for the Praise and Honour that follow good Actions; but this is not to

be expected in a Nation, at least leaning towards Corruption; and in such an Age 'tis as much as we can hope for, if the Prospect of some honest Gain invites People to do the Publick faithful Service. For which Reason, in any Undertaking where it can be made apparent that a great Benefit will accrue to the Common-wealth in general, we ought not to have an evil Eye upon what fair Advantages particular Men may thereby expect to Reap, still taking care to keep their Appetite of getting within moderate Bounds, laying all just and reasonable Restraints upon it, and making due Provision that they may not wrong or oppress their Fellow Subjects.

'Tis not to be deny'd, but that if fewer Hands were suffer'd to remain idle, and if the Poor had full Employment, it would greatly tend to the Common Welfare, and contribute much towards adding every Year to the general Stock of *England*.

Among the Methods that we have here propos'd of Employing the Poor, and making the whole Body of the People useful to the Publick: We think it our Duty to mind those who consider the Common Welfare of looking with a compassionate Eye into the Prisons of this Kingdom, where

where many Thousands consume their Time in Vice and Idleness; wasting the Remainder of their Fortunes, or lavishing the Substance of their Creditors, eating Bread and doing no Work, which is contrary to good Order, and pernicious to the Common-wealth.

We cannot therefore but recommend the Thoughts of some good Bill that may effectually put an end to this Mischief so scandalous in a Trading Country, which should let no Hands remain useless.

'Tis not all difficult to contrive such a Bill as may Relieve and Release the Debtor, and yet preserve to his Creditors all their fair, just and honest Rights and Interest.

And having in this Matter endeavour'd to show that to preserve and increase the People, and to make their Numbers useful, are Methods conducing to make us Gainers in the Ballance of Trade, we shall proceed to handle the second Head.

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S E C T. III.

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## Of the Land of England, and its Product.

I N treating of this Matter, we shall again produce one of Mr. *King's* Schemes, which are all of them so accurately done, that we may venture to say they are not to be contraverted in any Point so material as to destroy the Foundation of those Reasonings, which the Writer of these Papers, or any other Person shall form upon them.

He computes that *England* and *Wales* contain 39 Millions of Acres, according to the following Scheme.

*Vide* Scheme E.

Scheme



## Scheme E.

Arable Land,	_____	_____	9,00
Pasture and Meadow,	_____	_____	12,00
Woods and Coppices,	_____	_____	3,00
Forests, Parks and Commons,	_____	_____	3,00
Heaths, Moors, Mountains, and barren Land,	_____	_____	} 10,00
Houses and Homesteads, Gardens and Or- chards, Churches and Church-yards,	_____	_____	
Rivers, Lakes, Meers and Ponds,	_____	_____	} 1,00
Roads, Ways, and waft Land,	_____	_____	
In all			39,00

So the yearly Rents or Value of the Land is	_____	_____	10,00
The Houses and Buildings	_____	_____	2,00
All other Hereditaments	_____	_____	1,00
Personal Estates, such as have been reach'd in the 4 s. Aids	_____	_____	} 1,00
In all			14,00

So that whereas the Tax of 4 s. *per* Po  
 produc'd but \_\_\_\_\_  
 It should produce, if duly Assess'd

Place this Scheme p. 70.

	Acres	Value per l. s.
—	9,000,000	0—5—
—	12,000,000	0—8—
—	3,000,000	0—5—
—	3,000,000	0—3—
and barren }	10,000,000	0—1—
s and Or- }	1,000,000	The Lan
yards, }		The Buil
, —	500,000	0—2—
—	500,000	0—0—
In all —	39,000,000	about 6—

	True Year- ly Value. l.	Value, as to the 4s. l.
the Land is	10,000,000	6,500,000
—	2,000,000	1,500,000
—	1,000,000	500,000
e been }	1,000,000	550,000
— }		
In all —	14,000,000	9,050,000

of 4 s. *per* Pound, one Aid with another

Affess'd

ue per Acre.

s. d.

5--6

8--8

5--0

3--8

1--0

e Land

e Buildings

2--0

0--0

ut 6--2

Rent.

l.

2,480,000

5,200,000

750,000

570,000

500,000

450,000

2,000,000

50,000

12,000,000

ue, as rated  
the 4s. Tax.

l.

500,000

500,000

500,000

550,000

050,000

Produce of  
the 4s. Tax

l.

1,300,000

300,000

100,000

100,000

1,800,000

n another, has ?

1,800,000

2,800,000



# S C H E M E F.

*The Produce of the Arable Land, be thus Estimated  
in a Year of moderate Plenty.*

	Bushels	per Bushel s. d.	Value.
Wheat	14,000,000	at 3-6	2,450,000
Rye	10,000,000	at 2-6	1,250,000
Barly	27,000,000	at 2-0	2,700,000
Oats	16,000,000	at 1-6	1,200,000
Peafe	7,000,000	at 2-6	875,000
Beans	4,000,000	at 2-6	500,000
Verches	1,000,000	at 2-0	100,000
In all	79,000,000	at 2-3½	9,075,000

*Of the Land of England,*

This is only the Neat Produce, exclusive of the Seed, Corn, which in some sorts of Grain being near  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the Produce, and in others  $\frac{1}{2}$  may in general be reckon'd about 11 Millions of Bushels more, which makes the whole Produce to be 90 Millions of Bushels, which at 2 s. 3  $\frac{1}{2}$  d. *per* Bushel in Common, is about 10,338,600 *l.*

*Note,* That this Value is what the same is worth upon the Spot where the Corn grew; but this Value is increas'd by the Carriage to the Place where it is at last spent, at least  $\frac{1}{4}$  part more.

These 79 Millions of Bushels of Grain are the Product of 8 of the 9 Millions of Acres of Arable Land; the other Million of Acres producing Hemp, Flax, Woad, Saffron, Rape, Hops, dying Weeds, &c. the Value of the Product thereof may be about One Million Sterling.

So that the Rent of the Corn-Land being about 2,200,000 *l. per Annum*, and the Neat Produce thereof above 9,000,000 *l.* the Produce is full four Rents.

But deducting  $\frac{1}{11}$  part of the Neat Produce, or 700,000 *l.* in lieu of Tyths, there remains 8,375,000 *l.* or three Rents, and near  $\frac{3}{10}$ .

Now

Now the Rents or yearly Value of the Pasture and Meadows, Woods, Coppices, Forrests, Parks, Commons, Heaths, Moors, Mountains and Barren Land, being about 7,000,000 *l*.

The Produce being but 12,000,000 *l*. does not make fully two Rents, there being little Charge either in cultivating the Land, or gathering the Product thereof comparatively to what there is in the Arable Land.

---

*This*

*This Produce is principally in and by Cattle,  
Hay, Timber, and Fire-wood.*

The Produce by Cattle, in	L.
Butter, Cheefe and Milk,	2,500,000
may be, about	
The Value of the Wool	2,000,000
yearly shorn, about	
The Value of the Horses	250,000
yearly bred, about	
The Value of the Flesh	3,350,000
yearly spent, as Food, about	
The Value of the Tallow	600,000
and Hides of the Cattle, a-	
bout	
The Value of Hay yearly	1,300,000
consum'd by Horses, about	
The Hay yearly consum'd	1,000,000
by other Cattle, about	
The Timber yearly fell'd	500,000
for Building and such Uses,	
about	
The Wood yearly spent	500,000
in Firing and petty Uses,	
about	
<hr/>	
So the Produce (including	
1 Million in Hay spent by	12,000,000
Cattle) may be in all	



## S C H E M E G.

S

*An Estimate of the Live Stock of the Nation.*

	Yearly Bread or Increase	The whole Stock	Value of each besides the Skin	Value of the Stock.
			l. s. d.	l.
Beeves, Steers, and Calves	800,000	4,500,000	2 - 00 - 00	9,000,000
Sheep and Lambs	3,600,000	12,000,000	0 - 07 - 04	4,400,000
Swine and Piggs	1,300,000	2,000,000	0 - 16 - 00	1,600,000
Deer and Fawns	20,000	100,000	2 - 00 - 00	200,000
Goats and Kids	10,000	50,000	0 - 10 - 00	25,000
Hares and Leverets	12,000	24,000	0 - 01 - 06	1,800
Rabbits and Conies	2,000,000	1,000,000	0 - 00 - 05	20,833

*and its Product.*

*This Produce is principally in and by Cat  
Hay, Timber, and Fire-wood.*

The Produce by Cattle, in	l.
Butter, Cheefe and Milk,	2,500,00
may be, about	
The Value of the Wool	2,000,00
yearly shorn, about	
The Value of the Horses	250,00
yearly bred, about	
The Value of the Flesh	3,350,00
yearly spent, as Food, about	
The Value of the Tallow	600,00
and Hides of the Cattle, a-	
bout	
The Value of Hay yearly	1,300,00
consum'd by Horses, about	
The Hay yearly consum'd	1,000,000
by other Cattle, about	
The Timber yearly fell'd	500,000
for Building and such Uses,	
about	
The Wood yearly spent	500,000
in Firing and petty Uses,	
about	
<hr/>	
So the Produce (including	12,000,000
1 Million in Hay spent by	
Cattle) may be in all	

## S C H E M E G.

8

*An Estimate of the Live Stock of the Nation.*

	Yearly Bread or Increase	The whole Stock	Value of each besides the Skin	Value of the Stock.
			l. s. d.	l.
Beeves, Steers, and Calves	800,000	4,500,000	2 - 00 - 00	9,000,000
Sheep and Lambs	3,600,000	12,000,000	0 - 07 - 04	4,400,000
Swine and Pigs	1,300,000	2,000,000	0 - 16 - 00	1,600,000
Deer and Fawns	20,000	100,000	2 - 00 - 00	200,000
Goats and Kids	10,000	50,000	0 - 10 - 00	25,000
Hares and Leverets	12,000	24,000	0 - 01 - 06	1,800
Rabbits and Conies	2,000,000	1,000,000	0 - 00 - 05	20,833
	7,742,000	19,674,000	0 - 00 - 00	15,247,633

	<i>l.</i>
So the value of the live Stock for Food may be —	15,247,633
The value of the Hor- ses, &c. being 1,200,000 at 2 <i>l.</i> 10 <i>s.</i> each, breeding An- nually 100,000 may be —	3,000,000
The value of the Pelts and Skins over and above the Wool — — — —	2,400,000
The value of the Wool Year- ly shorn or pelted 12,000,000 of Fleeces, at 3 <i>s.</i> 4 <i>d.</i> per Fleece — — — —	2,000,000
The value of the whole Stock of Tame Fowl, as Geese, Turkeys, Hens, Ducks, Pigeons, Swans and Pea- cocks — — — —	460,000
The whole Stock of Wild Fowl about — — — —	12,000
<hr/>	
In all,	23,119,633

From these Schemes we shall make such Observations as we think may relate to our present Subject.

Of the 39 Millions of Acres in Territory belonging to *England* he lays down, that there may be above a fourth part, *viz.* ten Millions of Acres in Heaths, Moors, Moun-

Mountains and Barren Land; three Millions of Acres in Woods and Coppices, and three Millions in Forests, Parks and Commons. This Division of the Land seems to be made with great Judgment; First, Because it agrees very well with the Consumption of several Commodities, of which we can come at a near knowledge by the Excises now in being. Secondly, It corresponds exactly with that Increase in the Kingdoms General Rental, which for these last hundred Years may have been observ'd from the Produce of divers Land-Taxes, and from several other Particulars.

And there are undeniably Reasons to be given; That this General Rental, *Anno* 1600. did not exceed six Millions *per Annum*, but through the help of that Wealth which has flow'd in to us by our Foreign Trade, it has advanc'd in several Periods of time from 6 to 8, from 8 to 10, and from 10 to 14 Millions *per Annum*. When the General Rental was but six Million *per Annum*, there was a great deal more barren Land, of that which was cultivated very much was capable of Melioration; and there were more Forests, Woods, Coppices, Commons, and wast Ground than there is now, which our Wealth did enable us from  
time

time to time to inclose, cultivate and improve.

And for the future, as we grow in Riches, and as our People increase, those many Millions of Acres which now are Barren, will by degrees most of them be improv'd and cultivated; for there is hardly any sort of Ground, which Numbers of Men will not render fertile; but then it must be suppos'd, that we do not go backward in our Trade, for if that should happen, instead of improving what is wast, that which is improv'd and cultivated will rather return to the Wildness and Desolation of former Times; for as we have said in our former Discourses, Land and Trade rise and fall together. Trade brings in the Stock, this Stock well and industriously manag'd betters Land, and brings more Product of all kind for Exportation; the Returns of which Growth and Product are to make a Country Gainers in the Ballance.

As to our quantity of Land, in Relation to its Inhabitants, as the Case stands, we seem now to have about 7 $\frac{1}{2}$  Acres *per* Head; but there are many Reasons to think, that *England* is capable of nourishing double its present Number of People, which supposing them now to be 5,500,000 would be eleven Millions, and  
even

even then there will be as many Acres per Head as they have in *Holland*. And when we have this Complement of Men, either in the natural Course of time, or sooner by the help of good Conduct, we shall be in a State of Power to deal with any Strength in *Europe*. In the natural Course of time this cannot happen in a great while, but the common Progression of things may be hasten'd by Art, so that if we are studious to preserve and increase our People, peradventure in not many Years, we may have Hands enow, not only to make us safe from the Insults of others, but to render us formidable to all our Neighbours: And Men being the truest Strength and Riches of a Country, the Councils of all Wise States should tend to obtaining and keeping together as many as the Land will Nourish. There are indeed Countries, to whom their full Complement of Inhabitants would be dangerous, and subject them to frequent Famines in bad and unseasonable Years for Corn. As for Example, if *France* had had as many People as the Land will feed in times of common Plenty, half of 'em must have perish'd during their late Dearth for want of Bread, because they have a vast Inland Country, and only the Out Parts upon such an Emergency can be

be reliev'd by the Assistance of other Places.\* And we see that anciently before there was much Trade, there were frequent Famines in the World, because one Part could not then help another; for which Reason, the Northern Nations heretofore, when their People multiply'd too fast, did disburthen themselves by sending out numerous Colonies to seek out new Dwellings, in apprehension that by a scarce Year they might be destroy'd at home; but *England* (with any moderate Care) is not liable to such a Fear, tho' its present Numbers should even be doubled, because we have every where the Sea to Friend, and in such an Extremity our Wants may be supply'd from other Nations.

And our Matter leading us into it, it may not be unnecessary here to take Notice, That Countries not over-stock'd with Men, and tho' Situate, so as to be reliev'd by the Sea, may suffer greatly, and be reduc'd very low for want of Corn, unless they make some due Provision against such a Calamity.

The value of the Wheat, Barly and Rye, necessary for the Sustenance of *England*, amounts at least to six Millions of Pounds *per Annum* at the common Rate; from whence 'tis apparent, That if a long

Dearth



Dearth should happen here, such as they lately had in *France*, tho' we may be supply'd upon more easie Terms than *France* was, and tho' we might still keep our People alive, yet that a Disaster of this kind would exhaust more of our Mony than a War of ten Years continuance. Suppose (which God forbid) that for two or three Years successively the Season should prove so bad as to deprive us of half our usual Crop; to supply such a Want, what immense Summs must be carry'd out of the Kingdom? And it may be made evident, that such a Scarcity did very much drein the *French*.

To provide against a Calamity of the like Nature, is no doubt of the highest Consequence. That we have been deficient in this point of Polity is too Notorious, tho' Providence has taken more Care of us than a Negligent People deserve. However, we have had outrageous Famines in *England*, and in *Edward* the 3ds Reign, Corn did once rise to 13 times the common value; this indeed can hardly happen again, because there are more different sorts of Soils improv'd and manur'd now than in that Age; but at several times we have suffer'd Wants of this kind very afflicting, and sometime or other our Negligence in a Matter of such concern

to the People's Welfare, may come to be more severely punish'd.

By the best Accompts we are able to procure from such as have look'd into these things, we find that in *England*, in a plentiful Year, there is not above five Months stock of Grain at the time of the succeeding Harvest, and not above four Months Stock in an indifferent Year, which is but a slender Provision against any Evil Accident. We enjoy the benefit of such different Soils, *viz.* High Lands and Low Lands, where one hits when the other fails, that now a-days we seldom see Corn above treble its common Rate, which however would be fatal, if it should at any time continue so long as to make large Supplies from abroad necessary to us. 'Tis observ'd, That but  $\frac{1}{2}$  defect in the Harvest may raise the Price  $\frac{1}{2}$ , and when we have but half our Crop of Wheat, which now and then happens, the remainder is spun out by Thrift and good Management, and eked out by the use of other Grain; but this will not do for above one Year, and would be a small help in the succession of two or three unseasonable Harvests: For the scarcity even of one Year is very destructive, in which many of the poorest Sort perish, either for want of sufficient Food, or by unwholesome Diet.

We

We take it, That a Defect in the Harvest may raise the Price of Corn in the following Proportions.

Defect		above the Common Rate.
1 Tenth	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \frac{20}{100} \\ \frac{20}{100} \\ \frac{20}{100} \\ \frac{20}{100} \\ \frac{20}{100} \end{array} \right\}$	3 Tenths
2 Tenths		8 Tenths
3 Tenths		1. 6 Tenths
4 Tenths		2. 8 Tenths
5 Tenths		4. 5 Tenths

So that when Corn rises to treble the Common Rate, it may be presum'd, that we want above a third of the Common Produce; and if we should want 5 Tenths, or half the Common Produce, the Price would rise to near five times the Common Rate.

We dwell the longer upon this Subject, being convinc'd in Judgment, that nothing in the World can more impoverish a Country, nor tend more to set it back with other People in the Ballance of Trade for a long while, than such a Calamity; 'tis indeed the Scourge of God, but improvident States are more liable to it than wiser Nations.

The *Hollanders* cannot nourish their People from their Territory, and must always seek for Assistance from abroad; but in Prospect that the Harvest may be

bad now and then, in some and even in all those Places from whence they fetch their Corn, whereby in scarce times they would be impos'd upon. They take care to have Granaries and Store-houses, where in plentiful Years they lay up vast Quantities of all sort of Grain against a dearer Season; by which good and prudent Oeconomy, those Dearth's which in their turn have afflicted most other Countries, fall but lightly upon their Common People.

On the contrary, when such a Calamity happens, they are able from their Stores to assist other Nations; and tho'

\* *vid* Sir  
Walter Ra-  
leigh's Re-  
mains, p.  
173.

we cannot go so high as \* Sir *Walter Raleigh*, who is over large in his Computations of this Nature, and reckons the *Dutch* to get an Immense Sum by this sort of Trade; yet 'tis apparent, That they are very great Gainers from time to time, by selling us our own Corn dear, which they had bought cheap, and that they make us pay very largely for its Store-room.

A Nation that will get by Foreign Traffick, must carefully watch all these things; and the Instance we have here given, is a great pull-back in the general Ballance of Trade, and what the *Dutch* in this manner Gain, is a dead Loss to *England*.

But

But this Evil is without doubt capable of a Remedy. If they can afford to let their Mony lie dead for a time, pay Freight backward and forward, and Store-room, and yet be Gainers by selling us our own Commodity in a dearer Market, why should not we think it worth our while to build Granaries and publick Store-houses, within our own Dominions?

We take it, That Freight backward and forward in such a bulky Ware as Corn is, does over Ballance the difference in the Interest of Mony here and there: So that we seem to be impos'd upon in this important Matter, meerly through that Negligence of which Wealthy Nations are but too Guilty.

It may therefore be worth the Consideration of such as study the good of *England*, whither it would not be adviseable, and for the publick Welfare, to settle a Fond for the erecting in every County Granaries capable of containing such a quantity of Corn as may nourish the People for a certain time, upon any emergent occasion, and as may hinder us at all times from purchasing at a dear Rate our own Product from our more wary Neighbours.

This first Step would be the most chargeable, but in the Course of a few Years, the Expence would be over-paid to the Body of the Kingdom; as to filling these Stores with Corn, sufficient to answer the People's Occasions, we are inclin'd to think it would be best manag'd by private Undertakers, whom the hopes of Advantage will easily invite into such a Business. But here again will come the common Objection made to publick Things, That some private Men will be thereby Gainers; and so, in the name of God, let 'em, provided they do the Publick Service.

However, there are many Reasons to think, That such a Business, from the very Nature of it, would be more uncorruptly manag'd, than most other publick Matters. First, Some Persons would look after it as a Work of more meritorious Charity than any that can be thought on. Secondly, In case of Male Administration, the Clamors of the common People would be irresistible. Thirdly, A great many different sorts of Men would find themselves concern'd in point of Interest, to see it well and justly administer'd.

'Tis not here pretended, to give any regular Scheme of this whole Matter, which would take up more time than  
consists

consists with the brevity design'd in these Discourses; but 'tis hop'd, the Hints now given, will suffice to make some good Patriots in due season lay to heart a business of such high Importance to their Land, to its Product, and to the entire Body of the People.

That Corporation for setting the Poor to Work, of which a Scheme has been here propos'd, may very properly provide Granaries round the Kingdom.

It would likewise be very adviseable to review the Ancient Laws concerning Corn, for they no ways square with the present Numbers of our People, nor with the Growth of *London*, and indeed ought to be more adapted to many other Circumstances of the Times we now live in.

All Countries thrive or decline by Trade, as they well or ill manage their Product and Manufactures; and wise Nations observe carefully every part, where they think to have any probable Advantage. If they excel in Product and Manufacture, as in *France*, the Government bends it self to encourage the People in the pursuit of what is judg'd profitable to the Publick. If they have little Product of their own, as in *Holland*, they fall to be Carriers of the World, and to buy

Goods in one place to vend in another, whereby the Bulk of their Riches has been gain'd.

*England* has an Excellent Product of its own, wherewith to sustain its Inhabitants : The Woollen Manufacture is a Wealth in a manner peculiar to us. We have besides the Product of other Countries subject to our Dominion the *West-Indies*. The *East-Indies* are an inexhaustible Mine of Vanities, to barter for the Vanities of other Countries, which a rich Nation will always covet. We have Ports and Situation, and every thing that can contribute to make us the foremost People of the whole Commerical World, only a little Industry may be wanting, which to stir up is the Drift of these Inquiries.

We have look'd into Mr. *King's* Computation of the Corn, because it should be the Fundamental Care of a good Government, to provide that the People never want it, for two or three Years defect there pulls down whatever the Merchant has been doing for a long time.

As to his Estimate of our live Stock in Cattle, many Conclusions perhaps useful may be form'd from it, which we omit, as fearing to be too Voluminous : We shall only observe, That it seems  
more



more the National Interest of *England*, to employ its Land to the Breeding and Feeding of Cattle, than to the Produce of Corn; For, as Mr. Fortrey has well noted, \*The profit of one Acre of Pasture in the <sup>Eng-</sup> Flesb, Hide and Tallow of an Ox, or in the <sup>land's In-</sup> Flesb, Wool and Tallow of a Sheep, or in <sup>terest and</sup> the Carcase of a Horse, is of so much <sup>improve-</sup> <sup>ment, p.</sup> <sup>15.</sup> ter value abroad, than the like Yield of the Earth would be in Corn; that the Exportation of this Nation might be at least double to what it is, if rightly dispos'd.

'Tis true, in these Matters Men are apt to follow what they think their particular Profit, but the Influence of good Laws would go a great way towards inclining them more to pursue what is for the general Advantage; and indeed the private Concerns of Men should be always made subservient to the Publick Interest.

Nor is force at all needful to bring this about, for Men in most of their Measures, where the Administration is wise and steady, may be induc'd to pursue the common Welfare by directive Laws, by Examples from the Prince and great Ones, and by some few not very expensive Encouragements. As for Example, 'tis in the Power of a King of *England*, not only to have as many Horses bred, but of what

what Shape and Size He pleases; His Encouragement will at any time increase the Studds, and when He countenances the Shape and Size that He thinks will profit His Country most that way, the Breeders will forthwith turn all their Care and Industry.

Our Ancestors have not been unmindful to promote the breed of Horses, as we may see by 27 *H. 8. 6.* 32 *H. 8. 13.* foreseeing what an Advantage might accrue thereby to *England*; but those old Laws want revising, and to be more adapted to present use.

Our Fore-fathers indeed were against transporting Horses and Mares above such a value, 11 *H. 7. 13.* 1 *Ed. 6. 5.* but when those Prohibitions were enacted, the business of Trade was not so well understood, as it is at present. However, in practice we have of late Years consulted our National Interest, which in all appearance is to let this Commodity be traded for, as well as any other.

It may be convenient to restrain the carrying out of Mares, but as to Gueldings and Stone-horses we can see no danger in it. On the contrary, if such Numbers were call'd for, as would invite us to increase our Breeds, it would no doubt bring a great Profit to the Kingdom.

Stone-

Stone-Horses yield most abroad, and cost no more rearing than Geldings: Against this is objected, That we may thereby strengthen our Enemies, by mending the Breed of other Countries; but there is little Strength added to that Enemy, whose Money we take for a perishable Commodity: Besides, the Nation we have most Reason to distrust, labour under a Natural Impediment of not excelling in the Breed of Horses, their Ground is not proper for it. They do not want Stallions, of which they may have as good, if not better than Ours from other Parts, but they have neither Mares nor fit Pasture; and if they had Mares, they would be yet to seek; for 'tis Notorious that the Shape, Strength and Beauty of Horses proceed from the Soil; and when that is chang'd, in the next Race they degenerate.

This Matter has been taken notice of, because it has been frequently desir'd that the ancient Prohibitions here mention'd might be reinforc'd by some new Law; but whether or no such a Measure would be right for *England*, is humbly submitted to better Judgments.

Mr. *King* computes the Value of the Horses yearly bred to be about 250,000 *l*.

This

This Estimate seems not to be out of the way, and from it we shall observe that by good Laws and a due Care in their Execution, and by Encouragement from the great Ones above, it might peradventure be brought about to double our yearly Breed; and if this could be compass'd, and if great Numbers of them should be sold in Foreign Markets (provided it be deem'd safe for the State) 'twould be a new Addition to our National Stock, and be just so much put into the Scale, yet more to incline of our side the general Balance.

Our Mines are another Product of the Earth, and undoubtedly capable of great Improvements; we ought to respect them as the Parents of all our Trade, and which made us known to the first Merchants of the World, the *Phenicians*. We have Tin, Lead, Copper, Calamy, Iron, Coal, Culm, Allom, Copperas, with other sort of Minerals; and what is in this manner dug out of the Earth, cannot be a less Article than about 7 or 800,000 *l. per Annum* in the whole Rental of the Kingdom.

They who work these Mines and deal in these Materials, know best what Laws and Constitutions they want to make their Business more easie at Home, and

to

to give their Commodities a freer Vent Abroad; but if they need any Help from the Legislative Power, most certainly they ought to have it, since their Stock and Labour turn so much to the Common Good; for whatever their Product yields in Foreign Markets, is clear National Profit.

There are lately publish'd some extraordinary Accompts of the Mines in *Cardiganshire*, where 'tis said there are Eight large Veins of Silver, Lead and Copper Oar, lying near together in one Mountain, nigh a Navigable River and a good Port. \* 'Tis alledg'd, That these Mines <sup>\* *Mine Adventure and Expedient,*  
p. 7.</sup> with a large Stock, in a few Years, may be advanc'd to a clear Profit of 170,000 *l.* *per Annum*. This Computation does not seem at all extravagant, to those who have look'd into the Accompts of what Mines produce in other Countries, provided the Oar be good, the Vein like to last (and large ones seldom fail) and provided there be no invincible Impediment from Nature to their Working; they have stood still several Years for want of a good Agreement among the Adventurers.

'Tis said Sir *H. M.* has put 'em in a way of being wrought; but if his *Expedient* should not succeed, and if new Differences should arise, the Legislative Authority

thority may very well and justly interpose, even to compel the Partners to some Agreement, whereby the Work may be carry'd on; for 'tis a Justice due to the Publick at no time to suffer a few Stock-Jobbing Citizens to stand in the way of any National Advantage, the Fraud and Corruption of which sort of Men have hurt *England* in more than one Particular.

Vide Essay  
on the Value  
of the  
Mines,  
&c.

If these Mines come but any thing near the Value Mr. *William Waller* has put upon them, and with Reasons very probable, they are a fit Object of the States Care; and upon Inspection into their true Worth, if private Purshes cannot raise a Stock sufficient to set 'em going, it were better done upon some publick Fond, to be repaid out of the Profits, than to lose what is represented as so immense a Treasure. But should it prove less 'tis not to be neglected, for Nations (like private Men) who will thrive must look into small Things as well as great; and for this we have the Examples of *France* and *Holland*, whose Ministers examine into the minutest Matters, where the Publick may possibly Reap any Advantage; and 'tis a very commendable piece of Wisdom, were it but for this single Reason, That to do so constantly begets a

Habit

Habit of Care and Diligence in things of higher Importance.

The Fishery should be here treated of as being the Product of the Peoples Labour, but this Point we have elsewhere handled. However, it falls naturally into our present Subject to observe, That to recover the Fishery, and to bring us to the Height and Perfection our Coast and Situation are capable of, would increase the Numbers of our People (for Men always multiply where they have Conveniences of Living); It would find Employment for the Poor; It would raise Rents, and give a higher Value to all that Land produces; It would set us right in several Nations where we are believ'd to deal at Loss, and particularly in those Places where our Exportations bear no Proportion, at least in Bulk, with our Importations, which might be supply'd by Fish. We cannot therefore but earnestly recommend the serious Thoughts of this Matter, and by what Methods it may be retriev'd, to all such as love their Country, and who wish to see us every Year more and more Gainers in the Balance of Trade.

*Vide Discourses on the Publick Revenues and Trade, Part II. P. 135.*

Having touch'd upon these Heads, we shall proceed to say something of Wooll, which

which is a main Article in the Produce of Land.

Mr. *King* computes the Value of the Wooll shorn, to be about 2,000,000 *l.* *per Annum*.

Part II.

P. 414

And in the Discourses upon the Revenue and Trade, we compute, by a General Medium, That the Material is improv'd one with another, four-fold in the Workmanship; so that the Value of the Woollen Manufacture made here, may amount to 8,000,000 *l.* *per Annum*.

Perhaps neither of us are much out of the way in these two Calculations, but suppose us a little under or over the Mark, all People will agree with us, That this Branch of our Product is very large, and of the highest Importance.

The Writer of these Papers has an Account from a Person, upon whose Judgment and Experience in these Matters there is great Reason to rely, That our Exports of all kinds, in the Woollen Manufacture, amount to above two Millions *per Annum*; which is so large a Part of our General Exportation, that it must maim the whole Body of our Trade, to receive any Hurt in so principal a Member.

Whatever Goods we make up of Foreign Materials, and sell in the Markets abroad



abroad all above the Cost of the Materials is clear Gain to *England*; in the same manner all our clear Returns from the Plantations which we Export are Neat Profit.

But where the Materials and Manufactures too are both our own, as in this instance of the Woollen Goods, two Millions carry'd out when the general Balance of Trade is consider'd, must be esteem'd as two Millions gain'd to the Kingdom; for the Return of this Exportation supplies our Consumption of Foreign Goods (which would otherwise be bought with Money) with some Overplus, which Overplus is what must incline the Scale to turn of our side.

Some People have been apt to fear that we sink in the Woollen Manufacture, because the Accompts of the fine Draparies exported, have been heretofore larger than of late Years; but such do not contemplate, that tho' the Old may have lessen'd, what is commonly call'd the New Draparies have increas'd, consisting in Bays, Serges and Stuffs: So that upon the whole, infinitely more of the Material of Wooll has of late Years been wrought up for Foreign use than in former Times; and herein our Merchants have been only forc'd to follow the Modes and Humor

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of those People with whom they deal, and the Course they have persued has hitherto not been detrimental to the Publick.

Nor is there any Cause to apprehend, but that we may increase from time to time in the general Manufacture of Wooll, tho' the Exportation of particular Commodities may now and then vary : For upon the whole, our Material is better and fitter for all uses than that of most Countries.

'Twere better indeed that the Call from abroad were only for the fine Draparies, because then we should be in a manner without a Rival ; no Country but *England* and *Ireland*, having a Soard or Turf, that will rear Sheep, producing the Wooll of which most of our Draparies are made. 'Tis true, the Wooll of *Spain* is fine above all others, but 'tis the wear only of the Richer Sort ; and of *Spanisb* Cloaths not above 9000 Pieces are sent abroad *Communibus Annis*. And even in the working up of this Wooll, perhaps it may be made out, that our very Climate gives us an Advantage over other Countries.

The Learned Prelate, who has oblig'd *England* with that Noble Work, his *History of the Reformation*, Discourfing  
once

once upon these Matters, with the Writer of this Essay, did urge a thing of which the Philosophy seem'd very sound and right, and upon which we have since reflected often; He said, That Nature had adapted different Countries for different Manufactures; that cold and moister Climates are fitter for the working up of Wool, because there the Sun does not exhaust its natural Moisture, nor make it brittle, which would render it ill to work, and bad to wear; That hot Climates are best for the working up of Silk, because the Matter is there more dispos'd to imbibe the Dye, and to take a more durable impression of it, the Sun helping, at the same time, both to preserve and to give it Lustre.

That we have many natural Advantages over all Foreign Nations, who shall pretend to set up Looms, is beyond all dispute; but 'tis a very great Question, whither there are not weighty Reasons to apprehend Neighbours of another sort, we mean the People of *Ireland*.

The Country is very large, it abounds in convenient Ports; 'tis excellently Situate for Trade, capable of great Improvements of all kinds, and able to nourish more than treble its present Number of Inhabitants.

*Of the Land of England,*

Its Soil, Soard and Turf, are in a manner the same with ours, and proper to rear Sheep: All which Considerations beget a reasonable fear, that in time they may come to rival us in our Darling and most Important Manufacture.

That they should increase in People, that their Land should be drein'd and meliorated, that they should have Trade, and grow Wealthy by it, may not peradventure be dangerous to *England*: For 'tis granted, their Riches will center at last here in their Mother-Kingdom.

And Colonies that enjoy not only Protection, but who are at their Ease, and Flourish, will in all likelihood be less inclinable to inovate, or to receive a Foreign Yoke, than if they are harrafs'd and compell'd to Poverty, through the hard Usage of the People from whom they are deriv'd. For tho' there are now and then Instances of Countries that rebel wantonly, yet most commonly great Defections proceed from great Oppression.

It seems therefore a Point of the highest Wisdom to give the Planters of *Ireland* all Encouragements that can possibly consist with the Welfare of *England*: For 'tis an Out-work to the Seat of Empire here, if it should be gain'd by any Neighbouring Power, the Sum of Affairs would be put  
in

in danger. 'Tis to be preserv'd but by a Numerous Army, or by its own proper Strength. How far the first way may affect our Liberties is not difficult to determin, it follows then that the safest Course must be to let them thrive by Husbandry, and some Trade, whereby the Natives and Inhabitants will not only have the Means, but an Interest to defend themselves.

If through a mistaken fear and jealousy of their future Strength and Greatness, we should either permit or contrive to let them be dispeopled, poor, weak and dispirited, or if we should render them so uneasie as to incline the People to a desire of Change, it may invite Strangers to look that way; and if brought to be naked and defenceless, they must be a Prey to the first Invader.

This will be avoided, if they are suffer'd to prosper, and not only so, but Strength thus added to one Member will make the Body-Politick much the stronger.

For as all the Blood with a swift Motion passes frequently through the Heart, so whatever Wealth our Countries acquire, circulates about, coming into the chief Seat of Empire, from whence 'tis dispers'd into all its Parts; and ever since *Ireland* did improve, it can be made ap-

pear *England* has had no small Proportion of its Gains.

What made *Rome* so immensely rich? Her Citizens but little minded Arts or Handicraft, War was their chief Employment. 'Twas counted Ignoble in a Senator to exercise Merchandize, nor indeed was the Genius of the People adicted to it, but being the Head of that large Dominion, the Fountain of Law, and the Spring from whence all Power, Honors, and Magistracies were deriv'd, thither all Men resorted; some for Pleasure, others upon Business: So that what was got by the *Sicilians*, *Rhodians*, *Cretans*, and by the Trading Cities, not only of *Greece* but *Asia*, came at last to center there.

But this holds more strongly, where the Seat of Dominion is in a great Emporium, for such a City will not only be the Head of Power but of Trade, governing all its Branches, and giving the Rules and Price; so that all Parts thereon depending, can deal but subordnately to it, till at last 'tis found that Provinces work but to enrich the Superior Kingdom.

That what has been here said is true, in our present Case, appears manifestly from this, That all People agree, there is not in *Ireland* above 500,000 *l.* in current Cash,

Cash, notwithstanding their large Exportations for many Years, which could not be, if they had not some constant Drein, whereby they are exhausted. 'Tis true, improving Countries lay out a great Stock in Foreign Materials for Building, &c. so that they seldom abound much at first in the Species of Mony, but allowing for this; yet in the natural Course of Things they ought to have more Species, if what they got elsewhere had not been spent here, and return'd hither by Bills of Exchange from *Holland, France, Spain, the West-Indies*, and other Places.

But tho' we are ready to agree, That hitherto their Gains both at home and abroad have chiefly center'd here; yet in process of time, 'tis possible that in the Management of their Product and Foreign Traffick, they may come to interfere with, and bring Prejudice to their Mother-Nation. And remote Fears being allowable where the whole Safety of a State is concern'd, they should not wonder to see *England* so much alarm'd at the Progress they make in the Woollen Manufacture.

As has been said before, 'Tis so great a Part of our Exportation, that any considerable Failure and Interruption therein must set the Ballance of Trade against us

with a Witness; it falls therefore naturally into our present Subject to say something of this Matter.

Last Session of Parliament; a Bill pass'd the House of Commons, and was committed in the House of Lords, For Prohibiting the Exportation of the Woollen Manufactures of *Ireland* to Foreign Parts.

This Point has of late been much debated, and the general Subject of Men's Discourses; The Writer of these Papers was then inclin'd to the milder Side, being indeed in his Judgment against Prohibitions, because most of such as are come within his Observation, seem to have been push'd on (without Doors) rather for private Ends, and to serve some particular Turn, than calculated to produce any publick Benefit.

But having now more maturely consider'd this nice Controversie, he begins to lean to their Opinion, who think such a Bill necessary; and more especially if the Promoters of it can make out the Suggestions upon which it was founded.

Where the Common-wealth is truly concern'd, and where her Safety is in Question, they have very narrow Minds, who let their Compassion be too much extended to private Objects: Our chief  
Tender:



Tenderneſs ſhould be towards her, and rough Examples in the infancy of a Miſchief are rather merciful than cruel, becauſe fewer People ſuffer then, than would otherwiſe do, if the Evil were permitted to take deeper Root.

If their Manufactures interfere with ours, ſo as to hurt *England*, it muſt be undoubtedly adviſeable to intercept their Growth by ſome effectual Law betimes, before ſuch an Error in Government grow too big for our Correction; before too many Families have turn'd their Stock that way; before they have increas'd their Stock of Sheep, or bred up too great a number of Artiſts (all which Circumſtances would make their Caſe yet harder); for we ſhould preſerve our ſelves with as little Hurt to them as poſſible.

But it ſeems, ſome People make a doubt, whither or no we have Power thus to intermeddle in their Matters; queſtioning whether Laws made here are binding upon them, till they have receiv'd a Sanction in their own Parliament. And Mr. *Molynaux* counts it a very extravagant Notion, that has not the leaſt Colour from Reason or Record, to term them a Colony from *England*. But we muſt beg leave to differ with him in Opinion. For we take them ſo far to be a Colony

Colony in the Sense (by the Interpretation both of Law and Reason) as renders them still dependant upon their Mother-Kingdom.

Nor is this at all impugn'd by the Concessions made to the ancient *Irish* by *Henry* the 2d, King *John*, and *Henry* the 3d; but to set this in a better Light, the Posture of *Ireland* in those Times must be consider'd.

The first Adventurers that went over thither, namely, *Richard* the Son of *Strongbow*, and *Robert Fitz-Stephen*, who stipulated under certain Conditions to assist *Dermot Fitz-Murchard*, had not a strength sufficient to reduce the Country, and little was done towards it of any Consequence, till the Expedition of *Henry* the 2d, *Anno* 1172. with a Royal Army, to whom the Clergy, Nobility, Gentry and People, made an absolute Surrender of the Kingdom; and, by the description Historians give of it, it seems to have been that sort of Yielding which the *Romans* call'd *Deditio*, which was *se dare in Manus Potestatem & Arbitrium*. And their giving themselves up to *Henry* the 2d, without a Battel or Blood-shed, gave him yet a stronger Title, because the Act was less constrain'd, and more flowing from the Will. 'Tis true, so wild and numerous

rous a People were not to be kept in Order by a handful of new Inhabitants; the King therefore gave them a Constitution, by which they were to govern themselves, as a free Country under him their Lord. After this, the Dominion thereof was settled upon *John* his Youngest Son, and two and twenty Years after in him reunited to the Crown of *England*. From King *John*, *Henry* the 3d, and their Successors, the ancient *Irish* and the first Adventurers (of whom many as \* *Mr. Spencer* has observ'd, have taken the Names, Manners and Humours of the Natives) derive several Franchises and Immunities, and among the rest to hold a Parliament. The Story of those Times is it self dark, but the Reason of their Councils is yet darker. From *Mathew Paris*, and *Giraldus Cambrensis* it appears, That these Concessions were made to the Body of the Old *Irish*, tho' but few, in Practice, submitted to them; for to use *Mr. Spencer's* own Words, *To whom did King Henry the 2d impose those Laws? Not to the Irish, for the most of them fled from his Power into Desarts and Mountains, leaving the wide Country to the Conquerour, who in their stead establisht plac'd English Men, who possess'd all their Lands, and did quite shut out the Irish, or the most part of them. And to those new Inhabi-*

\* *Edmund  
Spencer's  
View of  
the State  
of Ireland,  
p. 222.*

*Inhabitants and Colonies he gave his Laws, to wit, the same Laws under which they were born and bred, the which it was no difficulty to place among them, being formerly well inur'd thereunto; unto whom afterwards there repair'd divers of the Poor distress'd People of the Irish, for Succour and Relief of whom, such as they thought fit for Labour, and industriously dispos'd, as the most part of their baser sort are, they receiv'd unto them as their Vassals, but scarcely vouchsaf'd to impart unto them the benefit of those Laws, under which themselves liv'd, but every One made his Will and Commandment a Law unto his own Vassal: Thus was not the Law of England ever properly apply'd unto the Irish Nation, as by a purpos'd Plot of Government, but as they could insinuate and steal themselves under the same, by their humble Carriage and Submission.*

But after this, during the Wars between the House of York and Lancaster, they shook off both the Rule and Laws of England, repossessing their ancient Seats, driving us by degrees to that which was properly call'd the *English Pale*.

In truth it does not appear, That they embrac'd our Form of Government for a great while: So that the Models of it given heretofore, from hence seem chiefly to have been intended for the better Rule of our

our own People, not but they were likewise meant as a Benefit to the *Irish*, if they would be contented to become a more civiliz'd Nation.

If their ancient Parliament Rolls were extant, it would more plainly appear what use they made of their Constitution, and thereby it would be seen whither or no both their House of Lords and Commons did not chiefly consist of the *English* Planters.

If, as Mr. *Molyneux* asserts, Ireland, tho' annext to the Crown of England, has always been look'd upon to be a Kingdom complete within it self, and to have all Jurisdiction to an Absolute Kingdom belonging, and Subordinate to no Legislative Authority on Earth; these Immunities must be deriv'd from the Concessions granted at *Cashal* by Henry the 2d. But with whom was this Compact made? With the Native *Irish*; and their Claim to it would be very just, if they had perform'd the Conditions of the Stipulation, but their Title seems weaken'd by 52 Rebellions which they have made against the Government of *England*. We would not be thought here to insinuate, that a People may lose their Natural Rights by an Insurrection against their Prince, but certain Priviledges not Fundamental, they may

may forfeit by non-usure or mis-usure. Besides, the Case between a Prince and his Native Subjects, and between a Government and the People of a Conquer'd Country, is quite different. In the first Instance the Relation is the same, as betwixt a Father and a Son, the Child may Err, and the Parent will forgive; but in the other Case the Tie is not the same, they are not so near a-Kin. 'Tis true, the Prince is Father of the People, in one place as well as in the other, but in his Politick-Capacity he is at the Head of another Common-wealth, with whose Blood and Treasure the stranger Country was perhaps conquer'd. And if a Foreign People, thus subdu'd, Rebel, they may without doubt forfeit certain Privileges, which were not any Natural Rights of their own, but Forms of living prescrib'd, and Concessions granted by the Conquerors. And the *Romans* in the best and purest Times of the Common-wealth, did frequently deprive Subject Cities and Countries, rebelling, of their Land, and of their Immunities: To be a State not Subordinate to any Legislative Authority on Earth; is a Privilege that may be forfeited by a Subject-Country, and yet leave to the People their Natural Rights unhurt: That the *Irish* were

were once a Subject-Country, appears from the intire Resignation of themselves to *Henry* the 2d, as Head of the Common-wealth of *England*. To reduce a wild Nation, it was expedient to put their Liberties upon a good Foot. He restor'd them therefore to be a free People, and so they and their Descendants might have been. They might have continu'd an Independant Kingdom, and the Old *Irish* might have preserv'd both their Land, and the Immunities thereon depending, if they had not themselves alter'd their own Constitution.

But by Rebelling frequently, and by being as often Vanquish'd, they chang'd their own Form of Government. They were heretofore Proprietors of the Land, and therefore had Right to be the two Estates in Parliament of Lords and Commons, but this was by degrees lost, and became vested in the new Inhabitants: Insomuch that, to use *Mr. Molyneux's* own Words, *Now 'tis manifest, That the great Body of the present People of Ireland, are the Progeny of the English and Britains, that from time to time have come over into this Kingdom; and there remains but a meer handful of the ancient Irish at this Day, I may say not One in a Thousand.*

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Are the Concessions granted by King *Henry* now vested in this Thousandth Part? And are they the Body-Politick of *Ireland*, of which not One in a Thousand sits in Parliament; and of which very few have Voices in choosing those who are to sit there? If any, these certainly are to be the distinct State, and *To have all Jurisdiction to an Absolute Kingdom belonging*, for with their Ancestors those Stipulations were made, under which Mr. *Molyneux* pretends to claim.

But the Old Inhabitants having lost the greatest part of their Property, have lost so much of their share in the Constitution, which is now devolv'd upon those Colonies which *England* has from time to time sent to conquer and possess the Land, who are now properly the Body-Politick of that Kingdom.

These we allow have forfeited nothing by any Rebellion the Natives have made, they are Purchasers, and at a dear Rate with the frequent hazard of their Lives and Fortunes: We must therefore see how far the ancient Rights of the *Irish* are devolv'd upon them, and whither under that Claim the New Inhabitants may justly term themselves an Independant Nation.

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Whoever Conquers, Conquers in the Right of that Country at whose Expence the War was made; and tho' the Property of the Land be often granted to the Adventurers, the Dominion thereof is always reserv'd to the Nation that sends her People out. 'Tis true, where a part of the People divides its self from the rest to seek new Seats at their own Cost, as they did among the *Seythians*, *Goths* and *Vandals*, there the Case was otherwise, for they rambled so far as no more to communicate with their Mother-Country.

But it does not appear, That *Fitz-Stephen* or *Richard Strongbow*, went out upon such Terms as those Northern Nations did. On the contrary, their Endeavours had little Success till seconded by the Power of *England*, at whose Expence all the succeeding Conquests of *Ireland* have been either made or secur'd; so that if the ancient *Irish* had any Rights of Dominion, and if those Rights are forfeited, the Forfeiture devolves upon *England*, and not upon the Adventurers, nor their Successors.

Nor is it indeed consistent with the Principles of Government that a part of the People should separate from the rest, and be (especially so near at hand) an Independant Dominion, for that were to  
I have

have Protection where they owe no Duty, which is an Absurdity in Politicks.

When a part of the People divides from the rest to seek more Territory, if they are at their own Cost, and strong enough to eradicate or keep under the Natives, they become a New Empire, and may be justly term'd a distinct Nation: But if not at their own Expence, and if they are weak and always stand in need of being protected by their Mother-Country, they are in all appearance to be accounted but as a Colony.

Nor are Names to alter the Nature of Things. 'Tis granted *Ireland* has been very anciently call'd a Kingdom, though our Princes did not take the Stile of Kings thereof till the Reign of *Henry* the 8th. 'Tis likewise apparent, That they have many distinct Jurisdictions; That they are a State within themselves; That they have an undoubted Right to hold Parliaments; but all this does not hinder them from being still a Colony, nor can it make them an Independant People.

*Sigenii  
Commen-  
taria.*

Almost every Colony that the *Romans* planted was a Model of their own Republick, and fram'd according to it, by those whom the Senate had deputed for its Settlement. They had an Annual *Duum-  
viratus*,

*viratus*, in Imitation of the Consular Authority. They had likewise *Censors*, *Ædiles* and *Quæstors*; and which comes strongest to our present Case, every Colony had its particular Senate: But will any one pretend to argue from thence, That all these were Distinct and Independent Common-wealths?

These Branches and Scions from the great Trunk of the Republick, had all of 'em the Face of Formal Governments; they had Magistracies and Councils, Power of Life and Death, and to raise Money for their Common Safety, and to make Laws for their better Rule; but this is no Argument that they had all the Parts of Sovereign Empire.

'Tis true the Inhabitants of *Ireland*, from ancient Concessions, have a Priviledge perhaps above the *Roman* Colonies, namely, to Tax themselves by their own Suffrages, within their own Limits; but this is no more than what is claim'd by several Provinces of *France*, which nevertheless account themselves subordinate to the Sovereign Power of the whole State.

There is a part of Empire not communicable, and which must reside Sovereignly somewhere; for there would be such a perpetual clashing of Power and Jurisdiction,

dictions, as were inconsistent with the very Being of Communities, unless this last Resort were somewhere lodg'd. Now this Incommunicable Power we take to be the Supream Judgment of what is best and most expedient for the whole; and in all Reason of Government this ought to be there trusted and lodged, from whence Protection is expected.

That *Ireland* should judge of what is best for it self, is just and fair; but in Determinations that are to reach the whole, as namely, what is most expedient for *England* and *Ireland* both, there, without all doubt, the Supream Judgment ought to rest in the King, Lords, and Commons of *England*, by whose Arms and Treasure *Ireland* ever was, and must always be defended.

Case of  
Ireland,  
P. 84.

Nor is this any claiming the same Empire over *Scotland*, as Mr. *Molyneux* would suggest, for there is no Parity of Reason in the Cases: *Scotland* to *England* (as *Aragon* to *Spain*) is a distinct State, governing it self by different Laws, tho' under the same Prince, and is truly but a Kingdom Confederated with the Realm of *England*, tho' subject to our King. The Land thereof was not acquir'd to the present Inhabitants by the Arms of *England*; protect them we do, as the Strongest Allies

lies always are to defend the Weaker, but this puts 'em not in the Degree of Subordination we are treating of. They are not our Discendants, and they are but Politically our Brethren; whereas the English-Irish, who are now chief Lords of that Soil, are naturally our Offspring.

Their Inferior Rule and Jurisdictions are not disputed, but that Super-eminent Dominion and supream and uncontrollable Regiment over themselves, which they pretend to, is neither safe for *England* to grant, nor for them to ask.

Such a Power would be dangerous, because by some Accident it may come to be so exercis'd, as to be their and our Ruin.

We have had bad Kings, and those Kings have had evil Counsellors: Suppose us then, in some future Age, under such Circumstances, as to have a Prince and his Council so angry with the People, as to desire their Destruction, which was our Case once with King *John*, who *Mu. Paris.* would have sold us to the *Moors* to wreak his own Discontents. And suppose this Prince willing to set up *Ireland* in opposition to this Kingdom, may not a Prince, so dispos'd, give the Royal Assent to Laws in *Ireland*, that would utterly destroy *England*? And what Remedy would

*Poining's Act* be in such a Juncture? In a Case like this, what way have the People of *England* to preserve themselves, but to represent their Grievance to the Prince? Who, when he sees the Error of his Council, may be induc'd to join in some Supream Exercise of the Legislature here, coercive, and such as may keep *Ireland* in the degree of Subordination, that seems requisite to the well-being of both Nations.

Suppose a Prince bent to hurt *England*, should give his Assent to a Law there, That the *Irish* may transport all their Wool to Foreign Countries; would not this, as they say, cut the Turf from under our Feet, and at one blow, in a manner, ruin all our Woollen Manufactures? There are many other Instances, in which, if they were indulg'd, the greatest part of our Traffick would be carry'd to their Ports.

In Matters of Trade, even the best of Kings may be surpris'd, of which we have a late Example; and the ill Consequences the *Scotch Act* will probably have, ought to make us very watchful over what our Neighbours do, especially where they depend upon us.

That the greatest part of the present Inhabitants of *Ireland*, chiefly those who claim

claim the Land-Property, are a Colony from *England*, has been here peradventure sufficiently made out; and we take it to be their best Hold, to be always so accounted, because it gives them a lasting Title to be protected and defended by us. And if they are a Colony, it would be a strange Defect in our Constitution, if we wanted any of the Powers requisite to pursue the Ends of Government, of which the Principal is to take care, that no one part of the People be permitted to hurt the other; but if the Legislature of *England* cannot, in Important Matters, restrain that of *Ireland*, *Ireland* is at least in a Capacity to ruin *England*, which would make our Form of Government at one and the same time Ridiculous and Dangerous.

But to be thus out of our Jurisdiction, would in the Conclusion be as fatal to them as to us; for tho' they should grow Rich at our Expence, and tho' a large part of our Trade were diverted thither, they would not yet be able to subsist alone, and by themselves. And if we by Loss of our Trade become weaken'd, how can we give them that Assistance which from time to time they have always wanted? So that this division of Strength would be destructive to both Countries.

It must therefore be their Interest as well as Ours, That the Supream Power, and the chief Wealth, should be ever preserv'd to Center here in the Seat of Empire.

Upon the whole Matter, it seems the Right of *England*, and as well for the Benefit of *Ireland* its best and noblest Colony, that the Legislative Authority here should upon all Emergencies, make such Regulations and Restrictions, relating to Trade especially, as shall be thought for the Weal-Publick of both Countries.

And having premis'd these Things, we shall proceed to handle more closely the Subject of our Question; namely, Whither it is necessary to Prohibit by Law, the Exportation of Woollen Manufacture from *Ireland* to Foreign Parts?

To put an early Stop to their turning their Stock and Industry this way, appears requisite for many Reasons.

First, *Ireland* contains near a half as much Territory as *England*, and the Soil being of the same Nature, may be brought to produce near a half as much Wool as *England* yields; and this Material being the Basis upon which our Trade is built, they who can come near us in it, will come just so near us in our Trade abroad.

Secondly,



Secondly, Countries thinly Peopled, can sooner improve in the Breed of Cattle, than any other way, because 'tis a Work which a few Hands may manage.

Thirdly, Where there is Plenty of a Material, which, Manufactur'd, yields a good Price, Hands will soon be invited over to work it up.

Fourthly, But this holds more strongly, where not only the Material, but all sort of Provisions are cheap; and in Countries which have not been yet improv'd, where every new Commer hopes to make a sudden Fortune.

From which Positions it follows, If *Ireland* be permitted to proceed in the Exportation of Woollen Goods,

First, That in no long Course of time they may come to carry out to the value of a Million *per Annum*.

Secondly, That the cheapness of Provisions will enable them to afford their Commodities cheaper than *England* can do in Foreign Markets.

All that have either writ or spoke upon this Subject, agree, That the whole Controversie turns upon this single Point, whether they can make the same Woollen Goods cheaper there than here.

To

*Of the Land of England,*

To set this in a true Light, we must consider the first Material, and those who work it up.

As to the first Material, beyond all doubt Wooll is a third cheaper there than in *England*.

As to the Workmanship, the Clothiers affirm Spinning to be one half of it, and that of all Hands is agreed to be cheaper there than here. And for the Combing and Weaving, the Price of course must abate, as Work-men increase; for Handycraft in Countries, where Living is cheap, can be dear no longer than till Artists are bred up. And a great many Artists will be instructed before the Multitude of Inhabitants can render Provisions dear in such a Place as *Ireland*. But to judge rightly of these Matters, we must contemplate the Body of the People in each Country.

\* Political  
Anatomy  
of *Ireland*,  
p. 76.

\* Sir *William Petty* affirms, That the Inferior Rank of People in *Ireland* (thro' whose Hands Spinning must pass) do not expend one with another above 52 Shillings *per* Head. The Expence of the same Rank cannot be less here than 5 *l.* *per* Head.

'Tis an undeniable Truth, That the Common Provisions for Life are one half cheaper there than here: 'Tis likewise  
as

as plain, That Meat and Drink are one half of Mankind's Expence reckon'd in a Mass together. And these Advantages of Living, must enable them to afford the same Commodity cheaper than we can do, where not only our Numbers make Provisions dear, but where new Excises give all things of our Home-Consumption yet a higher Price.

Mr. Clement's (for we take him to be the Author of \* that Fine Discourse upon this Subject, inscrib'd to the Marquis of *Normanby*) makes this Judicious Observation, *That if any one offers his Goods cheaper than the usual Price, that will then become the Market Price; and every one else must sell at the same, or keep his Goods.*

\* Interest  
of England,  
with Relation  
to the  
Trade of  
Ireland,

The Cheapness of Living, and all other Circumstances consider'd, it seems very probable, That if they should come to have the necessary Complement of Workmen, and to flourish in this Manufacture, they will be able to sell it one third cheaper than we can do.

If they can make for a Million, and afford it by one third cheaper than we, it follows, That at least one half of our Exportations in that Commodity must immediately determin.

And the Consequence of this would be, That Rents must every where fall.

The

The Purchase of Land must sink. The Poor must want Employment, and grow upon us; half our Foreign Trade must forthwith cease, and in the other half we must be Losers in the Ballance, which is chiefly kept of our Side by the Woollen Manufactures.

Not only a third, but an Abatement of ten *per Cent.* forc'd upon us, by the Rivalship in Trade of another Country, would throw us into more Disorders, than the most knowing Man in *England* can readily describe.

And to ask where will be the Stock of Money to set up so large a Manufacture is but an evasive way of Arguing; for where the Prospect of Gain is certain, Money never fails to come. And if it should ever be determin'd, That *England* cannot restrain that Country in this Exportation, Foreigners will carry Stocks to an Improving Place, where they may reasonably expect many more Advantages than what shall arise from this Manufacture. As for Example, To lay out Money upon good Securities, at ten *per Cent.* Interest, to buy Land capable of great Melioration at ten Years Purchase. And to have almost all the Necessaries of Life half as cheap again as in other parts, are not all these Circumstances sufficient

to invite thither, not only Foreign Stocks, but very much of our own Mony, and a great Number of our Work-men, where their Industry will turn to a better Accompt than it does here?

No Wise State, if it has the Means of preventing the Mischief, will leave its Ruin in the Power of another Country. And if Wars have been thought not only Prudent, but just, which have been made to interrupt the too sudden Growth of any Neighbour-Nation, much more justifiable may a Mother-Kingdom exercise the Civil Authority in Relation to her own Children; who from her had their Being, and still have their Protection, especially when her own Safety is so much concern'd.

Nor can this be thought Rigour; 'Tis but a reasonable Jealousie of State, and only severe Wisdom, which Governments should show in all their Councils; 'Tis a preventing Remedy which operates gently in the beginning of the Disease, before there are many, and those inveterate Humors to contend with. And if a timely Stop be put to these Exportations from *Ireland*, it will hurt but a very few (which is never to be regarded, where the good of the whole Publick is in Question) and even that Few, without any great

great difficulty, may have their Industry turn'd to safer Objects.

For these and several other Reasons, which will occur to such as think seriously of this Subject, it seems for the Publick Good, That the Legislature of *England* should, by some Restrictions, keep *Ireland* from interfering with us in this Principal Foundation of our whole Traffick. And to do it by a Positive Law here, and not to leave it to the Administration there, as some propose, appears to be the rather requisite; because when this Step is made, and when they are render'd incapable of Exporting Woollen Goods, there will lie a Necessity upon the Governing Part and Landed Men, of doing their utmost to promote other Improvements, of which their Soil is capable.

Nor is it fair to urge, That we may proceed from one Prohibition to another, till we leave them nothing, and till they are quite undone. They can fundamentally hurt us no other way, their Rivalship is dangerous in none but the Woollen Manufacture, where all *Lucrum Cessans*, is *Damnum Emergens* to *England*, since all our Affairs abroad turn and depend upon it; nor can we suffer any Competitors in it, if we mean to flourish and be Gainers in the General Ballance of Trade.

To

To think this Kingdom will either peevishly or covetously hurt that Colony, is an absurd Imagination. 'Tis obvious enough, that too much depends upon the Possession of such an Island, to render its Inhabitants desperate, and desirous of a Change, if they have a large Trade, and growing Riches, the Benefit thereof will redound to us at last; And the wiser a Government is, the more it will desire to see 'em prosper, except in this single Instance, where their Wealth would be built upon our Destruction.

But such a Prohibition as we have been treating of, will have very little Effect, unless they can be likewise hindred from carrying out their Wooll; to prevent which, their Situation consider'd, will be a very hard Matter; but there are no difficulties of the like Nature, which are not to be overcome, if the Administration be strict and steady.

They, who would prohibit the Exportation of Woollen Goods from *Ireland*, to Foreign Parts, have hitherto propos'd setting up there the Linnen Manufacture, but this Design is likewise not without its Dangers: The setting up the Linnen Manufacture will be less hurtful than to set up the Woollen, but we are to consider, That *Ireland* will be always able to supply

supply it self with Draperies at Home, and that there will be no Market for their Linnen, but *England*, and its Dependences. Now 'tis evident, That our Woollen Goods are sold in several Countries, namely, *Holland, Hamburgh, Germany*, the *Han's* Towns, and all the East Country; many of which Places will not be able to take off our Woollen Goods, unless we deal for their Linnens: And in Fact, and by Experience, it has been seen, in the Case of the *East-India* Trade, since there has been Imported from thence vast Quantities of Linnens, such as Callicoes, Muslins, Romals for Handkershifts, which answer'd the end of Lawns, Cambricks, and other Linnen Cloath, we have not Exported that vast quantity of Draperies to those Northern Parts, of which *Sir Walter Raleigh* makes mention. As our Call for their Linnens has diminish'd, their Call for our Draperies has proportionably decreas'd; and not only so, but these People have been compell'd by Necessity to fall upon making Courie Woollen Cloath, by which they supply themselves, and other Places, which heretofore we were wont to furnish. So that it deserves a very serious Consideration, what future Effect it may have upon our Woollen Goods, to promote a  
Con-



### Considerable Linnen Manufacture in *Ireland*.

Upon the whole Matter, it ought to be carefully examin'd, Whither or no a better Expedient may not be thought on, to stop their Progress in the new Draperies, than to introduce the Linnen Manufacture there? and whither it would not be best for both Kingdoms to take off the Prohibition that now lies upon *Irish* Cattle?

This Point has been formerly much debated, and it remains yet very doubtful, when this Prohibition was set on foot, which was most consult'd, Publick Good, or Private Interest; The Numbers of the Breeding were without doubt stronger, at that time, than those of the Feeding Lands; but 'tis to be fear'd, in the making that Act, that the general Interest of *England* was not sufficiently consider'd.

If the People of *Ireland* are permitted to bring their Cattle hither, it will lower the Price of Flesh in *England*; a Matter very important to a Country that Subsists so much by Manufactures. 'Tis true; the Breeding Counties will be thereby somewhat hurt, but it will encourage Improvements and Melioration of Barren Land, in order to Feed, which will be

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advan:

advantagious to the whole Publick of the Nation. It will divert those of *Ireland*, from thinking to extend their Trade too much abroad; a Point not to be slighted. And it will in a manner confine the principal Part of their Dealings to this Kingdom; which, for many Reasons of State, will be best and safest for *England*.

'Tis therefore submitted to better Judgments, whither or no to open the way hither for their Cattle, will not be most advisable; and the truest Method to hinder their Progress in Manufactures, without doing any thing that may look like Injury or Oppression.

'Tis no true Objection to say, That the People of *Ireland* will not fall readily into this sort of Trade, which has been now so long intermitted; for, as we are inform'd, the Payments are very ill made, for that Flesh, Tallow and Hides, that are Exported to Foreign Parts. That the Merchant makes the Butcher stay sometimes two or three Years, upon pretence of Bills of Exchange, and Returns expected from the *West-Indies*, *Spain*, and other Parts; and if the Butcher be ill dealt with, it must follow, that the Landlord cannot be paid his Rent: Whereas when the Trade was open for *England*, the

the Gentlemen of *Ireland* receiv'd ready Money, or if they gave Credit, it was answer'd by the next Return; and *England* was to them as *Smithfield* is to *Leicestershire*, *Lincolnshire*, or any other *English* Feeding County; besides, it would keep down the Exchange, which would be another Encouragement to the *Irish* Nobility and Gentry, who spend so large a Part of their Estates in *London*.

So that in all likelihood, the People of that Kingdom, if the said Prohibition were taken off, would cheerfully submit to a Law here, binding them not to Export to Foreign Parts their Woollen Goods; nor would they perhaps think of setting up the Linnen Manufacture, which is likewise not without Consequences very pernicious; and for these Reasons, the Expedient here propos'd, is now offer'd to Publick Consideration.

Before we quit our present Subject of *Land and its Product*, we shall offer another Hint. The Course Draperies is that part of our Woollen Manufacture, in which we are in greatest Danger to be rival'd by other Countries; it stands therefore in need of most Encouragement. There are many Parts of the World, whose Poverty disables them from buy-

ing our Woollen Goods, because of their high Price. As *Russia*, *Poland*, *Tartary*, &c. and therefore they are supply'd by the *Germans*, or some other Neighbours, with a sort of Cloath very contemptible, in Comparison of what we could make to answer the same Ends and Uses. Suppose then, instead of paying five *per Cent.* Custom outward bound, That such Course Cloaths not exceeding such a certain Value, should for a term of Years receive upon the Exportation ten *per Cent.* Bounty Money by way of Encouragement from the State, for so much as the Exporters can make appear was carry'd out, to Countries with whom we had no Dealings of that kind before, and that such their Exportations are in order to enlarge our Trade. A Recompence of this Nature would in all probability increase the Woollen Manufacture of *England*, in not many Years, at least one third.

We have the more largely handled the *Irish* Prohibitions, because in all appearance the Ballance of Trade will very much depend upon the Measures *England* shall take, in relation to that Colony; since we should proceed very heavily in all our Foreign Traffick, if *Ireland* is left in a Capacity to disturb us abroad, in the vent of our Woollen Manufactures.

And

And having treated of the Numbers of the People, and of Land, and its Product, we shall proceed to say something of our Payments to the Publick, and in what manner the Ballance of Trade may be thereby affected.

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 S E C T. IV.
 

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Of our Payments to the Publick, and in what manner the Ballance of Trade may be thereby affected.

**W**HETHER it be under a Commonwealth, an Absolute Monarchy, or in a Mix'd Government, the Affairs of a Country can never go on prosperously, unless the Publick Revenues are well and wisely ordered. *Richlieu* says, *C'est le Point d'Archimede qui estant fermement etabli, donne moyen de mouvoir tout le monde.*

*Testament  
Politique,  
part 2.  
§. 7.*

Commonwealths are seldom to blame in this part of Polity, and when they quit it, suffering their Treasure to be imbez-  
zel'd by the Men in Power, they seldom  
fail

fail of falling soon after into the Hands of a single Person. In Absolute Monarchies, where 'tis neglected, the Prince is compell'd by his Want to Flea and Rack his Subjects, and to wink at all sorts of Rapine in those whose Business it is to contrive Ways of supplying his Necessities, till at last he becomes Tirannical and Odious to the whole People.

Profusion has the same ill Effects in Constitutions where the Regal Authority is limited by Laws. *Richieu* says, *A necessities Prince can never undertake a glorious* Ibid.  
*Action; and Necessity ingendering Contempt, he can never be reduced to that Condition without being exposed to the Attempts of his Enemies, and of those who are envious of his Greatness.* Besides, when the Crown is brought very low, it alters the due Balance of Power, which should be kept even and well-pois'd to preserve such Forms of Government; for it either inclines the People who hold the Purse to intrench upon such Prerogatives as are necessary for the Prince's Safety, and to keep the Kingdom's Peace, or it gives bad Men an opportunity of suggesting to him that wicked Council (which was given to King *Charles I.*) of making himself easy, by subverting his People's Rights.

Testament  
Politique,  
Par. 1. C. 4.  
§. 1.

This able Statesman lays down, *That good Order in the Revenue depends more on those who have the Administration than on Laws and Regulations, which remain useleſs unleſs ſuch as are employ'd to ſee them obſerv'd be willing to perform their Duty.*

The Legislative Part of the Conſtitution gives the Mony, but it principally belongs to the Miniſterial Part to take Care that what is granted be not waſted, diverted, or miſapply'd; and if ſuch as are truſted fail to do this, it is incumbent on the Legiſlature to interpoſe, and call 'em to a ſtrict Account.

The Wealth of a Country is Finite, as well as the Subſtance of any private Man; and when a Miniſtry ſet themſelves induſtriouſly about it, they can as well ruin a whole People, as the Duke of *Buckingham* could ſee an end of his great Eſtate.

*Harry III.* of *France*, for want of Order and by being ill-ſerved, in a few Years conſumed an immense Sum, and anticipated all the Crown-Revenue. His Succeſſor *Harry IV.* with a very little Care of his own, but by the infinite Application, Prudence and Honesty of the Duke of *Sully* his Treasuſurer, paid moſt of thoſe Debts off, and left behind him, at his Death, Five Millions Sterling in his Coſſers.

And



And at this Day, for want of Conduct in the Ministry, Spain is not the richer for the Silver Mines of Potosi. So that the Wealth or Poverty of the Publick does, in a manner, wholly depend upon the good or bad Administration of its Affairs.

Machiavel does not seem to think Liberality a necessary Virtue in a Prince, because, to support it, there must go so much Oppression of the People. *And that a frugal Prince shall be accounted Noble to all from whom he takes nothing away, which are an infinite number: And that he shall be esteemed Near and Parsimonious only by those few to whom he gives but little. And he says, That a Prince ought not so much to concern himself (so he exacts not upon his Subjects, so he be able to defend himself, so he becomes not despicable and commits no Rapine upon his People) tho' he be accounted Covetous, for that it is one of those Vices which fortifies his Dominion. And he observes, That Pope Julius II. was liberal till he came to the Papacy, but frugal afterwards, which enabled him to do such great Things against the Power of France.*

That the Business of most Kingdoms has been ill managed, proceeds from this: It imports the lower Rank of Men only and the People (whose Cries seldom reach the Prince till it is too late, and till all is past

past Remedy) that Matters should be frugally ordered, because Taxes must arise from their Sweat and Labour. But the great Ones, who heretofore have had the Prince's Ear and Favour, or who hoped to have him in their Possession, were sway'd by another sort of Interest; they liked Profusion, as having had a Prospect to be Gainers by it: They can easily set their Account even with the State, a small Charge upon their Land is more than balanc'd by a great Place, or a large Pension. At the same time the People who are to pay all, and expect to receive nothing, are glad to see a frugal Court; which tho' it be not so good for its Followers, never fails to enrich a Nation.

'Tis true, *Galba* is an Instance that the Virtues of a close-handed Prince may be unsuccessful in Countries govern'd by the Sword, and where the Soldier is riotous, and in long Possession of a slack Discipline. And perhaps in all Absolute Monarchies, he who Governs should rather lean towards Munificence than Thrift. But Frugality in the State can never be dangerous in a Trading Nation, rul'd by Laws of its own making; and it is not only necessary in it self, but profitable in the Example, teaching private Men that good Husbandry in their Domestick Affairs.

fairs, which never fails to enrich the whole Body-Politick.

Much nobler is it to enjoy the Praises of an Universal People, living in Plenty and at their Ease, not burthen'd by Taxes and Duties; than to have the good Words of a few Flatterers, or those Harpies which commonly haunt a Court to gripe all they can; who, when they are gorg'd themselves, pollute all the Remainder with their foul and obscene Claws, so that no Body else desires to touch it. Besides, we have hardly an Instance of any Prince, that in time of Need, was truly assisted and defended by his Minions, and the Creatures of his Bounty and Favour; but a King belov'd for wise, just and careful Government, has been very seldom deserted by his People.

But suppose a Prince should desire to exercise in a very ample manner the inbred Magnificence of his Mind; if he will discharge the Trust committed to him by the King of Kings; if he will not make what he counts Virtue destructive to his People, he must find Matter to supply his liberal Inclinations; which he only can do, who sees that his Ministers look well after his Income and Expences.

Some Persons have a strange Notion, That large Payments to the State are not hurt-

hurtful to the Publick; That Taxes make Money circulate; That it imports not what A pays, when B is to receive it: But we hope to show, that they who argue in this manner, are very much mistaken.

Part I.

P. 196,

197, 198.

We have formerly touch'd upon this Matter in the *Discourses on the Revenues, and Trade of England*, to which we refer the Reader; but the Necessity of our present Argument compels us here to handle this Point something more at large.

All Nations have a certain Annual Income upon which the People live and subsist, out of which Taxes of all kinds arise; which Income we take to be since the War,

In *England*, ——— 43,000,000 *l. per An.*

In *France*, ——— 81,000,000 *l. per An.*

In *Holland*, ——— 18,250,000 *l. per An.*

P. 195.

And we must beg leave to repeat, in this place, something which we have laid down in those Tracts; “ That to nourish the  
“ Mass of Mankind, as to their Annual  
“ Expence in the Way and Form of Living practis'd in each of the three Countries, such an Annual Income is necessary  
“ as is set down in the foregoing Scheme.  
“ By Annual Income we mean the whole  
“ that arises in any Country, from Land  
“ and

“ and its Product, from Foreign Trade  
“ and Domestick Business, as Arts, Ma-  
“ nufactures, &c. And by Annual Ex-  
“ pence, we understand what is of Necess-  
“ sity consum'd to Cloath and Feed the  
“ People, or what is requisite for their  
“ Defence in time of War, or for their  
“ Ornament in time of Peace. And  
“ where the Annual Income exceeds the  
“ Expence, there is a Superlucration aris-  
“ ing, which may be call'd Wealth or  
“ National Stock. The Revenue of the  
“ Government is a part of this Annual In-  
“ come, as likewise a part of its Expence;  
“ and where it bears too large a propor-  
“ tion with the whole, as in *France*, the  
“ common People must be miserable, and  
“ burthen'd with heavy Taxes. That  
“ part of the Prince's Revenue that nour-  
“ ishes his own Person is very little; but  
“ in great Monarchies, where numerous  
“ Armies, large Fleets, and pompous  
“ Courts are maintain'd, there the Ex-  
“ pence swells high, insomuch that to the  
“ Maintenance of the Governing part,  
“ *viz.* the Prince, his Officers of State,  
“ Military Power, &c. which are not in  
“ time of Peace above one 26th of the  
“ whole, there is required near the Ninth  
“ Penny of the Annual Income. And in  
“ such Countries the Governing part are  
“ Rich

“ Rich or at their Ease, but the other 29  
“ parts, who are the Body of the People,  
“ must be oppressed with Taxes, as may  
“ be observ’d in the French Dominions.  
“ And this holds more strongly, where  
“ the Publick Debts make the Payment  
“ of a sixth part of the Annual Income  
“ necessary, which, for some time, is like  
“ to be the Case of *France*.

To explain these Assertions shall be the Subject of this Section, whereby it will appear how much the Ballance of Trade may be affected by our Payments to the Publick.

We shall endeavour to show, in the last Section, That the Wealth of a Country does in a great measure proceed from a right Administration of its Affairs: However, it may happen sometimes to increase in Riches where Things are in the main ill administer’d, as *England* did to the Year 1688, in the two Reigns that preceded this; but whoever looks carefully into the true Reason why we grew so fast in Wealth during those Eight and twenty Years, will find it was because we paid all that time but small Taxes and Duties to the Government, comparatively with other Nations.

For in 1688. }  
 our gross Pay- }  
 ments to the Pub- }  
 lick, in which }  
 Charge of Ma- } 2,300,000 *per Annum.*  
 nagement was }  
 included, did not }  
 exceed ——— }

Which was }  
 but little above }  
 one 20th Part of } 44,000,000 *An. Inc.*  
 the then ——— }

But our Case is very much alter'd, now, and since that Year, a great many new Revenues have been erected. We still pay the old Excise, the Customs and Post-Mony; besides which, there is laid Additional Duties upon Beer, Ale, and other Liquids; Additional Customs, the continued Acts and Joint Stocks, Duty on Marriages, &c. double Duty on Stamp'd Paper, Duty on Hackney Coaches, on Malt. The double Tonnage, the former and last Duties upon Salt. The Duty on Windows, upon Leather, Paper and Coals.

The

The Old and  
 New Impositions  
 of all kinds rec-  
 kon'd together,  
 and including the  
 new Poll, and the } 5,500,000 Last Year  
 3 Shillings Aid, |  
 it will be found:  
 that there was  
 collected from  
 the People about,  
 Which is above,  
 one eighth part of } 43,000,000 An. Inc.  
 our present —

During all the War, there has been levied here great Sums every Year, and many of the foremention'd Fonds are to continue so long, that it will be several Years before our Annual Payments can be considerably diminish'd. And there is such a difference between a Twentieth and an Eighth, or indeed a Tenth, or a Twelfth Part (which yet we shall not come at in some time) as must inevitably affect the Nation's Trade, and the whole Body of its People.

When there was rais'd no more than about a Twentieth Part, there were great Sums of Mony to circulate in Foreign Traffick, and to employ in enlarging our Home



Home-Manufactures, which two Fountains of our Wealth must be dry, when the Springs that heretofore fed 'em are diverted, and let into another Channel.

There is scarce any of these new Revenues, which do not give Trade some desperate Wound. The Additional Duties on Beer and Ale, and the Tax upon Malt, are apparently a Burthen upon the Woollen Manufactures, affecting the Carder, Spinner, Weaver and the Dyer, who all of them must be rais'd in their Wages, when the Necessaries of Life are rais'd to them. The Consequence of which will be, That our Woollen Goods must come at a heavy and disadvantageous Price into the Foreign Markets.

There is no Man will pretend, that High Customs are not pernicious to our Commerce abroad. A Nation is not Gainers in the general Ballance of Trade, by the Dealing of a Few, who are able to employ in it great Stocks; such may make to themselves an Immense Gain, but they go but a little towards enriching the *whole* Publick, which seldom thrives, but when, in a manner, the Universal People bend their Thoughts to this sort of Business; when every one is ready with his small Stock, and little Sum, to venture and rove about the World: Of  
L these

these some prosper, and others are undone; however, in the way of Merchandize, Men who do not thrive themselves, may yet contribute very much to make their Country Rich, which gets by the Dealings of all, and does not suffer by the unfortunate Conduct of here and there a Merchant. But when the Customs are High, all these under Dealers, who all along in *England* have made up the chief Bulk of our Trading Men, must hold their Hands, tho' in Skill, Industry, and inventive Parts and Wit, they may exceed Merchants of more Wealth, and of a higher Rank. Nor is it indeed practicable for Men of but a moderate Fortune to Deal at all, when more than treble that Sum is necessary to have ready now to pay the King, which formerly would set up a Substantial Trader, and maintain him in sufficient Business.

But of all the new Impositions, none are so dangerous to the very Being of Trade, nor so hurtful to all its Parts and Members, as the high Duties lately laid upon Salt. First, They affect the Common People in the whole Course of their Living, whose chief Nourishment is Bacon, and other Salted Flesh, so that this Excise has an universal Influence upon all our Manufactures whatsoever. But  
the

1871

1872

1873

1874

1875

1876

1877

1878

1879

1880

1881

1882

1883

1884

1885

1886

1887

# Scheme H.

A SCHEME of the Naval Trade of England  
arising thereby, Calculated for the Year, 168

	Value here l.	Value abroad l.	Value upon the Ballance l.	
Exported,				
By our Selves,	3,310,000	4,120,000	Value abroad 4,120,000	T
By Foreigners,	1,000,000	1,250,000	Value here 1,000,000	T
	<u>4,310,000</u>	<u>5,370,000</u>	<u>5,120,000</u>	
Imported,				
By our Selves,	5,570,000	2,870,000	Value abroad 2,870,000	T
By Foreigners,	1,550,000	1,150,000	Value here 1,550,000	T
	<u>7,120,000</u>	<u>4,020,000</u>	<u>4,420,000</u>	G
Gross Imports,	4,310,000	5,370,000	Gross Imports 4,420,000	G
Gross Exports,			Gross Exports 5,120,000	
	<u>11,430,000</u>	<u>9,390,000</u>	<u>19,540,000</u>	
In all—			Val. abroad	
			4,120,000	In
So the Exports by our own Shipping being			2,870,000	In
Imports by our own Shipping			1,250,000	
National Gain by our Shipping in the Ballance of Trade			Value here	
			1,550,000	In
And the Imports by Foreign Shipping being			1,000,000	
Exports by Foreign Shipping			<u>550,000</u>	
National Loss by Foreign Shipping in the Ballance of Trade				

Place this Scheme p. 147.

*Trade of England, and the National Profit  
for the Year, 1688.*

Ballance		Gain by Freight, &c.	
l.		l.	
4,120,000	To our Selves,	810,000	
1,000,000	To Foreigners,	250,000	
<hr/>		<hr/>	
5,120,000		1,060,000	
2,870,000	To our Selves,	2,700,000	
1,550,000	To Foreigners,	400,000	
<hr/>		<hr/>	
4,420,000	Gross Imports,	3,100,000	
5,120,000	Gross Exports,	1,060,000	
<hr/>		<hr/>	
9,540,000		4,160,000	
Val. abroad		Val. abroad	
4,120,000	} In all	—	6,990,000
2,870,000			
1,250,000			
Value here		Value here	
1,550,000	} In all	—	2,550,000
1,000,000			
<hr/>		<hr/>	
550,000		9,540,000	

the general Prejudice it may bring to Navigation, is yet of much a higher Consequence.

Mr. *King*, in his Computations of the Naval Trade of *England*, Anno 1688. and the National Profit then arising thereby, reckoning what Proportion was Navigated by our selves at that time, and what by Foreigners, is of Opinion, That with Relation to the value of our whole Trade here at home, our own Navigation was somewhat more than three fourths, and the Foreign Navigation near one fourth; But reckoning the value of the Foreign Navigation at the Market here, and of our own at the Markets abroad, then the Foreign Navigation seems to have been at that time in Proportion to our own, as one to two three fourths, and with respect to the Tunnage of Ships, our own Navigation seems to have been at that time two thirds, and the Foreign Navigation one third, according to the following Scheme.

*Vide Scheme H.*

From whence he Concludes,

L 2

That

l.

That our Gain upon the  
Ballance by our own Shipping } 1,250,000  
being — — — — —

And our Loss upon the  
Ballance by Foreign Shipping } 0,550,000  
being — — — — —

The Increase of Money, or  
Adequate Treasure, by the  
Ballance of Trade in General, } 700,000  
might be *Anno* 1688. — — —

And that the Advantage to Foreigners  
Trading to *England* in their own Ships,  
might be at that time in General thus.

l.

By Freight, or Advance of  
the Price of our Commodities } 250,000  
Exported by them, above the  
value here — — — — —

By Freight, or Advance of  
the Price of their own Commo-  
dities Imported here above their } 400,000  
value abroad — — — — —

In all, 650,000

Besides,

Brought over	—	—	l.	650,000
Besides, the Increase of Goods Imported to their own Countries over and above their own Exports, according to the value of them in their own Countries	—	—	—	100,000
				—
In all,				750,000

Upon the whole He Concludes,

First, That the General Increase of our Mony or Adequate Treasure, and of Wares and Commodities over and above the value of our Gross Exports, was *Anno 1688.* —

And the Gain made by Foreign Nations with *England*, in their own Shipping, was

So that the Naval Trade of *England* was at that time, generally profitable to our Selves and Foreigners in all —

Secondly, That the National Profit to *England* by Foreign Trade was then at least

L 3

Where



l.	
Whereof in } Mony or Ade- } quate Treasure }	700,000
And in Wares } or Commodities }	
Treasur'd up, or }	
applied to the }	1,700,000
Increase of the }	
National Stock, }	1,000,000
besides what we }	
consum'd our }	
selves — — — }	

Whoever considers these Computations, will find 'em very Judiciously made, and that Mr. *King* has done as much as could be performed meerly by the Strength of Numbers.

To come to an exact Knowledge in this Matter, and such as would be almost beyond Contradiction, the Books of the Customs should be look'd into; and from thence might be drawn an Accompt of all the Exportations from *London*, and the Out Ports to every distinct Country; and also of all the Importations to *London*, and the Out Ports from every distinct Country, and what might at that time be the value of those Goods, being computed

puted by able Merchants: And this to be done for some competent Number of Years by reasonable Mediums, it may be very nearly guess'd from such a View, how the Ballance of Trade stood from time to time.

But where a thing so much within their Reach (and which the *French* Ministers are said to do in their Exports and Imports) has not been done by the Men of Business here; there is no way of knowing how the Ballance stands, but by considering the Numbers of the People, and their probable Consumption of our Home Product, and of Foreign Materials, from whence a Judgment may be form'd, not indeed perfectly demonstrable, but very near the Truth.

Mr. *King* observes, That by how much the Nation does not consume of its Imports, but either lays up, or increases the Stock of Gold or Silver, or other Adequate Treasure, or of durable Commodities in Specie; by so much, at least, does the Nation gain by Foreign Trade, besides all other Advantages of Navigation.

'Tis difficult to know how our Navigation has proceeded for these ten Years last past, but 'tis to be feared, That the Gain which Foreigners have made, by

fetching and carrying in their own Bottoms, has been much greater of late, then it was heretofore; which must be a very considerable Prejudice to *England*, and highly tend to set the Ballance of Trade against us.

Reckoning long and short Voyages together, the principal Expence of fitting out a Trading Vessel, is Drink and Meat. The Excises and Duty upon Malt, without doubt, make Drink sufficiently dear to the Freighter. And the Duty upon Salt makes Victualling a very heavy Burthen upon him, all which must end in lessening our Navigation from time to time; for undoubtedly Foreigners observing how dear Freight is with us, will Trade in their own Ships as much as possible.

In Barrelling up Beef and Pork, we heretofore made use of *St. Martin's*, &c. or *Oleron* and *Englisch* Salt mixed together; and with these Materials the Flesh was best prepared, both for wholsomness, and long keeping; our own Salt without Foreign Mixture being fiery, corrosive, and very Scorbutick. As we are informed, the *St. Martins*, and worser sort of *French* Salt, from 1676, to 1688, was delivered in *London*, at about 2*l.* 5*s.* per Tun, and forty Bushels to the Tun. And that from  
*Oleron*,

*Oleron*, at from 2 *l.* 10 *s.* to 2 *l.* 15. *per* Tun. But now the very Duty for forty Bushels of *Oleron* Salt amounts to 13 *l.* 6. *s.* 8. *d.* besides the 25 *per Cent.* *ad valorem*, of which formerly the prime Cost came to but 2 *l.* 15 *s.* at highest: The Duty likewise upon forty Bushels of *Lisbon* Salt comes to 13 *l.* 6 *s.* 8 *d.* of which the prime Cost was formerly, at highest, but 3 *l.* 10 *s.* And as to our *Newcastle*, and *Limington* Salt, which is now generally made use of in Salting Beef and Pork for Trading Vessels; the very Duty for forty Bushels amounts to 6 *l.* 13 *s.* 4 *d.* of which, before the War, the prime Cost came but to 3 *l.* at the dearest Market: Infomuch that we are credibly inform'd, a Merchant can store himself in *Ireland*, for a long Voyage, with Salt, Beef and Pork, ready pack'd up, almost as cheap as he can buy the Salt in *England*.

So that for long Voyages, the Merchant will either Victual in *Ireland*, or Salt his Beef and Pork on some Foreign Coast, as he Sails along, where Provisions shall be cheap, which must bring a great Damage to the Landed Interest here; or if he does not do so, Victualling will be so expensive to him, as to make Freight much dearer than it ought to be in a Country that expects to thrive by Trade.

The

The Consequence of all which will be, That the Body of our Merchants must lie under a general Discouragement; They will neglect looking after National Gain, which *English* Merchants have perhaps heretofore as much consider'd in their Dealings, as any Trading Men in the whole Commercial World; They will have an Eye to nothing but their own temporary Profit, and suffer Strangers to go away with those Gains which *England* was wont to make by Freight; from whence it will follow, That we must decay in our Stock of Shipping, and decrease every Year in the breed of Seamen; and when this happens, we must no more pretend to such a Naval Strength as has hitherto made us terrible to all our Neighbours.

Trade, without doubt, is in its nature a pernicious thing; it brings in that Wealth which introduces Luxury; it gives a rise to Fraud and Avarice, and extinguishes Virtue and Simplicity of Manners; it depraves a People, and makes way for that Corruption which never fails to end in Slavery, Foreign or Domestick. *Licurgus*, in the most perfect Model of Government that was ever fram'd, did banish it from his Common-wealth. But, the Posture and Condition of other Countries

tries consider'd, 'tis become with us a necessary Evil. We shall be continually expos'd to Insults and Invasions without such a Naval Force, as is not to be had naturally but where there is an extended Traffick. However, if Trade cannot be made subservient to the Nation's Safety, it ought to be no more encourag'd here than it was in *Sparta*: And it can never tend to make us safe, unless it be so managed as to make us increase in Shipping and in the Breed of Seamen.

Freight is not only the most Politick, but the most National and most certain Profit a Country can possibly make by Trade; Therefore all Duties must be pernicious that burthen it, and make it dear. And we have dwelt the longer upon this Article of the Salt Duty, because it seems to have more dangerous Consequences, in relation to our Commerce abroad, than all the other Impositions put together.

The late Tax upon Coals is a heavy Burthen on all Handicrafts working on Iron, a Manufacture in which we are now come to a great Perfection. And the Skill and Neatness of our Work-men is such in Locks, Keys, Hindges, and other Curiosities of this kind; that our Exportations of these Commodities may in time grow

grow very considerable, if this new Duty does not interrupt their Industry.

We have shown in several Instances, how the Excises lately set a foot, may affect us in the general Ballance of Trade. And we have done it with a design of making it appear how much it is for the Common Good, to endeavour to get out of those Debts, for which these Revenues are the Security and Fund.

Mr. *King*, in a Scheme of his, of the Yearly Increase and Decrease of the Actual Stock of *England*, from the Year 1600. to 1698. and what it may probably amount to by the Year 1710. if the present Peace continue, (and none of those Accidents of Plague, War, Fires and Civil Discords intervene, which more or less do certainly diminish or hinder the Increase of the Nations Wealth, whenever they happen) computes, That *Anno* 1600. the said Actual Stock was but about 25 Millions, making a Yearly Increase of about 4 or 500,000 *l*. That *Anno* 1630. it was about 37 Millions, making a Yearly Increase of about one Million. That in 1664. (the Year before the last great Plague) it was about 64 Millions, making a Yearly Increase of about 1,200,000 *l*. And that *Anno* 1668. it was about 86 Millions, making a Yearly Increase of 2,400,000 *l*.  
And

And Concludes,

First, That the last Plague, the Fire of *London*, and the *Dutch War*, did actually diminish the said Stock, at least 9 or 10 Millions, and hindred the Increase of 18 or 20 Millions more.

Secondly, That the last War with *France*, with the other Circumstances of the Revolution, and the Recoyning the Mony, has actually diminish'd the said Stock about 12 Millions, and hindred the Increase of about 28 Millions besides.

Thirdly, That the Nation will not arrive to the same Degree of Actual Stock, which it had *Anno 1688.* till about the Year 1705. nor make an Increase of 2,400,000 *l. per Annum*, as it did in 1688. till about the Year 1706. nor then neither, unless the Taxes be considerably diminish'd; that thereby our Navigation and Commerce may be fully restored, to what it was before the late War.

We do not pretend to give any Account of the present Posture of our Foreign Trade, nor how it stood during all the last War, for it would be launching into a very wide Sea; but without doubt, the Immense Sums that have been rais'd every Year, and the variety of new Duties that have been lately levied, are a heavy Burthen upon it.

And



And in order to give some little Light into this Matter, and to show how the Ballance has been, and may be thereby affected, we shall briefly State what Money has been Anually granted since the War.

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
For <i>Anno</i> 1689. <sup>7</sup> Granted for the War, and to pay 60,000 <i>l.</i> to King <i>Charles's</i> Servants, and to pay 600,000 <i>l.</i> to the <i>Dutch</i> , in all that Year ———	1,844,786	16	04
For <i>Anno</i> 1690. Granted for the War ———	2,535,452	01	02
For <i>Anno</i> 1691. Granted for the War, and for build- ing Ships ———	4,794,861	07	00 <sup>1</sup>
For <i>Anno</i> 1692. Granted (besides what was paid out of the Revenue of the Crown towards the War) ———	3,337,268	08	09 <sup>1</sup>
Carry over ———	12,512,368	13	04

For





*Of our Payments to the Publick.*

159

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
Brought over ———	12,512,368	13	04
For <i>Anno</i> 1693. }			
Granted for the	3,471,482	16	01
War ——— }			
For <i>Anno</i> 1694. }			
Granted for the	5,030,581	09	09
War ——— }			
For <i>Anno</i> 1695. }			
Granted for the	4,883,120	00	06
War ——— }			
For <i>Anno</i> 1696. }			
Granted for the			
War, and to make			
good some Defici-			
encies, and to make	7,961,469	00	00
good the Clipp'd			
Mony, and for the			
Civil List, and			
<i>French</i> Protestants }			
For <i>Anno</i> 1697. }			
There was Granted			
for the War, and			
to make good the			
Deficiencies of for-	11,887,160	00	91
mer Funds, and for			
the Civil List, and			
<i>French</i> Protestants }			
Carry over ———	45,746,182	00	51

For

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
Brought over	45,746,182	00	05½
For <i>Anno</i> 1698.			
There were Funds given, amounting to about ———	4,500,000	00	00
Ordinary Reve- nue of the Crown, reckon'd at a Milli- on <i>per Annum</i> , by a Medium during these ten Years, might produce in the whole about	10,000,000	00	00

---

In all, 60,246,182 00 5½

But

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
Brought over	60,246,182	00	54
But in these			
Articles several			
Sums are twice			
reckon'd ; as for	<i>l.</i>		
Example, where			
one Fund was			
taken away, and			
another given in			
its place ; and	7,000,000		
where Funds			
have been grant-			
ed to supply the			
Deficiencies of			
other Funds, for			
which Articles			
there may be de-			
ducted about—			
And the ordi-			
nary Crown-Re-			
venue might be			
charged, during	5,000,000		
that time, to-			
wards the War,			
with about—			
So that there has been			
actually granted but a-			
bout			
	48,246,182	00	54

M

'Tis

'Tis not pretended, That the foregoing Accounts are exact to a Tittle; but according to the best Information we are able to procure, they are as near the Truth as is requisite in our present Argument.

Having shown what has been granted in Fonds, we shall now show what was intended by the Parliament; and, for five Years, very little more demanded for the Fleet and Army.

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
For <i>Anno</i> 1689, —	3,295,628	04	05
For <i>Anno</i> 1690, —	4,010,760	06	07
For <i>Anno</i> 1691, —	4,172,393	09	07½
For <i>Anno</i> 1692, —	3,629,439	12	03
For <i>Anno</i> 1693, —	4,117,080	09	06
For <i>Anno</i> 1694, —	5,030,581	09	09
For <i>Anno</i> 1695, —	4,883,120	00	06
For <i>Anno</i> 1696, —	5,024,854	04	11
For <i>Anno</i> 1697, —	4,880,078	19	11
For <i>Anno</i> 1698, —	1,300,000	00	00
<hr/>			
	40,343,936	17	05½

*Note*, That from *Anno* 1693 inclusive, to *Anno* 1697 inclusive, the difference between what was demanded by the Ministers, and granted by the Parliament for the Fleet and Army during those Five Years, amounted in the whole time but to 1,465,623 *l.* 19 *s.* 9½ *d.*

Sup-

Suppose the Expence of the Civil List from 1689 inclusive, to 1698 inclusive, to have been one Year with another 600,000 *l. per Annum.*

*l. s. d.*

The Expence of the Civil List then in ten Years may have been } 6,000,000--00--00

Towards which the ordinary Revenue of the Crown, besides what it was charged with to the War, may have yielded about — — } 5,000,000--00--00

But in 1696 and in 1697, there was granted by the Parliament for the Civil List *per Annum*, 500,000 *l.* in the whole — — } 1,000,000--00--00

So that in this Computation the Expence of the Civil List is to be reckon'd at but — — } 5,000,000--00--00

M 2

And



And the Accounts of *England* may run thus,

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
Actually granted	48,246,182	00	05½

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
Ex- pence of the War,	40,343,936	17	05½

Ex- pence of the Civil List	5,000,000	00	00
---	-----------	----	----

	45,343,936	17	05½
--	------------	----	-----

Remains	2,902,245	02	11½
---------	-----------	----	-----

So that except in the Article of Interest Mony, and except in the Article of 1,465,623 *l.* 19 *s.* 09½ *d.* in which the Demands of the Ministers for the State of the War, exceeded what was granted by the Parliament, the Expences of the Government seem to have been fully supply'd, and that there remains an over-Ballance of 2,902,245 *l.* to be accounted for.

Now as to Interest-Mony for the 5,000,000 *l.* with which the Crown-Revenue may have been charg'd towards the War, those Fonds, most of 'em, have and will answer the Principal and all the

Interest

Interest allow'd by Parliament: And other Interest, which several Fonds fell short of satisfying, has been in a great measure made good by the Supply of 7,000,000 *l.* granted to answer Deficiencies.

And as to the State of the War having exceeded what was granted, in ballancing the general Accompt, this Article ought to be considered, if during the whole War the Muster-Rolls have been full; and if all along we have had our Complement of Ships and Seamen, according to that State of the War which was every Year laid before the Parliament.

But upon the whole Matter, considering what has been granted, and what may probably have been expended, there seems good Reason to think that the Publick of *England*, if all Accompts were narrowly inspected, cannot be much in Arrear either to the Fleet, Army, or to the Civil List.

So that if there shall remain any great Arrear, in all likelihood it must chiefly arise from exorbitant Premiums, unwarrantable Interest, and other ways of laying out Money, hurtful to the King, and destructive to the People.

The rough Draught of our general Accompts here given, which is as perfect

as a By-stander only could procure, may perhaps afford some little Help to such as will think of these Affairs; and this rude Model may contribute towards the forming of a better Scheme.

The Forty eight Millions granted, as we have said, by Parliament for the several Years from 1689 to 1698 inclusive, have not been actually levied. To state exactly how much of it has been already rais'd, and what proportion of it remains secured by remote Fonds, is not to be done without greater Helps than the Writer of these Papers can come at: But so far we know, and may affirm safely, that a great part of the Product of Land, our Trade, and Manufactures, remain still mortgaged for upwards of twenty Millions.

Two of the Nine Pences on Beer and Ale are to be esteemed as a Perpetuity, the third Nine Pence is engaged for a long Term of Time; the first Duty upon Salt can be look'd upon no better than as a perpetual Fond; the new Customs, continued Acts and Joint-Stocks, the Duty on Marriages, Births, &c. the first Duty on Stamp'd Paper, the Duty on Windows, half the Duty on Glass-Ware, the new Duties on Whale-Fins and Scotch Linnen, are continued to the First of *August*, 1706. The last Duties upon Salt, and Stamp'd Paper,

Paper, are Perpetuities; there is a further Subsidy of Tonnage and Poundage granted from the last of *January*, 1699. for His Majesty's Life-time; and the Impositions upon Malt, Leather and Paper, are not expired.

To imagine we can buy off and redeem, in any moderate time, all these Perpetuities or long Fonds, is a vain Hope; but this may be laid down for a certain Truth, That *England* will never flourish in Trade and Manufactures till the greatest Part of 'em are clear'd, and till our Affairs are brought to such a Posture, that we may not pay to the Government either for the Support of the Crown, or on Accompt of Fonds, where the Principal is sunk, above 2,300,000 *l. per Annum*, or about a twentieth part of the Nation's general Income, which was our Condition before the War.

And unless this can be compass'd it will be found, That in no long Course of Time we shall languish and decay every Year, by Steps easy enough to be perceived by such as consider of these Matters. Our Gold and Silver will be carried off by degrees, Rents will fall, the Purchase of Land will decrease, Wooll will sink in its Price, our Stock of Shipping will be diminished, Farm-houses will go to ruin,

Industry will decay, and we shall have upon us all the visible Marks of a declining People.

It may indeed be objected, That *France* for about forty, and *Holland* for above a hundred Years have thriven by Trade, notwithstanding that all the while they have lain under the Burthen of heavy Taxes. To which may be answered, That where (as in *France*) the Administration in other Things is exact and right, the Subjects, though poor, may enlarge their Traffick; for general good Order makes amends for a great deal of Oppression; but they would yet have had more Trade if their Prince had left 'em richer: Besides, Arbitrary Power has compell'd 'em to that Domestick Thrift, which of it self goes very far to make a People succeed in Foreign Commerce, tho' their Payments to the Publick are excessive. And as to the Dutch they have been so long inur'd to this Parsimony, that the more they are to pay the State, the more they save at home; and they always take care not to clog their Importations; and from this Polity it comes that high Taxes are not hurtful to their Trade.

But in Countries where the Administration of Affairs is loose, partly through the mildness of the Laws, and partly through

through the bad Execution of 'em, where the People have been in a long Possession of Ease and Plenty, and where they think it an Essential part of Freedom to be as Expensive and Luxurious as they please, and where no Man retrenches upon any publick Accompt whatsoever : Among such a People, high Taxes, Duties, and Impositions, must inevitably occasion a decay of Trade ; and tho' their Dealings seem large and not to be interrupted, they shall carry on such a sort of Traffick as will bring along with it at last their certain Ruin.

A variety of new Impositions and remote Fonds do not only hurt us in the Ballance of Trade, as we have shown, but they are dangerous to Liberty, without which, Trade can never truly flourish, and without which it is indeed of no Importance ; for to what end should Men acquire Wealth, which they cannot call their own ? And accordingly under Despotick Governments (except in some places where the Administration of the Tyranny is very wisely carried on) but few trouble themselves with the Thoughts of Foreign Traffick.

Whoever considers the vast number of new Duties now a-foot, will find that 'tis not impossible to make 'em the Engines  
where-

wherewith bad Men, some time or other, may endeavour to undermine our Civil Rights. 'Tis true, in this Reign we have no reason to entertain such a Fear, but a Country that will preserve its Constitution must provide against remote Dangers.

At present we pay to the Government, besides the Three Shillings Aid and Poll-Mony, so many Duties, Old and New, as amount to about Three Millions and a half *per Annum*. Some of 'em, 'tis true, expire shortly. But suppose Necessity or bad Management (and there is nothing which ill Husbandry cannot devour) should compel us to continue what is now expiring for a longer time; and admit that for present Subsistence, and to pay old Debts, these Fonds of Three Millions and a half *per Annum* should be settled as a Security to Lenders, for some certain time to come.

Suppose then a Government in the Possession of such a large Revenue at first legally granted, put into a Method of Collection, and to the Payment of which the People shall be accustomed.

And suppose, in some future Reign, the Ministers should be either weary or afraid of Parliaments, and desirous to Govern by the Sword, and without Law. That this may happen is not impossible, because

cause we have heretofore seen Statesmen so dispos'd.

'Tis to be hoped this is a Danger very remote indeed ; but when a Ministry shall be so madly inclin'd, the Symptoms of their approaching Frenzy will be evident enough ; for at such a Season we shall see 'em choose rather to be supply'd by distant Fonds, than with what will produce ready Mony : And they will take care that Revenues granted may not be well managed nor improved to the Height, with this Design, That the People may be kept in the dark, both as to what they give, and as to what each Branch is like to yield.

Suppose then an Ambitious and Desperate Set of Men, with all these Thoughts about 'em, and resolved to make their Master Absolute, may they not, with the Help of such an ample Revenue, quite overthrow our Constitution ? Arbitrary Ministers have heretofore stopp'd the Exchequer ; and if we should ever see Men of the same Stamp upon the Stage of Business, 'tis not impossible but that they may run into the same wicked Measures, especially if they should be back'd with the Support of a Standing Army.

The



The Liberties of a People are but in a very precarious Condition, when they can be subverted by one pernicious Counsel: It should therefore be the Care of such as love their Country, to render this fatal Advice as dangerous and impracticable as Laws can make it.

At a time when there is such an Immense Revenue collected every Year, it seems a Fault in our Constitution that sufficient Provision is not made against diverting and misapplying the Publick Treasure, and against breaking into Appropriated Fonds. And to speak in plain Words, There is reason to fear that the Laws have not made it Criminal enough to stop Payments in the Exchequer.

When a Town that apprehends a Siege finds it self weak by Nature in one place, the first Care of the Defenders is to fortifie that Post as well as ever they can. In the same manner a Constitution that is attackable one way, should strengthen that Part with severe Laws. The Exchequer therefore should be fenced about with all possible Skill, that it may never be invaded by bold and designing Ministers.

A Stop there would at once pull down all our Civil Rights. Nay, to stop the Principal only, tho' the Payments of the  
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Interest should be continued, would be fatal to our Constitution, for there would yet remain an Income large enough to make Parliaments useles. And if wicked Men should thus set up for themselves, they would still have Revenue sufficient to bear their Expences, and to keep up an Army to awe such as their Conduct shall displease.

Some indeed will argue, That a corrupted Ministry will as soon make new Levies of Mony, as venture thus to divert what has been already granted and appropriated: But this Objection has no weight in it. The People more willingly submit to a Tax once lawful, than to pay a new Duty against Law. The Tonnage and Poundage illegally levied in the former part of King *Charles I.*'s Reign, did not occasion half the Clamour as the new Imposition of Ship-Mony. In the beginning of King *James II.*'s Reign, the Tonnage and Poundage, and Temporary Excise, determined by King *Charles* his Death, was paid without opposition; but if King *James* had attempted to raise a new Tax by the Regal Authority, his Subjects without doubt would not have paid it. Besides, when a Tax is lawful in its Original, 'tis to be feared that the People will not much concern themselves  
who

who is to receive it, the Court, or such as have trusted the Exchequer; but they would be alarm'd to some purpose if they should be called upon to make new Payments not warranted by Law. So that in all probability more Danger may arise to our Liberties from breaking into old Fonds appropriated, and stopping the Exchequer, than from making new and forcible Levies upon the Subject.

And though there is no Cause in this Reign to fear such Attempts, yet it must certainly be Wisdom to provide against future Evils, especially when 'tis possible that one desperate and wicked Council may destroy that Constitution for which we have been so long contending.

The true way to hinder such a Disease from ever coming upon the Body-Politick will be to remove the Cause, by lessening as soon as possible these Payments to the Publick of three Millions and a half *per Annum*, besides Polls and Land-Taxes; which large Issues may endanger Liberty, and without doubt hurt us in the Ballance of Trade.

The Debts for which these Fonds are a Security, by Negligence will every Year increase, insomuch that in a very short time, and with a very little more Carelessness, the Raising more and more will  
grow

grow unavoidable for our common Defence, till at last we shall come to pay constantly between five and six Millions *per Annum*. And when this Kingdom shall be arrived at that Period of ill Conduct, we may venture to Pronounce, That the Common People of *England* will in all Circumstances be then as poor and miserable, as the Common People of *France* were before the War. And we desire all good Patriots to carry this Reflection in their minds.

On the contrary by good Management this Debt may be lessen'd, so that the Fonds which are its Security (instead of of being continued) may be dropt every Year, till at last we may come to pay to the Government for its Support and Defence, such a Sum as will not be dangerous to our Freedoms, nor prejudicial to our Foreign Traffick.

He who proposes Thrift may please the Common People, but he shall be sure to disgust some others; However the Writer of these Papers thinks it his Duty to Recommend Frugality in the State; and he believes 'tis the Wisest and Honestest way of Inriching the Publick, to make it Rich out of its own Revenues.

As

Part I.  
pag. 119.

As to what Improvements may be made in the Revenues already granted, we refer the Reader to what we have formerly said upon this Subject in our Discourses on the Revenues and Trade of *England*; We have laid down that several Branches there specified may, by good Management, and without Oppression, be Annually Encreased 736,075*l*.

Nor upon Enquiry since, do we find any Reason to recede from this Opinion; on the contrary we have good Cause to think, that they are rather Capable of greater Improvements than we had then taken notice of.

The *Malt* is indeed an Article in that Account; but 'tis an expiring Duty which the People of *England* hope never to see continued, therefore an Abatement is to be made upon that Head: But the remaining Branches, if well look'd after, would ease us of very many Burthens.

In that Discourse, we have shown several Reasons not yet Answered, Why the Excise on Beer and Ale single and double is Improvable in the whole 318,000 *l. per Annum*, but instead of rising, the Excise is again fallen since the Account was Stated.

Single

l.

Single and Double Excise	}	900,000.
Year Ending 24 June, 1697.		
Produced about ———		

The said Duties, Year End-	}	860,000.
ing 24 June 1698. Produced		
about ———		

The Duties fallen, about	40,000.
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So that the Excise now almost Doubled produces but about the same Sum which it yielded formerly with the single Duty only upon it; for which we shall presume to say, the Managers neither have given, nor can give, any well grounded and solid Reason.

When we consider how much the Excise was Advanced in six Years by good Management, we cannot but be of Opinion, that a very great Sum might be Raised every Year towards Clearing the gross Debt, by Skill and careful Conduct, in such as Govern the respective Branches.

But tho it imports the State to a high Degree to have the utmost of its Legal Dues, and just Revenues, fairly brought in, yet a great deal more depends upon having this Revenue Frugally and Wisely

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laid out; For, as in private Instances, He who lives with Oeconomy, shall be Richer, tho his Gains are but small, than a Prodigal, let his Gettings be never so large; So Governments which manage their Affairs thriftily, shall have more Wealth than States which have the way to obtain never so large Contributions from their People.

What is to be got by good Management in bringing in the Revenues, is nothing in comparison of what may be saved in laying out the Publick Treasure, one way the Proffit is limited and narrow, and the other boundless, one way we can reckon but by Hundreds, the other way by Millions.

*Testament  
Politique  
Part 2. C.  
9. Sect. 7.*

A Venetian Ambassador once told Cardinal Richlieu, That there needed no more to make France happy, than wisely to lay out what was vainly dissipated. *Qu'elle Scut aussi bien despeser ce qu'elle dissipoit sans Raison que la Republique sçavoit bien n'employer pas un seul Quadrain sans besoin, et sans beaucoup de Menage.*

A State must be plunged into endless Debts and Difficulties, unless it has a strict Eye over all its Expences, especially such as relate to a War, which is always a greedy Monster, but Devours much more when 'tis left to feed at random.

To

To come at such a future Thrift as may bring us out of that Debt which lies so heavy in the other Scale when we consider of the Ballance of Trade; One way perhaps will be severely to Enquire how the Forty eight Millions already given have been Expended: Besides it will not peradventure be difficult to show that of the many Millions still owing, a large Sum might be saved, if the Publick Accompts from their very beginning were overhauled.

A Government that will get out of Debt, must look nicely into every particular; It ought in Prudence to examine into all Grants made by the Crown, when the People lay under the Burthen of Heavy Taxes.

'Tis said that the Forfeitures in *Ireland*, and the Lands possessed by the Crown in 1688, would satisfy a large part of what the Publick is now Indebted.

'Tis alledged that Gains unwarrantable in Law, and not to be justified by any Necessity whatsoever, have been made in several Contracts with the Crown, if all this were look'd into, very probably something might be sav'd towards discharging the Nations Debts.

There is one piece of Management which the Writer of these Papers is very much surprized at, and it relates to the Exchequer Bills.



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l.

The first  
Subscription at 10 } 400,000. Premium 40,000.  
per Cent, was for }

The second Sub-  
scription at 10 per } 700,000. Premium 70,000.  
Cent, was for }

The third  
Subscription at 10 } 500,000. Premium 50,000.  
per Cent, was for }

The 4th.  
Subscription at 8 } 400,000. Premium 32,000.  
per Cent, was for }

The fifth  
Subscription at 4 } 1,000,000. Premium 40,000.  
per Cent, was for }

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Total Sub- } 3,000,000. tot. Prems. 232,000.  
scriptions }

Besides

Besides, these Premiums there is a Current Interest upon the Bills of above  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per Cent, And 'tis likewise observable, that the whole struck into Exchequer Bills is but 2,700,000 *l.* to circulate which there has been a Subscription of 3 Millions, so that the Engine which carries, is heavier than the weight it bears, which seems but clumsy Workmanship; besides 'tis remarkable that there is yet sunk of these Bills but 1,250,000 *l.* And of the Exchequer Bills a vast Sum are become Specie Notes at the Current Interest, tho Money now lies, or ought to lie, for their discharge.

There is likewise another piece of Oeconomy after which, sometime or other, it may be worth while to make Enquiry. The Old *East-India* Company offer'd to raise the two Millions then wanted, and to deposit 200,000 *l.* to make good their Proposal, nor did they propose or expect any Premium or Deduction whatsoever; Yet their Offer was discouraged and rejected by some of our Men of Business; and the same Persons have thought it reasonable to allow to the New Company a Premium of 62,500 *l.* which was defalk'd out of the first Payment of 200,000 *l.* part of which Premium is contrary to the Express direction of the Act of Parliament.

'Twill cost *England* a large Tax to raise the Sums lavish'd in these two Instances, but we shall say no more upon these Particulars, leaving the Reader to make his own Comment upon such unaccountable Proceedings.

When the Affairs of a Private Man are in disorder, he sinks faster towards the latter end than in the beginning; The same thing holds in a Government whose Revenues are entangled, the further it goes the more the Debt swells, unless such as are concern'd in the Administration resolve before it be too late, to enter upon Wise and Thrifty Measures.

Where the King's Person is belov'd, where his Virtues are rever'd, and where the Government is of the Peoples own Forming, and Election, the Subjects will seldom fail to exert themselves strongly, and are very willing to stretch their Purses, in order to put the Publick Revenues into such a posture that the Administration may be easie, and that the Kingdom may be protected; but they must be invited to this by seeing that what they give is Frugally managed, and not Profusely wast-ed, and by observing that their Money goes to Support the State, and not to Enrich Private Persons.

Men

Men when they are worn out with Diseases, Aged, Crazy, and when besides they have the *Mala Stamina Vita*, may be patched up for a while, but they cannot hold out long; for Life, tho' it is shortned by Irregularities, is not to be extended by any Care beyond such a Period. But it is not so with the Body-Politick, by Wisdom and Conduct that is to be made long-liv'd, if not Immortal; Its Distempers are to be cured, nay its very Youth is to be renew'd, and a Mix'd Government grows Young and Healthy again, whenever it returns to the Principles upon which it was first founded.

The Disorders we labour under are capable of a Remedy, and our Difficulties are not such but that they may be master'd: Those Payments to the Publick, by good Management may be lessened, which inevitably must set the Ballance of Trade against us.

While these Immense Debts remain, the Necessities of the Government will continue, Interest must be high, and large Premiums will be given. And what Encouragement is there for Men to think of Foreign Traffick (whose Returns for those Commodities that enrich *England* must bring no great Profit to the private Adventurers) when they can sit

at home, and without any Care or Hazard get from the State by dealing with the Exchequer, Fifteen and sometimes Twenty, Thirty, Forty and Fifty *per Cent.*? Is there any Commerce abroad so constantly advantageous? Will Men who can safely, and without Trouble, reap such Gains, breed their Children to be Merchants? Will they venture great Stocks to make Discoveries, and employ their Industry to enlarge and extend our Dealings in distant Parts? Will they think of building that multitude of Trading Vessels which alone can rear us up a sufficient Breed of able Seamen? And if that Tide of Wealth which was wont to flow in Trade, be diverted to another Channel; and if we mind no other Traffick but that which just supplies our Luxuries, must we not in a few Years be Losers in the general Ballance?

Where Interest is high, the Merchants care not to deal in any but rich Commodities, whose Freight is easy, and whose Vent is certain in corrupted Countries; And of these Costly Wares very many carry out Money, and but few bring any back to the Kingdom. 'Tis the Bulky Goods, whose Returns are not of so great Profit, that breed most Seamen, and that are most Nationally gainful; but such  
Goods

Goods cannot be very much dealt in where Interest is high, nor can any Laws in the World lower it where great Sums are continually borrow'd by the Government. And by these Instances it must sufficiently appear, how much our Payments to the Publick may affect the Ballance of Trade.

And, treating upon this Subject, we cannot but take Notice, where the Prince is frequently absent from his own Dominions, sojourning for a long space of time in a Foreign Country, in which He, His Court, and His whole Retinue are oblig'd to make great Expences, That this is highly prejudicial to the Ballance of Trade, and, without doubt, must incline the Scale to that Nation's Side where the Money is spent.

Upon the whole Matter, If the Revenues already granted are well look'd after, and improv'd; if the Accompts of the Fleet and Army are carefully inspected; if the Grants are strictly examin'd; if the State enters intirely upon Frugal Measures; and if we resolve to exert our Selves, so as not to let this dangerous Burthen lie long upon us, this Great Debt may be clear'd in some moderate time, and those large Payments to the Publick will cease, which are like so

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many bloody Issues that emaciate the Body-Politick, and render it Hectical and Consumptive; and, if this Debt were paid, we should get rid of that variety of new Excises, and high Customs, which hurt Foreign Traffick, and interrupt us in our Domestick Business, and which are more especially a heavy Weight upon the Woollen Manufacture.

Even in a Common-wealth 'tis dangerous for one part of the People to be very much indebted to the other; and in *Rome* it was the occasion of great Seditions. When the State has borrow'd large Sums, and issued out Securities by Tallies upon different Fonds, 'tis commonly said the Publick is so and so indebted; but in truth the Case is otherwise, and more properly speaking, these sort of Fonds divide a Country into two Ranks of Men, of which one are Creditors and the other Debtors; and this Distinction does without doubt belong to all Nations where the People pay Taxes to one another, as it now happens to be our Case in *England*. The *Creditors* are the Bank, such as deal with the Publick for Stores, Lenders of all kinds, besides a great many Foreigners, whose Money is lent to the State in English Names. The *Debtors* are the Landed Men, the 5th or 6th part of

of whose Rents are pawn'd for the Publick Service from Year to Year, by Aids and Land-Fonds. All Merchants likewise who pay Customs, and all Shopkeepers and Retailers are, according to our Distinction, to be accompted *Debtors*. Thus almost all *England* may not be improperly divided into *Debtors* and *Creditors*, nor in a long and expensive War was this wholly to be avoided, but without doubt it cannot be wise nor safe to let this Distinction long continue; for tho' such as Receive may like their Condition and think themselves at Ease, yet such as are to Pay cannot be so well contented. 'Tis true, some modern Politicians have run upon another Notion; and several Persons have thought that the more Fonds are erected, the more People are engaged to preserve the present Government. This Policy indeed of theirs would hold good if they could make out, That the Lenders are stronger; and more in number than such as are concern'd in Payments to the Publick: But it rather seems to hold in Sense and Reason, That the Throne of that Prince, in a Free Nation, must be the most firmly established, whose Affairs permit him to ask the fewest Taxes from his People.

*France*



*France* was once upon a right foot in relation to its Liberties ; and they who peruse their History with Care will find, That Arbitrary Power did not so much bring in high Taxes, as high Taxes introduced Arbitrary Power ; for when that Golden Idol of an Immense Revenue was once set up , all the Nation bowed to it.

In the Second and Third Sections we have shown, That the probable Methods to make a Country Gainers in the Balance of Trade, are to take Care of Increasing and Employing the People, and to Improve Land and its Product. In this Fourth Section we have set forth how this Ballance may be affected by our Payments to the Publick. And in the last Discourse we shall endeavour to show, That the Wealth and Prosperity of a State depend chiefly upon a wise, steady and honest Administration.

SECT.

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## S E C T. V.

*That a Country cannot Increase in Wealth and Power but by Private Men doing their Duty to the Public, and but by a steady Course of Honesty and Wisdom, in such as are trusted with the Administration of Affairs.*

**A**T Romæ ruere in Servitium Consules, Patres, Eques, quanto quis illustrior, tanto magis falsi ac festinantes. *But at Rome they all ran headlong into Slavery; the Consuls, the Senate, the Gentry and the nobler the person was, the more false, and the greater haste he made. This was the Condition of Rome when Tiberius assum'd the Empire, but God forbid it should be ever the Case of England, for our Constitution will be entirely lost when such a Corruption happens; we may indeed preserve the Name of Liberty,*

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ty,

ty, and some of its outward Forms, but no more than what will help to keep our Chains the faster on: Tyrannies have been often subverted, where the Princes govern meerly by their own Will, without giving to their Subjects the least appearance of being free; but those absolute Monarchies are hardly to be shaken, and that Servitude is lasting, where the People are left to make their own Fetters.

It is a matter of great wonder, that from the Time of *Augustus* downwards, the *Romans*, who were seldom without Brave and Virtuous Men, should never make One Attempt to restore the Commonwealth, and to shake off that Power which some of the Emperors exercis'd with such exorbitance; but in all likelihood it proceeded from this, that the Souldiers and Common People, without whom no great Revolution can be made, believ'd themselves still free, because, in show, the Commonwealth had the same Form as in elder times: there was a Senate, Consuls, Tribunes, and an appearance of all the Antient Magistracies, the nothing remain'd of the antient Liberty: Bar this the Common People did not feel, for the Cruelty and Fraud of *Tiberius*, the Madnes of *Caligula*, the Stupi-

dity of *Claudius*, the Riots and Lust of *Nero*, the Gluttony and Sordid Mind of *Vitellius*, the Vanities of *Otho*, and the Enormous Vices of *Domitian* did little hurt to the Inferiour Rank of Men, who all the while had *Panem & Circences*, which was all they desir'd ; but the Mischiefs these Monstrous Princes brought upon the World, fell chiefly upon Nobler Heads ; who yet could not rescue their Country, so much were the Common People lull'd asleep, with the Opinion they entertain'd, that the Laws still govern'd, because they saw every year Consuls and a Senate ; but this Senate being corrupted, made the Tyranny boundless and safe : For the People could never be induc'd to oppose that Power which still bore some Resemblance to their Ancient Form of Government.

In the same manner, if in future Ages our Parliaments should be debauch'd in Principles, and become willing to be the Instruments of a Prince's Will, and to act as he directs them, Arbitrary Power would be here settled upon a lasting Foot ; for the Common People would never join with any who would attempt to redeem their Country, because they will be deceiv'd by Names and Forms, and think the Laws govern'd, and that they are  
 free,

free, if the outward show of the Constitution is still preserv'd.

When Cotruption has seiz'd upon the Representatives of a People, 'tis like a Cronical Disease hardly to be rooted out. When Servile Compliance and Flattery come to predominate, things proceed from bad to worse, till at last the Government is quite dissolv'd. Absolute Monarchies are in danger of great Convulsions, when one Man, their Prince, happens to be weak, or wicked; but Commonwealths, or mix'd Constitutions are safe till the Chief Part of the Leading Men are debauch'd in Principles. However, Monarchy has this Advantage, that the one Man, their Prince, is mortal, and if bad, he may be succeeded by a better; but a people thoroughly corrupted never returns to right Reason; And we see that the depravity of Manners, which began in *Rome* presently after the second *Punic* War, among the Nobility and Gentry, became every year worse and worse, till at last *Cæsar* destroyed the Commonwealth. And after his time, under the succeeding Emperors, every Senate grew more abject and complying than the other, till in Process of Time the old *Roman* Spirit was utterly extinguish'd, and then that Empire by degrees

became a Prey to Barbarous Nations.

If all parts of the State do not with their utmost power promote the Publick Good, if the Prince has other Aims than the safety and welfare of his Country, if such as represent the People do not preserve their Courage and Integrity, If the Nations Treasure is wasted, If Ministers are allow'd to undermine the Constitution with Impunity, If Judges are suffer'd to pervert Justice and wrest the Law, then is a mixt Government the greatest Tyranny in the world; it is Tyranny establish'd by a Law, tis authoris'd by Consent, and such a People are bound with Fetters of their own making. A Tyranny that governs by the Sword, has few Friends but Men of the Sword, But a Legal Tyranny ( where the People are only call'd to confirm Iniquity with their own Voices) has of its Side the Rich, the Fearful, the Lazy, those that know the Law, and get by it, Ambitious Churchmen, and all those whose Livelihood depends upon the quiet Posture of Affairs; And the Persons here describ'd compose the Influencing Part of most Nations; So that such a Tyranny is hardly to be shaken off. Men may be said to be enslav'd by Law, or their own Consent, under Corrupt or degenerate

Republicks, such as was the *Roman Commonwealth* from the time of *Cinna*, till the Attempts of *Cesar*, and under degenerate mix'd Governments, such as *Rome* was while the Emperors made a show of Ruling by Law, but with an aw'd and corrupted Senate: To which Form of Government, *England* was almost reduc'd, till the King came over to put our Liberties upon a better Foot.

But what has been, may be, and tho we are safe during his Reign, yet in after Ages, bad and designing Ministers may think their Conduct is no way to be maintain'd but by the Sword, and that they cannot securely prey upon the Commonwealth, till they have made their Master absolute, upon which Score, in these Inquiries concerning the Methods whereby *England* may be a Gainer in the General Ballance of Trade, we think it needful to lay down, That all that Wealth and Power which must defend this State upon any Emergencies or Invasions from abroad, depends upon our preserving inviolate the antient Constitution of this Kingdom.

Men do as industriously contrive Fallacies to deceive themselves (when they have a Mind to be deceiv'd) as they study Frauds whereby to deceive Others;  
And

And if it leads to their Ends, and gratifies their present Ambition, they care not what they do, thinking it time enough to serve the Public, when they have serv'd themselves; and in this view very many betray their Trusts, Comply, Give up the Peoples Rights, and let Fundamentals be invaded, flattering themselves, that when they are grown as great as they desire to be, 'twill be then time enough to make a stand, and redeem the Commonwealth. The same Notion led *Pompey* to joyn with those who intended to Subvert the *Roman* Liberties; But he found them too strong, and himself too weak, when he desir'd to save his Country.

In the same manner, if there be any in this Nation who desire to build their Fortunes upon the Publick Ruin, they ought to consider that their great Estates, high Honours and Preferments, will avail 'em little when the Subversion of Liberty has weaken'd and impoverish'd us so, as to make way for the bringing in of Foreign Power.

It imports all Degrees of Men in their several Posts, to endeavour at the Preserving that Form of Government, under which we have prosper'd for near seven hundred Years. It happens seldom that



any Country is totally subdu'd by Foreign Force, and Civil War is indeed a raging Fever; but it goes away of itself, when the Humours that fed it are spent, and is often no more than the Sign of a Health too florid, and the Effects only of too much Blood in the Body Politick: But ill Conduct in a State long continued, wastes it by slow and certain degrees, and at last brings an incurable Consumption upon all its Parts and Members,

If the Affairs of this Kingdom should ever happen to be ill conducted, which we hope is a Remote Fear, the Legislative Power must then interpose with its Authority, and the united Wisdom of the Nation must rescue Us out of weak and polluted hands, for such a Ministry is a surer Engine to destroy a State, than any its Enemies can bring against it.

'Tis true, such as would correct Errors, and watch that no Invasion may be made on Liberty, have been heretofore call'd a Faction by the Persons in Power; but 'tis not properly their Name, and ought to be given to another sort of Men.

'Tis wrong to call them the Faction, who by all dutiful and modest Ways promote the Cause of Liberty, as the true means to endear a Prince to his  
Sub-

Subjects, and to lay upon them a stronger tye and obligation to preserve his Government. For a People will certainly best love and defend that Prince, by whom the greatest Immunities and most good Laws have been granted.

They cannot properly be term'd the Faction, who desire a War should be manag'd upon such a Foot of Expence as the Nation is able to bear; Who would have the Publick Treasure not wasted, the Prince not deceiv'd in his Grants and Bargains, who would have the Ministry watchful and Industrious, and who, when they complain, are angry with Things and not with Persons.

The Name of Faction does more truly belong to them, who, tho the Body Politick has all the Signs of Death upon it, yet say all is well, that the Riches of the Nation are not to be exhausted, that there is no misgovernment in all its Business, that it feels no decay, and that its OEconomy is perfect, and who, all the while, are as arrogant and assuming as if they had sav'd that very People, whom their Folly and mad Conduct has in a manner ruin'd.

They may be rather term'd the Faction, who were good Patriots out of the Court, but are better Courtiers in it, and  
who.

who pretended to fear excess of Power while it was not communicated to them, but never think the Monarchy can be high enough advanc'd, when they are in the Administration.

In Nations (where for a long time Matters have not been plac'd upon a Foot of Honesty) their great Assemblies consist commonly of two Parties, in both of which Sides there are many who have the same right Intentions to the Public, and many, who in all their Councils consult only their private Interest.

Of one side, some out of Principle love their Country, and are jealous of its Liberties; and yet at the same time are careful of their Princes Honour and Interest. In all their Proceeding they have nothing in view but the Public Good, They study not so much how to blame the Past, as which way the Future is to be mended; They do not accuse the Statesman, and yet let the Fault continue, as well knowing, that Impeachments of Men, and not of Crimes produce new, but seldom better Ministers.

They desire the Necessities of the State should be well supply'd, the Person of the Prince reverenc'd, and his Government maintain'd. When his Ministers have made false steps, or when their Councils have

have had unsuccessful Events, they desire not to inflame the Assembly where they sit, but are willing rather to assist with their superior knowledge, and to bring the minds of Men to the Temper and Calmness that is proper in weighry Deliberations.

Persons of this Character are in most Assemblies of a People, but they are often joind and follow'd by such as have quite another View and Aim, and who in all their Actings, consult not the Common Welfare, but either wreak their own Discontents, or pursue some Ambitious Hope, and upon such, or the like Accompts, mix themselves with the wiser and better sort; However the Good and the Bad, being thus mingled and blended, compose altogether what in vitious times is called the Country Party.

On the other side, there are some very nice in what may intrench upon the Regal Authority, yet never forgetful of the Peoples Rights; 'Tis true, their Post often compells them to excuse all Faults, tho guilty of none themselves, They are forc'd too frequently to move for Mony, but wish there was less occasion for it: They hate not such as differ from 'em in Opinion, and secretly approve of the Right Course, which sometimes they must not fol-

follow; but with such as have been here describ'd, there will too often join an Ignorant, Mercenary, and Servile Crew, who like all things, and examin nothing, Unanimous in Evil, Diligent in Mischief, Variable in Principles; Constant to Flattery, Talkers for Liberty, but Slaves to Power. Such as these will too frequently in vitious times mingle with the sound Part of a Court, stiling themselves the Court Party, and the Princes only Friends.

In former Reigns, by the Artifice of designing Statesmen, the Representatives of the People were divided into those two Parties; Besides, in most Assemblies which meet by the Authority of a single Person, there are still some who are thought to have the Secret, and they stile themselves the *Managers*: The Eyes of every one are bent upon them, their words are observ'd, and in most things they give the first Turn; At Court indeed they pretend to sway and govern every Motion: but in Matters esteem'd indifferent, they carry with 'em many of the best sort, and are certainly followed by all such as are willing to be guided. These are believ'd to have weigh'd before hand, and to know what is wisest, most safe, most expedient,

ent, or at least most grateful ; And when they appear, it is imagin'd there has been put into their Heads the whole extract-ed Quintessence of all the Ministerial Wisdom. In the House they undertake for the Court, and at Court for the House, receiving singly, the Thanks of what proceeds from the joynt Affection of all the rest, and are thought alone to give what the whole Nation pays.

To tell what time designing Men began to erect for themselves this new Office, and when and how this Imposition took its Rise, would be too long a Digression from the present Matter ; but we may truly affirm, Things have never gone well with our Princes, nor their People, since it was first invented.

Good Kings at all times, without any Danger, may repose their intire concerns upon a House of Commons, the National Interest will go on there without driving, and when Difficulties arise, the Ministers only make them ; For when the King and People have but one Interest, it goes on of its own Accord, and such as pretend to be busy for the Prince in that Place, are working for themselves, and not for him.

But if in after Ages our Disorders and Corruptions should make this Office Necessary ;

cessary ; If there must be Managers, if some must lead and others follow, 'tis reasonable the Guides should be well instructed.

Nothing therefore can more import the Prince, than that they who will assume such a Province, should be Men of Grave Discretion, and solid Judgment, Wise, and not Subtle, Cool, Temperate, Steady, Discerning, and Patient of Contradiction: and indeed they cannot be proper for that Post, unless they have in their Heads an Universal Scheme of their own and the Business of other Countreys.

When Giddy Young Men without Experience are rely'd upon and trusted in this Station, they embroyl the Princes Affairs, By their Ignorance they give his Enemies advantage, and by their Insolence disoblige his Friends.

A Man can be no more born a Statesman than a Physician, or a Lawyer ; and let the Mind be never so happily dispos'd, time must ripen what is begot by Nature.

Hobbes's Leviathan p.  
10.

Mr Hobbes says, *He that has most Experience in any kind of Business, has most signs to guess at the future time ; and consequently is the most Prudent : And so much more Prudent than he that is new in that kind of Business, as not to be equall'd by any*

*any Advantage of Natural or Extemporary Wit.*

The Sanguine Hopes conceiv'd by Young Men are by no means proper in Weighty and great Deliberations, and they seldom make good States-men : Elder Years, where they produce not Wisdom, bring at least Caution, which is something like it.

They who have seen much are us'd to frequent Disappointments, and therefore not inclin'd to venture ; especially they rarely hazard the sum of affairs upon any single Council.

Young Men are good to execute the Results of elder Wisdom, but the same Fire which makes them best for Action, renders them unfit for Council : Yet there is now and then a fortunate Genius, in whom the Prudence of Age, and the Warmth of Youth meet together, but of such the Examples are not common.

*Pierce Gaveston, Hugh Spencer,* and the Duke of *Buckingham*, are sufficient Instances that the Conduct of Young Ministers is seldom Successful to themselves, nor to their Masters : They do the less Mischief if they meddle only in the Pleasures of their Prince ; but when warm Heads, full of Conceit, with slight Wit, and no true Wisdom, pretend to guide a  
whole



whole State, and to have Majority at their Beck and Rule, in a short time they occasion more Disorders than can be remedy'd in many Years.

When Persons so describ'd come to have a Corrupt Majority of their side, They diminish the Nations Stock and in Coin, They lose its Trade, They Anticipate all the Princes Revenues, They charge the Subject for many Years to come with a great Number of New Duties and Impositions, They bring the State into an Immense Debt, and plunge it into such Difficulties, that hardly any new Revenues can be well erected: But to hop'd *England* will never fall into such destructive Hands.

Our Wealth and Greatness depend absolutely upon keeping the Legislative Power to future Ages untainted, Vigilant for the Public Safety, Jealous of the Peoples Rights, Watchful over the Ministers, and to have the Members not aw'd by Armies, nor to be seduc'd by Preferments, Bribes or Pensions; That we are safe at present is granted, and that we are not now under any Dangers of the like kind, and that this important Post is well secur'd, is allow'd: But writing for Posterity, to which these Papers may peradventure be transmitted, we think it needful to give these Cautions: While

While we preserve our Constitution as we receiv'd it from our Ancestors, Bad Men may have a short Power to do Mischief; however their Rage and Folly will be at last corrected; but if we suffer our Civil Rights to be invaded, and if our ancient Form of Government should be lost, then ill Ministers will proceed without Comp-trol, they will in a short time dissipate the Nations Treasure, the People will have no Stock for Trade, they will lose their Industry, they will grow inclinable to change, Resty and Indifferent in the cause of Liberty, and perhaps willing to submit to any foreign Force, like *Spain* which has been both despotically and weakly govern'd.

Freedom and Wealth proceed hand in hand together, and if one is lost the other will not long continue: but this Notion is not much regarded by those who can only be great, and have no ways of making their own Fortunes, but by the destruction of their Country.

For such as propose to thrive by Disorder and Misgovernment, have a strong Interest to beggar the People, The Confusion which Public wants and Private Necessities introduce, suits best with their Designs: A wealthy Nation may be jealous of its Rights, and watch any Inva-  
P sions

sions upon its Freedome, and a Rich Gentry may be unmanageable; And such bad Men may think, that the best Course to keep us humble is to make us poor.

If any should be so wicked to have Thoughts of enslaving *England*, they will endeavour to Mate and Quell the Stomachs of the Common People, by reducing them to the Misery and want which decay of Trade, if it ever happens, must bring upon this Nation; And they will try to distress the Gentry in their Estates to that Degree, as to make 'em rely upon the Court for a Livelyhood and Subsistence: for which Reasons they will wink at the loss of our Foreign Traffick, and perhaps contrive its Destruction, knowing that upon the Prosperity of Trade, Rents and Land have for many years depended. Nor can ill Ministers desire a better Circumstance, than to have Men of the best Fortunes reduc'd by their Necessities to come and Cringe and Sue to them for a small Employment. Does not this bring all into their Power? Must not such as shall have the Distribution of these Favours be courted and follow'd by the major Part of the Gentry? Would not so great a Capacity of helping others add to their strength, make 'em rich and

safe,

safe, and indeed set them in a manner above Impeachments?

If bad Men should ever get into Power they will not only contribute to ruin our Foreign Trade, but they will try to impoverish the Kingdom by exorbitant Taxes, thereby to bring the Gentry and People yet more under their Subjection; They will likewise plunge their Master into Debts and Necessities, to render their Tricks and Arts of more use, and to put a higher value upon the Band they shall have in pay; for in former times we have seen that when a Court wanted, they who procur'd Money to be given, were thought to give it; by which means they obtain'd Favour cheaply at the Expence of Others: And this single Merit won'd for all their Faults, It excus'd false Steps and Negligence, It shelter'd their Bribery, and cover'd their Disability for the Public Service.

Besides, they will intangle their Masters Affairs, because a Prince that does not need Money, may come not to need them, whose Talents, in all likelihood, will consist in procuring Taxes, not in well laying out the Sums granted; Therefore a wanting State, a troubled Government, and an indebted Exchequer will be their Region; Large Premiums,

Exorbitant Interest, Diverting Appropriated Fonds, Choice of Fonds on which to place their own Money, Preferring one Debt and Postponing another, will be always good Matter for ill Statesmen to work upon, but afford much a better Harvest when the Government stands in want of Money; Immense Sums given every Year will be a brave and ample Field for their Avarice to range in, which would be cramp'd and confin'd, if bound within the narrow Limits of what a Nation may be able to pay.

Of all things, they love a long and an expensive War, and fear Peace; for Peace produces Order, and gives the Prince leisure to enquire into the Abuses of the State; It lets him into a right knowledge of Persons in the Kingdom, and the Drop which float upwards when the Liquor is stirr'd, must sink to the bottom in quiet times; Peace restores Liberty of Speech, whereas in War all is silenc'd with the single word *Necessity*; In Peace there is no need to court Factions, Turbulent Spirits are not so useful, Thrift may be introduc'd, and such sudden Fortunes cannot be rais'd out of the Publick. Grievances may be calmly debated, The Management of the Revenues inspected, The Conduct of the Ministers may be examin'd;

min'd ; And good Laws may be propos'd without the Perpetual Objection of, *Are ye for bringing in the French and Popery ?* But War will better answer their Designs, who mean to thrive by the loose Administration with which War is generally accompany'd, and who propose to prosper by the Calamities and Misery of their Country.

The Business of *Ireland* at the beginning of the Revolution, is a pregnant Instance how much designing Men love a long War. That Kingdom might have been presently reduc'd, the Nation was dispirited, He who held the Government was ready to give up the Marks and Ensigns of his Authority, with the Strengths depending on it ; They were struck with a Panic Fear, and had readily submitted if in any reasonable time a small Force had been sent thither ; But one People does rarely yield so much to the Fame of another, as to surrender without being ask'd or summon'd. It was desir'd that a few Troops might be carry'd over to confirm and countenance our Friends, and to give our Enemies a fair Colour for pursuing that Course to which they were enough perswaded by their true Interest, tho they could not modestly acquiesce, unless something had been done that might save Appearances ; for a great

Army could not with any Decency disband, without so much as hearing of an opposite Strength, to which (in the general Fright that possess'd their Party) they might have yielded with some Saving to their Honour. But *Ireland* was for a long time slighted, and the Natives were suffer'd to gather into a formidable Power. That Diversion gave our Neighbour Kingdom opportunity to take Breath, and time to recover from the Fright and Amazement which so potent a League had brought upon them. The Troops who perish'd so miserably at *Dundalk* and elsewhere, would have been a great Addition to the Confederate Force. The Vigor that actuates the Minds of men in their first Proceedings should have been carry'd against *France*, and not have been let to consume itself, and slacken within our own Dominions. If by good Conduct the Affairs of *Ireland* had been sometimes appeas'd, the Power of these three Nations had been united, and we might have enter'd the Lists with our Strength intire, and a Treasure unwasted, which probably would have wrought such Effects, and begot such a Terror as might have produc'd long ago as sound and honourable a Peace as we enjoy at present, after the Expence of so much Blood and Money.

This

This War stood *England* in 4,128,672*l.*  
5*s.* 3*d.* 4, and both Nations in 4,515,693*l.*  
0*s.* 8*d.* 3, but if we come to reckon the  
Burnings, Waste and Depredation, and  
the irreparable Loss of Men, *English* and  
*Irish*, by Sicknefs and in Battel, and the  
*Irish* damage redounding to us at last, it  
may be safely affirm'd that we are the  
worse for that War by at least 7 Millions.

However that fatal Neglect did divert  
from the War against *France* above four  
Millions, and did engage in Civil Broils those  
Arms which were so needful in the be-  
ginning to make a strong Impression upon  
our Enemies abroad.

But a certain Party of Men were too  
busy themselves at home for to mind the  
Nations Foreign Concerns. They were di-  
viding the spoil here, They were hunt-  
ing after Places, and sharing among one  
another the Dignities and Offices of the  
State, which took up all their time, and  
employ'd all their Care. Besides, such an  
early Coalition and Union of the whole  
strength of the three Kingdoms, might  
have terrified *France* too soon, and taken  
away their Hopes of a succeeding War,  
which is the Crop and Harvest of de-  
signing Ministers, the Field in which  
they fatten, and a Spend-thrift, to  
whom they are Stewards without Ac-  
count,



If not minding the Affairs of *Ireland* did hinder the Peace so long, then we owe to that fatal Council the Beginning of the Debt, which now presses so hard upon us; for without the Colour of such a War, those immense Sums could not have been consum'd, which for these last five Years have been levy'd in this Kingdom.

When King *James* went away, we were reduc'd to what Mr *Hobbes* calls the State of Nature, the Original Contract being dissolv'd, and the Ligaments broken, which held us before together: The Nation was then a Blank, apt to receive any Impression; The old Building was pull'd down, and the Faults in it before might have been corrected, if the Architects had been skilful, and such Lovers of their Country as they pretended to be. Never men had such an Opportunity of doing Good, as they who had the chiefest hand in making the Revolution. They had a Prince willing to consent to whatever might set us upon a right Foot, if they had met his design of Landing here with equal Virtues. The Gentry and People were at that time newly awaken'd from the Lethargy in which they had been for many Years; They saw how narrowly Religion and their Liberties had escap'd; Their Fears had made 'em Wife and Sober;

ber; Their Eyes were universally open'd; And they were wrought up to a Temper (which seldom happens in a whole Nation) of being capable to receive good and honest Councils. It was in their Power for ever to have banish'd Flattery and Corruption from the Court, and from another Place where those Vices are yet more hurtful; and when they had chang'd Persons, if they had taken Care at the same Instant to mend Things, they had wrought a general Reformation in our Manners. It was in their Hands to have given us a Sound Constitution, They had before 'em the Errors of preceeding Reigns, by which they might have corrected their Model, They should have enter'd upon a strict OEconomy, neither plundering for themselves, nor suffering Others to grow Rich at the Public Cost. They should have been as careful in the State, as their Master was active in the Field, they should have begg'd less, and done more. They should have avoided Bribery, than which nothing could be more unseemly in Reformers of a State, and which was certain to keep out the best, and let the worst Men into all their Business. They ought to have known that a new Settlement was to be maintain'd by severer Rules and Methods than perhaps are necessary

cessary in a Court where the Prince is born in Purple. And lastly, They should have made this Reflection, That more than ordinary Virtue of all kinds was needful to answer the Peoples Expectations, and that more than common Wisdom was requisite to maintain and justify so great a Change.

The worst and most unhappy Kings that ever were would have rul'd better, had it not been for the wrong Suggestion and wicked Incitements of the Flatterers about 'em; But those Pests and Poisons of a Court are yet more to blame, when things succeed not well with Wise and Virtuous Princes.

That Declaration which the King sent to *England* before he came over, was the Pole Star by which our State Pilots were to steer their Course. 'Twas well known that to keep the same Parliament sitting so many Years was what had chiefly debauch'd the Gentry of this Kingdom, it was therefore expected that in the Act for declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, some Provision should have been made against this Evil for the future. Several Ministers, who betray'd their King and Country, have gone on to the last with Impunity, by keeping Parliaments quite off; but more have found a Shelter  
for

for their Crimes in Houses, which they have long held together, and of which they have had the handling for many a Sessions; Could Men pretend to be Patriots, and not take Care of securing that Post? Could our Freedoms be any way certainly lost, but by laying aside the use of Parliaments, as was design'd in the Reign of King *Charles* the First, or by keeping them so long sitting, till a Majority of Members should be under Engagements with the Court, as had almost happen'd in the Reign of King *Charles* the Second? Were we not both times upon the very brink of ruin, and in hazard of being no more a free People? Did it not therefore import that Party which had heretofore made such high Professions for Liberty, to provide that *England* might be no more threatned with the same danger? Should not this have been a main Article in our Contract with their Majesties upon their Accession to the Throne, who readily consented to all things that might make us safe and happy, The King having promis'd in his Declaration, *To do all things which the two Houses of Parliament should find necessary for the Peace, Honour and Safety of the Nation, so that there may be no more danger of the Nations falling at any time*

*Of Private mens Duty in the  
time hereafter under Arbitrary Govern-  
ment.*

'Twas certainly a great Omission not to bring on in the very beginning of the Revolution, the Act for Triennial Parliaments, which our own Corruptions produc'd at last ; If the State had enter'd early into that wholesom Council, it had made the Kings entire Reign more easy to himself, and less costly to his People. It had given a Rise to that Virtue and Publick Honesty he came over to plant, and had answer'd all the ends of his Declaration. They who were not well principled, must have pretended so to be, for the Paths and Road to Preferment had been thereby quite alter'd : The Ingredients which before compos'd a Statesman, were Skill to govern the House, Ability now and then to make an Important Turn, knowledge of the Members, that is, who were to be taken off, and what was their Price, Diligence in keeping that Band together who were right or wrong to be unanimous. They who were thus qualify'd themselves, or who would blindly follow the Professors of these pernicious Arts, engross'd the whole Business and Employments of the Nation, But by neglecting to put Matters under a good Settlement in the beginning, one  
and

and the same House of Commons came to continue sitting with short Intervals for Six Years, and this wrong measure being taken, renew'd all the former Errors of our Constitution, and for a time restor'd to Men the same dishonest Interest they had before, and, if any were so wicked, gave them fresh opportunity and room to endeavour once more the Subversion and Ruin of this Kingdom, not by the very ways practis'd in former times, but by the same corrupt Inclinations and Councils dress'd in other Shapes; And tho, without doubt, none of 'em are chosen into this Parliament, yet 'tis to be fear'd, that in those Sessions of Six Years continuance, there was rear'd up a new brood of Men of Business, as high Flatterers, more false, designing, and rapacious than their Predecessors, but without the same Skill and Dexterity to support their Malice.

However, 'tis hop'd the Act for Triennial Parliaments may have given a Check to this Ulcer, which was growing in the Body Politick, and that it may hinder the Gangreen from proceeding further; yet tho the old Venome may be restrain'd a while by Remedies, 'tis to be fear'd it lurks still within us, ready to break out upon the first Occasion.

If

If that Party which once seem'd so Jealous of our Rights had not abandon'd all their old Principles, they might have form'd us a lasting Establishment, such as could not have been shaken by Domestick Rage or Foreign Power: whereas now we depend alone upon the Reputation, Merit and Virtues of the King, that bind and hold us together; But when he must yield to Nature (which Misfortune we hope is very distant from us) in all Humane Probability, nothing can be expected but Confusion and Civil War.

When the Breaches made upon our Constitution in the late Reigns, had induc'd many of the best Sort to judge a Revolution needful, the People had reason to expect that in a new Modell'd Government, all things should have been set upon the Foot of Honesty and Virtue, and to see all that Male-Administration reform'd, which some persons had been reasonably complaining of for 30 Years. We thought to see a virtuous Court, a watchful State, an Industrious and frugal Ministry. If all these our Expectations had been answer'd, what Disasters from without or within could have hurt *England*? Must not the Change have been tacitly consented to, (if not applauded)

even

even by those that suffer'd in it? Had we not at home a discontented Party, which was to be silenc'd by showing 'em an honest, more steady, more disinterested, and a wiser Conduct than what they had known before, and still linger'd after? Had we not abroad a Potent Enemy against whom our Strength was to be husbanded discreetly, that it might last the longer? And lastly, was not the best and most irreproachable Management in the world necessary and hardly sufficient, to enable us to carry on that War, with which so great an Alteration was certain to be follow'd?

But instead of building upon these Foundations, and taking such measures as had render'd our Proceedings safe in their Consequences, and not obnoxious to any Censure, some Persons have given manifest Proof that they were acted by no sort of Principle, and that in their Doings they were rather sway'd by Private Interest, Revenge, Ambition, and their other Appetites; than guided by any sense of the Publiick Good; for we no sooner had upon the Throne a Prince fear'd and reverenc'd broad, and Idoliz'd here, but some persons immediately forgot the Cause for which they call'd him over.



If we had shown any Desire to assist and imitate his Perfections, what a fair Fame of our selves had we transmitted to After Ages.

If some Men had consider'd wisely they would have found, that all things were not secure, because Religion was out of danger, whose Concerns are soon forgotten when we begin to be press'd with other Fears; Besides, if Matters are not so order'd, that *Spain* may not fall under the Power of *France*, Popery, and universal Monarchy are still to be apprehended.

Prosperity, a flowing Trade, and great Riches, may admit of Prodigality, Negligence in the State, and false steps in the Ministry, but a People exhausted by long Taxes desire to see in those above 'em Thrift for the Public, Vigilance, and as much good Conduct as can be expected in humane Business. Power is seldom Invidious to the Common People when plac'd in virtuous Hands, nor are Calamities intolerable, which could not have been avoided by any Care or Caution. When the Ministers do well, those under 'em suffer quietly; but on the Contrary, If they observe themselves rul'd in the Subordinate parts of Government, by such as make a prey of the Common-wealth

wealth, and to that end only take upon  
em its Administration, if they plainly per-  
ceive their miseries and Misfortunes to pro-  
ceed chiefly from the Corrupt or weak Coun-  
cils of such Statesmen, they become dis-  
hearten'd and lose that Mettle and Spirit,  
without which the high designs of their  
powerful Neighbours are not to be re-  
sisted.

But tho' some Errors might be commit-  
ted in the beginning of the Revolution,  
'tis hoped all things are now well, that  
Peace has put an End to those Disorders  
in Government which War does com-  
monly beget, and that our present Ma-  
nagement is not lyable to any Censure.  
And what is said here, and what may be  
observ'd hereafter of the like kind in the  
series of this Discourse, is not at all the  
present case of *England*; 'tis hoped we  
are not a Corrupt People, but in Process  
of time we may grow so, and lose that  
Virtue which is presumed to shine in this  
Age. This Section is therefore directed  
to Posterity, which alone is concern'd in  
the Ethics here advanced.

In future Ages perhaps Ambitious and  
Designing Men may desire to embroyl  
their Masters affairs only, to make him  
more Dependant upon their Arts, here-  
after Men of Arbitrary Principles may de-  
signedly

Q

signedly neglect the Concerns and Care of Foreign Traffick, with a Purpose to impoverish, and so to enslave the People; In the next Age likewise designing Ministers may take Advantage of the Martial Temper of a Prince, and instead of reigning in his High Courage with grave Councils, they may disguise from him the true State of his Affairs, and push him on to a new War, without making right Provisions, or without such previous Leagues as may make it tollerable in the Progress, or happy in the Conclusion; and perhaps they may desire the Semblance of a War, only to have a Pretence for a Standing Army.

For the Benefit therefore of future times, it may be proper to show by what steps these Vices and Immoralities that affect the Public first creep into a Country, and what Progress they come afterwards to make, and to show what sort of Men and what kind of Councils intangle a Princes Affairs.

But tho this Paper be directed to Posterity, and tho 'tis nothing but a Caution to future times, yet probably it may offend some Persons who are tender in these Matters.

However we shall venture to affirm that if this Nation should ever be under any  
great

great Disorder, the truest Course to mend it, will be to plant in the Minds of the better sort Morality, and the Shame of doing ill to their Country, And we shall presume to assert that observing the Rules and Dictates of Virtue, does not only lead to Heaven and a blessed State hereafter, but is the best way of securing to a People in general, Prosperity, Peace, Safety, Power, and Happiness in this present World.

To trace those Men who may design to change this Constitution in all their dark and crooked Ways, and to follow 'em in all their Mazes will be difficult; however we shall do our best to describe the Persons, and to show their Councils, that they may be narrowly watch'd by all such as love their Country.

But to do this we must take a short view of things past, and a little consider the Posture of Affairs at the Restoration of King *Charles* the 2d, and how they stood during his Reign and the Reign of his Successor.

When that Prince was recall'd from Exile, by the Voice of the whole People (who had been tired with the many Changes in Government, that happened from *Cromwell's* Death to the year 1660) 'twas almost impossible, but that we

should run from one to the other Extream; And 'twas reasonable to fear that Men should readily embrace Servitude, who knew not how to make a right use of Liberty. Upon which Account many have wonder'd why our Antient Form of Government was not at that time alter'd, and how it came to pass we did not then embrace Absolute Monarchy.

But we are to consider that King *Charles* was a young Prince, more inclined to taste the Pleasures of Power, than willing to feel its Weight; He had undergone many Troubles, which he intended to recompence with great Ease and Luxury; so that the rugged work of Subverting the Laws suited neither with his Age nor Temper. Had he lived longer, as Time and Opposition began to slow his Blood, what he might have attempted is very doubtful.

Besides the unactive Genius of the King, there happen'd then another Circumstance very fortunate for *England*, which was, that the Services and Merit of the Chancellor *Clarendon*, and the Treasurer *Southampton*, did strongly induce him to put the Administration of his Affairs into their Hands. They were both Persons of Age and Experience, They had known the former Reign, They had seen the  
Grounds

Grounds and Rise of the Civil War, They understood the Nature of our Constitution, They saw what had depos'd one King, and found that unlimited Power was hard to compass, and difficult to keep; And having their Masters Ear, and at first a large share in his Affection, They kept Him within Bounds. The Skill in the Laws of One, the Eloquence of the Other, the General Abilities of both, made 'em esteem'd by the People, and awful to their very Prince, and this gave a weight to all their Councils. They had Authority enough in their Persons to be listen'd to, when they spoke bold and necessary Truths: having Superiour Knowledge and Desert too, to be heard, they did not stand in need of saying always what was pleasing, which is the miserable and servile Condition of Upstart, Weak and Obscure Statesmen; But less were they oblig'd to Flatter every Flatterer. Having a Foundation of Merit, they scorn'd the mean Aid of Parties, or to be the wretched Journey-men of any dark Cabal: Knowing what was their Masters and the Nations Interest, and intending to promote both; They gave wholesome Advice, without Fear of offending either Prince or People. That Kingly Government was then kept

within the Limits of the Law, That our Constitution was not given up between the Fears of One, and the Hopes of the Other Party, and that our Civil Rights were still preserv'd, was chiefly owing to the Wisdom, Courage, and Integrity of those two able Statesmen.

But even then, and all along afterwards, there were still some among us impatient to make their Master Absolute; They consisted principally of such as had large Ambition, and Slender Merit, who are the best Instruments for any Tyranny. These were ever embroiling the King with his Parliament, either to protect them, or to justify some of their illegal Actions. Sometimes they got him to appear a violent Church-man, and at other seasons to favour the Dissenters, but at no time to take Care of Religion itself. They persuaded Him to extend the Regal Power in every thing; They got him to seize all the Charters, in order to influence Elections. By their Councils He rais'd an Army, under Colour of declaring War with *France*; By their Instruments They made him absolute in *Scotland*, at the same time doing what they could to weaken the Protestant Interest in *Ireland*.

But

But their chief Aim was to procure Him so large a standing Revenue, as might make Parliaments useless for the future. 'Tis true, they propos'd this Revenue for his Life only; but if that first step had been made, it had not been difficult afterwards to entail it on the Crown: Besides, what has been granted to one Prince, has been always continu'd to his Successor without any Struggle.

That these Things were done with a Design to change the Constitution, is visible enough: And 'tis as evident that these Councils were either promoted by Persons, who wanted the Sublime Part of Wisdom, necessary for the Conduct of Great Affairs, and therefore were to form a Government that might subsist by Tricks and Arts, or they were forg'd by a set of Men, whose Avarice and Ambition no Regular Establishment could satisfy, whose Crimes a Free State would look into, and whose Arbitrary Proceedings a Parliament would not suffer: They were therefore to build their Fortunes, Gratify their High Desires, and find Impunity, by setting up the Regal Power above the Laws.

In the next Reign, yet more open Invasions were made upon our Liberties,



not by the same Men, but by Men acting upon the same Principles; But they proceeded more cunningly before than afterwards: For in the former Reign 'twas thought best to begin with altering the Constitution, and that when this was done, Religion might be chang'd of course: But the hot Zeal of the Catholics would not permit 'em to go by Slow and Regular Measures; They therefore made a strange and unpolitick Attempt, never like to succeed, which was first to Convert, and then to Inslave the Nation.

While these Matters were transacting, there appeared all along Persons, both in and out of the Court, who did most Virtuously oppose those Designs, that, first secretly, and then openly, were forming against their Country.

As some were contriving to Subvert our Civil Rights, others did as carefully watch their Preservation, which Invading and Defending, divided *England* into what was then call'd the Court and Country Party.

Never was Liberty more cunningly attacked, nor more Nobly Protected, than in that House of Commons which sat Eighteen Years. It contained bold bad  
Men,

Men, with Hearts and Heads fit to contrive the Subversion of a State. But there were in it also Persons of another Character, very Great indeed, with quite Superior Judgments, and with Minds so rightly adapted for Government, that the Weight of a whole Empire might be safely repos'd upon their Shoulders, in whom Conversation with the dead Wisdom of past Ages, was join'd with Experience, and a perfect Knowledge of this present World. These brave Spirits from the Beginning resisted that Inundation of Flattery and servile Compliance, with which great Revolutions in Corrupt times are certain to be attended. They Vigorously opposed that Unanimous Band, which diligently promoted Arbitrary Power. Sometimes they sav'd us when we were within three or four Votes of utter Ruin; They hindered that Increase of the Kings Revenue, which alone would have put an end to Parliaments. These were the Prime Leaders of such whom the People for some Years were pleas'd to Term the Country Party, and by Good Patriots, so call'd, our Constitution was for a while preserv'd.

But after the Year 1679. on both sides the Minds of Men grew so inflam'd, and such Animosities did arise between 'em, that they

they could no longer call one another by the Civil Appellation of Court and Country Party, so that the different sides began to be distinguish'd by other sort of Names.

'Tis indeed below the Gravity of a Sober Writer to use the Common Cant words of the Town, but 'tis sometimes unavoidable, especially when that which was only Mirth and Cant at first, became at last a serious Matter.

The Accidental words of *Guelph* and *Ghibelin*, in Process of time grew to be the Names of Powerful Parties, into which several Countreys were divided, and in which Emperors, Kings, Popes and Princes engag'd, and these Names of distinction continued for some Ages, producing War and Actions of great Importance.

In the same manner the Words of *Whig* and *Tory*, intended at first as reciprocal Reproaches, in a short time grew to be the Names by which two great Parties were contented to be call'd, and into which in a manner the whole Nation was divided.

They were termed Whigs, and indeed they called themselves so, who under another Name, had heretofore opposed the Corrupt and illegal Proceedings of the Court, who foresaw the Dangers  
that

that would arise from a Catholick King, who were for correcting the Exorbitances of *Westminster Hall*, and for putting a stop to extravagant Fines, and who made a resolute stand, and would give no more Money, till the *Habeas Corpus* Act was passed, and till the new rais'd Army was disbanded; and who did their utmost against the Surrender and Regulating of Charters.

In the next Reign the same Men, or Men acting upon the same Principle, declar'd themselves against taking off the Test and Penal Laws. They shew'd an open Dislike in Parliament of Catholicks being put into Offices of Trust. They abhor'd the Cruel Executions in the West. They oppos'd the Violent Prosecution of the Seven Bishops. And lastly, They were ready and active with their Councils and Assistance to bring over the Redeemer of *England*.

A Man is but young at Nineteen, but a Party may be thought old that is of so long a standing. The Persons just now describ'd were the *Old Whigs*, whose Principles will be reverenc'd in future Ages by all such as love their Country. 'Tis true, some Persons did join with these, and call themselves *Whigs*, who had all along other Views than the Nations Service,

vice, whom Disappointments had sower'd, who oppos'd to be taken off, and who did not like a Court, because a Court did not like them. But they who swim against the Tide, must make use of all Helps, and in Corrupt Times, even the best Patriots have refus'd no sort of Men that could any ways assist the Public: the Good and Bad of these altogether were call'd the *Whig Party*.

To what had been formerly stil'd; the Court Side, the People afterwards gave the Name of *Tories*. And we shall give an Account of what sort of Persons this Party was compos'd. The Bulk of 'em consisted of such as were descended from the Cavaliers, whose Families had suffer'd very much by the Civil War, and who by Education were season'd with an early Love to Kingly Government. They were Jealous that all Motions tending to preserve Liberty, favour'd of the Commonwealth, with whose Weight their Fathers had been so lately Crush'd. A most unwise Generation of Men, to have any Fears that a Commonwealth could be restor'd in a Country so corrupted! Many of them were much of that Principle of which *Tacitus* describes *Marcellus Epirus* to have been, who said in the Senate, *Se neminisse Temporum quibus natus sit, quam Civitatis*

*Civitatis formam Patres Aviq; instituerint :  
alteriora mirari, presentia sequi, bonos Im-  
peratores voto expetere, qualescunq; tolerare.*  
Many of 'em were debauch'd by Pomp  
and Splendour, and in the Heat of their  
Youth, they lik'd the Pleasures of a Court,  
but the Riots of it compell'd many of  
'em, at last, to depend upon its Favours.  
Others embrac'd the Regal Power more  
warmly, because they saw many of the  
Opposite Side bitter against the Church,  
not so desirous to Correct any of its Er-  
rors, as willing to lay the Ax to its very  
Root. Others link'd themselves with  
this Band out of a Cautious Temper, and  
through a Fear that contending with the  
Court might produce another War. Some  
gave into this side out of Gratitude to  
King Charles, and Many through meer  
Affection to his Person ; for without  
doubt He was a most engaging Prince.  
Others went into it from a real Convicti-  
on of their Minds that the King was not  
safe without more Power, to which Opi-  
nion they were chiefly led, by observing  
the Rash Councils, unquiet Spirits, and  
insolent Behaviour of some of their Op-  
ponents. But with those who might Act  
of this Side upon a Principle, there joyn'd  
a great many who had no good Intenti-  
ons to the Publick, who were for enlarg-  
ing

ing the Prince's Power, in order to augment their own, who were for Robbing the People, that they might share in the Plunder, who would have set the King above all the Laws, that they might be never accountable to a Parliament for their Proceedings; and, who pretending a great Zeal for the Church, were all the while making way for Popery; thus upon Different Motives, considerable Numbers were list'd of this Side, and the Good and the Bad mingled together, compos'd what was call'd the *Tory Party*.

But Humane Affairs are subject to such odd Turns, that in the next Reign many of both these Parties travers'd their Ground, and mutually pass'd into that Camp which some of their Enemies had deserted. Not a few of the Whigs enter'd into the worst of King *James's* Measures and Councils; And the Eyes of those who had been reckon'd Tories, were in a manner universally open'd, and they began to see the Errors they had been committing so many Years, inso-much that they were as eager as any Others to promote the Revolution: So that the Soundest Part of these Clashing Factions shook Hands together, and join'd in that Rescue of our Liberties which could never have been brought about,

about, but by the Concurrent Endeavour of both Parties.

Both sides had their Faults, and of both sides had Men were list'd, and of each side there were many who all along acted upon the Principles of Honesty and Virtue, and who aim'd at the Common Good, tho' as to the Way to it, in their turns, each side might be now and then mistaken; It must indeed be granted, that the Whigs saw the Diseases that were growing upon the Body Politick, before the Tories, But when the Distemper began to rage, the Tories were not behind hand in seeking out the Proper Remedy.

But tho' such as the Common People then call'd Tories, joyn'd in the Revolution, and had without doubt the greatest Hand in it, having on their Side Men of Fortunes, Power, and Figure, and the main Body of the Church, which will always be found the strongest Interest in *England*, yet it must be confess'd that the Change was made upon the old Whig Principles, of making Parliaments awful to the Ministers, and of keeping the Regal Authority within the Limits of the Law; for what this Nation then did, was directly Opposite to the Church or Tory Maxims; but when Princes quit the old Rules of right Government, their Subjects



jects will be apt to forget the old Rules prescrib'd for their Obedience;

'Tis hop'd these Names of Distinction are now quite abolish'd and forgotten; But the Faction of *Guelfs* and *Ghibelins* after having slept for some time, reviv'd again, and continu'd upwards of two hundred years, even when the Derivation of the Words was no more remember'd; And the Parties lasted so long because the same Principles upon which they had first differ'd, remain'd still deeply imprinted in their Minds, and afforded continual Matter for new Dissention.

In the same Manner perhaps some time hence the Names of Whig and Tory may be again renew'd here, to disturb the Nations Peace; And if this should happen, we must implore the Whigs not to forget their old Principles and antient Maxims.

The Tories, by taking Arms to defend their Civil Rights, and by joining to Depose that Prince by whom those Rights were violated, have in the most Public Manner in the World renounced their Doctrine of *Jus Divinum*, Passive Obedience, and Non-Resistance.

But if the Whigs should hereafter take their Stations, if they should go upon that Ground which the Tories have quitted, if they

they should enter upon just such Measures, if they should pursue the same Councils, if they should suffer themselves to be imbib'd with Tory Notions, our Constitution must be intirely lost.

For they may undermine it without Suspicion: who will be Jealous of those who have been Preaching up Liberty and accusing Arbitrary Ministers for thirty Years? who will suspect such profest Patriots? They may change the Form of our Government, and have the People of their side, who can have no Jealousy of them, for the Whigs are the Favourites of the People, as having so often preserv'd *England*. No Person could be Popular enough in *Rome* to think of Subverting its Constitution, in the Purity of the Commonwealth, but *Manlius* who had sav'd the Capitol.

It will hardly be surmis'd, that they can mean to inflave us, who (by their Speeches, Actions and Writings) for many Years seem'd rather inclin'd to a Republic, than to Despotick Government. But if they should come to change their Minds, if They should throw off their former Principles, we shall be undone by the very Men whom we thought our surest Friends.

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If old Whigs should hunt after Places as much as ever the Tories did, and if like them, upon Preferment, they should become quite new Men, in Voting, Thinking, and Speaking, in a Moment making a sudden Turn from the whole Course of their former Lives; If old Whigs, as the Tories did, should ever take Bribes and Pensions to betray their Trust; If they should do any thing to break into the *Habeas Corpus* Act, which is the Chief Guardian of our Liberties; If they should oppose any good Act for the frequent sitting of Parliaments, which want in the Constitution produc'd all our former Miseries, If they should openly oppose any reasonable Provision for Tryals in Treason, the want of which has lost many a Noble Life, and for which heretofore they had so loudly called; If, as the Tories did, they should send their Emissaries about to influence or corrupt Elections; If old Whigs to whom *Menum* and *Tuum* was once so sacred, should come to ruin a Society of Trading Men, and at one blow destroy many hundred Families, but God forbid *Englisbmen* should ever have such a Thought; If old Whigs shall perswade any Future Prince to Closet Members, as was done in the preceeding Reigns; If by their  
Power

Power they should get Men turn'd out of Employment, for pursuing the Dictates of their Conscience, and Understanding ; If like the Ministers heretofore complain'd of, They should have a Band of Pensioners ready to give up any Right, to grant any Summ, and to excuse, nay, even to vote thair Pay-master Thanks for any Male Administration.

If the Old Whigs should restore to Men the same dishonest Interest they had heretofore, If they should consume us in their Ministerial, and sell us in their Legislative Capacity ; If they should desire to have things governed rather by Tricks and little Arts, than according to the Direction of the Laws, or the Bent of the People ; If they, who upon the Virtuous Principle of keeping *England* a free Country, in former times, oppos'd all Excises, should be brought to create so many new Offices and Officers, as may influence Elections round the Kingdom ; If they, who heretofore thought the best way to preserve their Civil Rights, was to keep the Purse, and to have always something to give, should be for settling such an immense Revenue on the Crown, as may make Parliaments unnecessary ; If they who were so careful in King *Charles's* Reign, not to burthen the Nation with Taxes,

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should

should give away the Peoples Wealth, as if *England* were a Mine of Treasure never to be exhausted ; If they who have ever asserted, that all Rents and Payments to the Crown were the Kingdoms Revenues, and not Alienable, but by Authority of Parliament, should in a short space of Time come to Alienate all the Crown Land, and to leave the King hardly a Turf of Ground either in *England* or *Ireland* ; If they who formerly thought it sufficient Matter of Impeachment for a Lord Treasurer, or any Other intrusted by the King, to pass large Grants from the Crown to Themselves, should give to their Creatures, and share among one another, in a few years, of Crown Lands, near to the Value of two Millions.

\* A<sup>d</sup> De-  
claring  
the Rights  
and Liber-  
ties of the  
Subject,  
p. 197.  
p. 192.

If the very Men who have \* *Asserted and Claim'd* it to be their true, antient and indubitable Right, and that it ought to be esteem'd, allow'd, adjudg'd and deemed That the Raising or keeping a Standing Army within the Kingdom in time of Peace, unless it be with the Consent of Parliament, is against Law ; If they who once believ'd this Eagle in the Air frighted all Motions towards Liberty ; If they who heretofore thought Armies in time of Peace, and our Freedoms inconsistent ; If the same Men should throw off a Whig Principle so fundamen-

damental ; It they should become the open Advocates for standing Forces, and even submit to Troops compos'd of Foreigners.

If in this manner the Old Whigs, whose Foresight and Courage has hitherto preserv'd *England*, should quite change their Minds, and go thus retrograde from all their former Speeches, Actions, and Councils ; If they should thus come to cloath themselves with the Foul, Ridiculous and Detested Garments of the Tories, and give into the worst of their Measures ; And if all that has been here discours'd should happen, then would the Constitution of this Country be utterly subverted.

For Men finding themselves thus forsaken by the Antient Friends to Liberty, would believe they were bought and sold ; They would imagine that there was no such thing as Virtue and Honesty remaining in the Kingdom ; They would think all Pretensions to the Public Good, to be nothing but Designs of Ambitious Persons, to lift themselves up to high Honours, upon the Shoulders of the People ; And when Nations have before their Eyes an Arm'd Power to Fear, and none in whom they can put any Trust, they seldom fail of submitting to the Yolk.

Free States yield to Slavery when the Men best esteem'd, and most in Vogue, are generally thought to be corrupted.

*Lib. 1. Ann.* This was the Condition of Rome under Augustus, as Tacitus finely describes it, *Ubi Militem donis, Populum Annona, Cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit; insurgere paulatim, Munia Senatus Magistratum, legum in se trahere, nullo adversante: cum ferocissimi per acies aut proscriptione cecidissent. Ceteri Nobilium, quanto quis servitio promptior, opibus ac Honoribus extollerentur: ac novis ex rebus aucti, tuta & presentia, quam vetera ac periculosa mallent, neque Provincie illum Statum rerum abnuebant, suspecto Senatus populique imperio, ob certamina potentium, & avaritiam magistratum: invalido legum auxilio quæ vi, ambitu, postremo pecunia turbabantur.* When the best and noblest Spirits were all extinct, and when 'twas seen that the Remainder were contented with Wealth, Titles and Preferments, the Price of their Submission, the Romans thought it their safest Course to commit all to the Care and Wisdom of a Single Person.

In the same manner, If in times to come it should happen that our Nobility and Gentry should be more solicitous to get a small Employment, than to keep a great Estate; If the Persons of Note and Figure

Figure shou'd be sway'd by their private Interest, without any Regard to the Public Good ; If it should be visible to the Counties and Burroughs, that Men covet to be chosen, not for their Country's Service, but in order to serve themselves ; If it should grow apparent, that neither Side is at bottom better principled than the Other, that Court and Country Party, Whigs and Church-men, are nothing but the Factions of Those who Have, and Those who desire Preferment ; If in this manner the whole Mass of Blood in the Body Politick should be corrupted, the Nation will throw off that Reverence to Parliaments, which has hitherto preserv'd our Liberties, and like the Neighbouring Countries either terrify'd or allur'd, they will by degrees submit to unlimited Monarchy ; And so we shall lose one of the best Constitutions that was ever set afoot for the well Governing a People.

Handling as we do the Methods whereby a Nation may Increase in Wealth and Power, we thought it necessary to describe those Parties and Factions which probably hereafter may come to influence in its Councils ; And this has been done in order to incite Good Men to watch over their Growth and Progress, and such Good Men chiefly as design to engage on



neither Side, but to bend all their Care that no Side may be able to hurt the Commonwealth.

\* Machiavel's Discourses on Livy, lib. 2. c. 2.

And if it should be ask'd, Why the Care of Liberty and preserving our Civil Rights should be so much recommended in a Paper relating to Trade? We answer, that herein we follow *Machiavel*, who says, *That when a Free State degenerates into a Tyranny, the least Mischief that it can expect, is to make no farther Advancement in its Empire; and no farther Increase either in Riches or Power, but for the most part it goes backward and declines.*

Lib. 1. c. 10.

This deep Statesman has a saying in another Place well worthy of eternal Remembrance, *That the Prince who aims at Glory and Reputation in the World, should desire a Government, where the Manners of his Subjects are corrupted and depraved, not to Subvert and destroy it like Cæsar, but to rectifie and restore it like Romulus, than which the Heavens cannot confer, nor Man propose to himself greater Honor.*

It may be objected, that in *France*, where all Thoughts of Liberty are extinguish'd, Trade and Riches have of late Years very much increas'd. But this admits of an easy Answer. An absolute Prince, with great Abilities and Virtues, by Care and Wisdom may make his Country flourish

for a time. However, if his Successors are weak or wicked, all shall be soon unravell'd and go backward, and Poverty shall soon invade the same People which before began to thrive; for to make a Nation very Rich and Powerful, there must be a long Succession of good Princes (which seldom happens) or a long Succession of good Laws and good Government, which may be always had in Countreys that preserve their Freedom: And without doubt 'tis on this Accompt that *Machiavel* has asserted, *That no Cities have augmented their Revenues or enlarged their Territories, but whilst they were free and at Liberty.* Lib. 2. c. 2.

And if in future times the Nobility and Gentry of *England* (which God forbid) should traffick the Peoples Rights for Titles, Bribes or Places, *vilia Servitii pretia*, and if they should be induc'd fearfully, or which is worse, corruptly to give up this Constitution, Poverty will creep insensibly upon us. We shall, as *Machiavel* says, *go backwards and decline*, Land will yield a great deal less than now, Rents will be ill paid, And we shall not have a Foreign Traffick, large and extended enough to produce such a Naval strength as may make us Safe at home and Terrible abroad. Tacit. lib. 2. Ann.

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'Tis therefore upon the Authority of this great Man that we have laid down, *That a Country cannot Increase in Wealth and Power but by Private Men doing their Duty to the Public, and but by a Steady Course of Honesty and Wisdom, in such as are trusted with the Administration.*

However, if Things should hereafter proceed amiss, 'Tis hop'd the strong Constitution of this Government will in time throw off those Diseases which may affect it for a Season, and that the united Wisdom of the Nation can recover us from that Decay of Health to which we may be reduc'd by a few Empiricks of State; Their Giddy Management for a while may be supported, and born out, by the great Riches which peradventure may have been collected here by the Industry and Prudence of former Ages; but if what has been gathering seven Centuries, they should squander away in a few Years, the Cries of that People whom they so impoverish, will at last awaken the Parliament to enquire into, and animadvert upon their Wild Proceedings.

If the Wealth and Power of a Country depend upon the Good Government and Stability of its Affairs, it must certainly import all the different Ranks of Men to contribute their utmost that Things may  
be

be well administer'd : And in mix'd Constitutions almost every Man is able in some Degree to help towards this ; for if the People are honest and careful in the Choice of their Representatives, and if those Representatives perform their Duty, Arbitrary Power can never be settled here, and no Male Administration that may hereafter happen can long continue.

That we are in no Danger at present, and that Matters proceed well, now is allow'd, but for the security of future times it may not be amiss frequently to repeat this Caution, that our Whole depends upon keeping one Post well defended.

The Publick Virtue which must preserve a State is *A Constant and perpetual Will to do our Country Good* ; And where this Principle governs, tho in the Minds of but a Few, yet if they persevere with undaunted Courage, the small Number may prevail at last to defeat the Malice of the Corrupt Part, especially when the Endeavours of the Few are assisted by a Prince dispos'd by Interest and Inclination to promote the Common Welfare.

If Good Men were but as Active and Vigilant as their Opposites, 'twould not be so easie a Matter to change the Constitution of a Country : When those who  
are

are concern'd in Honour and Interest to have things well administer'd, do resolutely and firmly joyn together to oppose such as find their Profit by a Corrupt and loose Administration, a Stand may at least be made, and some Stop put to the further Progress of the Evil.

But tho *Pompey*, *Cesar* and *Crassus* compos'd a fatal Triumvirate, and united in a strict League to Subvert the Liberties of *Rome*, we do not read that there was the same Union and good Understanding between *Lucullus*, *Cato*, *Cicero*, and the rest, who endeavour'd to save the Commonwealth, for the Luxury and Lazyness of some, the froward Temper, or Secret Ambition of Others, made 'em either neglect or obstruct the Business of the Publick, which might be the Reason that *Cesar* at last prevail'd.

In the same manner, if hereafter a Cabal of Men, in order to their own Greatness, should design To change this Constitution, To introduce a Government by the Sword, and To give away all the Nations Wealth; And if to these Ends they should form Assemblies, and there propose what they intend to consent to in another Place, They will succeed, and their Attempts can never be withstood, unless such as mean *England* well, joyn in as  
firm

firm as League for its Preservation, as They shall enter into for its Destruction.

If therefore, in future times, it shall be visible that some Men, to build their own Fortunes, are Pushing at their Countries Ruin, good Patriots must then exert all their Virtue, they must re-assume the Courage of their Ancestors, they must lay aside their Pleasures, but, chiefly, they must Sacrifice to the Publick all their ancient Animosities; They must mutually forgive one another, It must be no more remember'd of what Party the Man was, it being sufficient to enquire, whether or no he always acted upon the Principles of Honesty and Honour. At such a time the best Men of both Sides, if the Name of Parties shall still remain, must shake hands together, with a Resolution to withstand the unanimous, subtle, and diligent Enemies of the King and Kingdom.

In such a Juncture both sides must contend, not which shall flatter highest, but which shall best contribute to the defence of their Princes Person, and to the maintenance of the established Government.

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Discour-  
ses on Li-  
ber, G. 52.

If bad Men shall have Meetings to consult how they may destroy our Civil Rights, Good Patriots ought to meet calmly to Communicate Councils which way those Rights are to be preserv'd; for *Machiavel* says, *There is not a better or more secure Way to Suppress the Insolence, or Cross-bite the Designs of an Ambitious Citizen, than to take the same way to prevent, which he takes to advance them.*

In such a Juncture not only the best of all Parties must be taken in, but we must be angry with no sort of Men that are willing to unite against the Enemies of *England*, for in a Nation which for a long time was, as all allow, upon a dishonest Interest, 'twill be difficult to find Persons whose Characters shall be intirely without a Blemish; Nor indeed was there ever any Man perfect; At such a Season therefore, Men must place their Hopes in such as have most Abilities, and fewest Faults, especially when they live in the Dreggs of *Romulus*, and not in the Republick of *Plato's* Institution.

If the Nobility and Gentry retain their wonted Courage, and preserve their former Wisdom, They will always rescue us out of weak and polluted Hands, And will never endure that so Noble a Prince

as we have now upon the Throne, esteem'd by the whole World, and Head of the Protestant Interest, should at any time be distress'd at home, or interrupted abroad, in the Measures His high Valour purposes for the Good of *Europe*, by the ill Conduct of any Minister.

Particular Men do often miscarry in the World, notwithstanding that in their whole Transactions they give continu'd Proofs of a most perfect Conduct, They shall not be the Richer for their Thrift, nor better esteem'd for their Integrity: Their Industry shall avail 'em nothing: Their Courage shall never bring 'em Victory, and their wisest Councils shall have no Success. Others in the mean time every Way deficient, of no Desert, and meerly by the help of Fortune, shall succeed in all they undertake. But tho she may be said to govern thus in single Events, and here and there to influence in the Actions of Private Persons, Great Monarchies and Commonwealths do not depend upon Her. Politick Institutions, prudently order'd in the beginning, and keeping on in a Steady Course of Wisdom and Virtue, are out of her Power and Rule, and can never fail to prosper; And when Disasters happen to a State, 'tis seldom the work of Chance, but rather the effect of some Misgovernment. For



For in former Reigns we have seen, that when the Kings Revenue was not well Managed it proceeded from this, that the Employments relating to it were not the Rewards of Skill, but the Recompence of another Merit, and that want of knowledge in the Managers was wink'd at while they were giving Money in another Place. Heretofore If Men betrayed their Trust and sold the People, it was because they were largely invited to it. In former times, when the Nations Trade impair'd and went backward, the secret Cause was that the Ministers were servilely to Promote the Interest of some other Country. And in the preceeding Reign, if the Kings Treasure was wildly dissipated, and if exorbitant Grants were made, it came from this, that the Ministers could refuse no Body, having a great deal to ask for Themselves, and that they were not to put Rubs in the Way of others, that they might more smoothly carry on their own Pretensions. These Instances are only given, not but that by many others we could support this Position, That when the Public Treasure is wasted, when a Nation runs into immense Debts, when the Land of the Crown is granted all away, when its Revenues are ill managed, and when the  
Peo-

People are Corrupted, we are not altogether to blame Fortune, the Times or Accidents of the War, but rather to attribute a great Share of these Evils to some Error in the Subordinate Parts of the Administration.

Tiberius in a Letter to the Senate has Tacit l. 1. Ann. this Expression *Necio an Snaſurns fuerim omittere potius prævalida & adulta vitia, quam hoc adſequi, ut palam fieret quibus ſagitiis impares eſſemus.* The Scope of his Epiſtle is to ſhow how difficult it was for him to correct Vices, with which the Principal Men of Rome were tainted, and that by the Attempt he might draw Envy upon Himſelf. But tho a Cautious Prince might have reaſon to entertain ſuch a Fear, the whole Legislative Power of a Country need never lye under Apprehenſions of the like nature. This Strength can deal with the Ambition, Avarice, Corruption and Rapine of the Great ones: The Legislative Authority can correct Men of Arbitrary Principles, and pull down the topping Pride of Insolent and undertaking Miniſters, who are by no means equal to their Buſineſs, and whoſe Heads are Giddy, and turn round in the Eminence, on which Fortune, Flattery, and their other Vices, not their Merit, has plac'd them.

And if our Affairs here should ever happen to light into such Hands, we must put our chief Hopes in the King at the Head of a Parliament.

While that Place contains Men of Courage and Public Spirit, Matters cannot long proceed amiss. Whoever therefore undertakes that Trust, should continually have before their Eyes how much the Common Welfare depends upon their Virtues. But above all things, they should have disinterested and self-denying Minds.

It can hardly be conceiv'd, but by those who have seen it, what Reverence is paid, even by his Enemies, to a Man of steady Principles, the Tenor of whose Words and Actions are always the same, who is neither to be bought nor frighted: He is admir'd and follow'd, all he says has its due weight, his honest Hoary Head is dear to all Mankind. Whereas the Whiffling Prolers after Places, and little busie Intreaguers, are contemptible to the very Men, of whom they are the wretched Instruments. And let the Ambitious think what they please, that Man has most real Power in this Country, who is believ'd to be of the most unshaken Integrity towards the Public, and He who has such a Character enjoys more true  
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Greatness than all the vain Pomp and Honors a Court can give.

The Employments of *England* are yet but few, and their Profits but Inconsiderable to what they are in several Nations, however small as they seem to be, 'tis to be fear'd that some time or other they will be made the Engins wherewith bad Men will endeavour to subvert this Constitution.

'Tis true, at present we are out of such a Danger, but if in future times we should chance to see all Employments reserv'd for Men in one certain Station, if the Road to Preferment should lye but through one Place and Passage; when this happens we shall have Cause to be alarm'd, and to look about us.

They who feel within themselves Abilities to serve the Public, are by no means blameable in desiring to be upon the Stage of Business. On the contrary, that sower Philosophy which makes some Persons at all Seasons retire and abandon the State, is by no means to be commended. They do indeed but *Nomine* Tacit L. *Magnifico, Segue otium velare*: If the Po- 4. Hist. sture of Affairs will possibly admit it, Good Men should rather strive to be in Power, that the Commonwealth may not be ingross'd by Corrupt and Unskil-

ful Hands. A Wise Man can easily discern whither the Ministers are such, that he may with Honour and Safety mix in Councils with them. If the Administration be sound and right, or if it has but a Face looking that way, 'tis a proper Season for Men of Probity, Skill, and Virtue, to produce their Talents, and to push themselves forward, in order more fully to mend Things. And at such a time They should be ready to assist the State with their true Sense and right Understanding; nor should they lazily suffer the Perfections of their Minds to be useless and unactive. And if among those there be any very Eminent, Strong in Friends, vers'd in Affairs of State, of a deep Reach and Foresight, Who have Eloquence to sway Assemblies, and Courage to resist and overcome Popular Fury, Such ought not to despair of the Public, but assist with their Wisdom to redeem a People from their weak Hands, who shall get into Power by meer Chance, when the Nation perhaps has been in a high Ferment, as in Boyling Liquors the Scum will get uppermost. And there is such Reverence paid to those who have a very great Genius, that when they offer themselves to serve the Commonwealth, the weight of the People will bear down all the

the Upstart Pretenders, and force 'em to give way, and make Room for Merit so Superiour.

But if it should ever happen that the Administration should be intirely bad and wrong, then ought Good Men to have no Share nor hand in it, They should withdraw from any Participation in the Negligence or Guilt; They should quit what They cannot honourably hold; They should concern themselves no more in Businels, leaving such Ministers to govern by themselves, who will not govern well, and be contented to serve their Country by defending Liberty in *one Post* against any Incroachment; They should not make so ill a Use of that Affection the People may bear 'em, and of the Interest they may have in the Nation, as to be a shelter for the Crimes or Folly of Others; Nor should they as it were lend their Countenance, and be the Skreen behind which bad Men may safely attempt to undermine the Constitution.

If the Times are good, Silent Merit will be sought after; but if they are bad ill Men will be lifted up to the Offices and Dignities of the State by the Applause of their Adherents, and the Faction of their Friends; but at such a Season 'tis no shame not to be employ'd, *Tatitus* speaking of

Tacit lib.  
6. Ann.

*Ælius Lanira*, says, *Et non permissa Provincia Dignationem addiderat.*

Great Men are often lyable to one unfortunate Vanity: They believe their Parts, Dexterity and Wisdom, to be such, that they can mend Things, give 'em a new Complexion, Correct all Errors, and at least that they shall preserve themselves sound, tho every one else be tainted; And upon these Presumptions, some of the Men in best Esteem have heretofore engag'd with a foul and deprav'd Ministry; But we could never see that they were able to make any Converts: On the contrary, instead of changing the Court the Court did alter them.

Courts are but slowly mended, and that not by the Authority or Example of any Single Person, except it be of the Prince Himself, strongly bent to set Matters upon a right Foot. And yet we have more Instances of Courts which have spoilt their Prince, than of Princes that have reform'd their Courts.

And if it be ask'd, when is the most proper time for Persons of Probity and Virtue to undertake the Management of Affairs, It may be answered, It is then seasonable when Things call loudly to be mended, when unskilful Pilots have run the Ship aground, so that she sticks fast,

fast, ready to split at the next coming of the Waves, when Ignorant Men are quite bewilder'd in their Errors, when the whole People See and Feel the Effect of ill Government, when the Prince grows asham'd of those whom His Subjects hate and fear, when the Commonwealth cannot emerge out of its Debts and Difficulties, without Help from Abler Hands, then is the true time for the best Men to offer themselves to the service of their Country. At such a Season Honesty will not stand alone, weak, defenceless, and out of Countenance at the sight of Prosperous Vice. Nor can Courts be ever Safe for Honest Men, till the Circumstance and Necessity of the times bring thither a Party strong enough to maintain itself against those who are grown great by wicked Arts.

If *English* Men will be continent in this single Point, all must of Course go well; If they who have Noble Commands in the Country will scorn meanly to depend in Town; If they who have brave Seats of their own will despise the crowded Antichambers of the Great Ones here; If they who have plentiful Estates, will slight a troublesome and precarious Employment, They are more happy than a Court can make them: If our Nobility



and Gentry would consider how miserable the Noble-Men of *France* are with all their Mighty Places, they would at no time hereafter desire to wear the Livery of Bondage. And if they are truly season'd with these Notions, That their Liberties are above all Price, and (as Sir Benjamin Rudiard was wont to say) *That there is nothing worth being a Knave*, the Head must be very Skilful, and the Heart very Bold, that will undertake to invade our Fundamental Rights.

'Tis true, what has been here advanc'd and what shall be said anon, may seem needless at present, when all things are presum'd to go well, but these Notions may be of Use to After-Ages.

*The Duty which Private Persons owe to the Public*, lies in a very narrow Compass, and when that is thoroughly perform'd, a Country seldom fails to see a steady Course of Wisdom and Honesty in such as are trusted with the Administration. This Duty may chiefly consist in the following particulars.

1st, That such as represent the People, be Uncorrupt, Unbias'd, and Disinterested.

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2ly, That they diligently attend the Nation's Service.

3ly, That they carefully watch any Innovation or Incroachments upon the Constitution.

4ly, That they make Provision against future Evils,

5ly, That they look narrowly into the Income and Expence of the Kingdom, and examin which way immense Debts have been contracted, and how that Money has been disposed of which the Nation has already granted.

6ly, That They hold a strong Hand over the Men of Business, calling those to an Accompt, who, either through Folly, or upon some wicked Design, pursue destructive Measures.

1st, *That such as represent the People be uncorrupt, unbias'd, and Disinterested.* This Point we have handled sufficiently in the Series of this Discourse. And to what has been already said upon that subject, we shall now only add, That *Rome* was once free, That *France* heretofore had the three Estates, which were the Guardians of its Liberty; That *Spain* had formerly many Rights and Privileges, of which nothing now but the Shadow remains: That *Denmark* and *Sweden* had once Constitutions something like

like that of *England* ; and that all these Countries have been inflav'd by their own Corruptions.

2ly, *That They diligently attend the Nations Service.* For otherwise They do not discharge the Trust to which They are chosen. It has been formerly a Matter of great Wonder, that Gentlemen should even waste their Fortunes to be elected, and yet afterwards never mind that Station which they seem'd before so vehemently to covet. *Cato* had many Virtues too big for Practice, but he may be easily imitated in one good Quality he had, of never failing to be present in the Senate. Such should give way to Others, and make Room for Men of more Leisure, who cannot afford to employ all their Time in the Service of their Country. But above all others, they are to blame who can be drawn from their Duty by Luxury, Lazyness, and Pleasures. Liberty can be hardly wounded in a full House, the Attempts made upon it in former Reigns were made when such as had no Dependance upon the Court were absent about their Country Business. The ill Ministers of those days took that Opportunity To promote Taxes, which would never pass in a full Assembly, To pass dangerous Laws, To set afoot  
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new invented Corporations, which may be fatal in their Consequences, and To form Projects either destructive to the Nation in General, or Ruinous to particular Men. All the ill things ever done have been compass'd when the Negligence of some had made one side Strong and the other Weak.

And if in After Ages any of the Men of Business should be so wicked as to proceed by the same Councils, and to go by the like Measures, they will promote their dark Designs in some such Juncture, when the best Patriots shall be gone away quite tir'd out by Sessions artificially prolong'd.

But it is the Duty of all who love *England* to defeat by unweary'd patience such a Conspiracy against the People; And to obviate such a Mischief, if the ordinary Rules cannot do it, extraordinary Laws may be thought on to oblige the Members to that Attendance which they owe their Country.

He who does not attend, injures the Borough for which he serves; for it may so happen, that in his Absence a thing may pass to their Ruin who have sent him, and which his presence might have prevented; His Electors therefore seem to have such a Right to his Service as in reason no Others ought to dispence with, without their Consent.

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Deserting in this Manner the Public is a growing Evil, upon which account it ought to have a timely Remedy. Perhaps it might not be amiss if a Bill were brought in to make it highly Penal for any Member to be absent from the House above fourteen days, without express leave first had under the Seal of the Borough for which he serves.

A great many Mischiefs both Publick and Private would be prevented, if such as represent their Country would be strict in this Duty of attending.

3dly, *That they carefully watch an Innovation or Incroachments upon the Constitution.* There is nothing lulls a People more asleep than the Reign of a good Prince, reverenc'd for his Wisdom, fear'd for his high Courage, belov'd for his Lenity, and admir'd for a Number of other Virtues; whereas under a bad Reign the Subjects are Jealous and vigilant, tho often to little Purpose. However, 'tis agreed on by all Writers, that the Mild Rule of *Augustus*, contributed more to confirm the Slavery of *Rome*, than all the Severity and Cuning of *Tiberius*.

The best Times likewise produce the worst Presidents; for in good times the People let many Things slip, being then  
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at their Ease, not suspicious, and consequently not watchful over the Government; but where this Supine Temper prevails, mixt Governments decline immediately into Absolute Power. The frequent Contests that were of old between the Senate and People of Rome without doubt preserv'd their Freedom; for where all are of one Mind, ill Use may be made of that Unanimity, by some Eloquent, Subtle, and Ambitious Man, who may turn and rule it as he pleases. Therefore to preserve Constitutions that have a mixture in 'em of Popular Government, 'tis necessary there should be always some small Division, just enough to keep the Minds of Men awake, that they may observe what Advantages one part of the State gets over the other.

Bad Kings provoke enow to look into their Actions, but when the People have a good Prince, they give a favourable Interpretation to all he does.

And the best Man that ever Reign'd may be ill serv'd. It is a Maxim of our Law, *That the King can do no wrong, but if any ill be committed in Matters of State, the Council; if in Matters of Justice, the Judges must answer for it.* Declaration and Remonstrance of Lords and Commons, May 19. 1641. But though the Laws exempt our Kings from Blame, They

They are not freed from the bad Effects of ill Conduct in their Ministers.

He therefore who represents his Country, cannot do the Nation nor his Prince better Service, than to see that those who sit at Helm, do not run the Ship upon dangerous Rocks. Absolute Dominion is a Bait with which the greatest Minds may be tempted ; for they whose Goodness is unlimited, may desire that their Power should be so too. But no one Man ought to think of being Omnipotent, unless he could be Omniscient and Omnipresent. Besides, though Princes may desire great Power, that they may be able to do great Good, such as serve 'em rarely proceed upon this Principle. They often desire their Masters should be Arbitrary, in order to their own Impunity, and to build a large fortune for themselves, for which reason they should be watch'd in all their Windings, and follow'd in all their dark and subtle Mazes.

It seldom happens that the Liberties of a Country are Invaded all at once, The Steps of Power are leisurely and slow, Ministers who have it in their Thoughts to change the Nature of a Government, go to work by Degrees. At first they make use of the most Popular

pular Hands they can possibly procure, ordering it so, that the People may not perceive who 'tis that puts their Fetters on, but these Popular Men they shove out at the first convenient Season, that all may be of a Piece. Their next Business is to corrupt such Persons as have the clearest Fame, whom they discard when sufficiently tainted, and this they do that the People may think all Mankind alike, which naturally drives 'em to follow those only who are in Power, and who can do 'em good. Afterwards they get from the Nation all the Money they can, the Collecting of which erects new Employments, and creates them a number of Dependants, who, in one certain place, are their chief Strength and best Support: By the distribution of these Summs, They likewise make more Friends. But being never out of fear of accounting for all at last, their Principal Aim is to procure their Master such a standing Revenue, as may make him subsist without the People's Help. If they find this impossible, or difficult, then by Accusations, by Exorbitant Proceedings without any President, and by harrassing Private Persons, either in their Fame or Fortune, they endeavour to make all the different Ranks of the People out of love with their ancient Constitution.

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But when they have done all this, They will not yet think themselves quite out of danger. *Senatus & Populus nunquam obscura Nomina, etsi Aliquando obumbrentur.* They will still lie under Apprehensions of being reach'd at last by the Guardians of Liberty. Therefore to damp all Thoughts of Freedom, To influence the better Sort, and To awe the Vulgar, their last work is to procure a Standing Army.

By Manifest Original Contract, an Arm'd Force cannot be rais'd nor kept within this Kingdom, without Consent of Parliament, so that if hereafter we should be ever enslav'd that way it is our own proper Fault.

Where Armies are Powerful, there grows a Necessity upon Princes, rather to please them than the People. And yet no Mercenaries are sufficient to help a Prince against a Powerful Foreign Force, if the Subjects are disoblig'd at home. *Machiavel says, That a Prince who founds the Duration of his Government upon Mercenary Troops shall never be firm nor secure.* But he counts Foreign Forces yet more dangerous, because they are always unanimous, and at the Command of other People.

Prince Ch.  
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Ch. 17.

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If hereafter any Ministers should be so wicked, to attempt the Subversion of our Fundamental Rights, we have here shown some of the Steps, which they will probably make, to compass their Designs. It therefore imports all good Men, to watch their first Invasions and Incroachments, and sometimes to intercept 'em in their Course.

*Fourthly, That they make Provision against future Evils.* The Virtues requisite for such as will handle matters of Government, have their Foundation in Wisdom and Courage. He, whose Endowments of the Mind, are not sufficient to foresee a long while before what may be the Event of a Council, cannot consult safely for his Prince; and he who at every turn is afraid of Popular Anger, shall never give any sound Advice.

Virtue and Wisdom, in some Sense. are Terms Synonymous, and different Words, signifying the same thing; for no Man can be Virtuous with any Effect conducive to the Publick Good, without a rich Talent of the Mind, and strong Wisdom; nor can a Man be truly Wise, without such Publick Virtue, as warmly embraces the Liberty, Honour and Interest of his Country. And when a Genius of this kind appears in any Nation, he has a Natural Right to the Offices and Dignities of the State: But if e-

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ver Courts shall happen to be deprav'd, they will like quite another sort of Men: Wanting true Wisdom, they must set up something in the Room of it; that is to say, Momentary Shifts, and short Remedies; raw and unskillful Medlers in Business, are their Darlings, that will venture at all, and yet know nothing; upon which Principle they make open War with Desert of any kind, and reckon it a great Conquest, when they can get rid of a wary and knowing Statesman.

They count it supream Wisdom to answer any single Necessity, never regarding whether the manner of doing it be Safe, Just, or Honourable. They not only trust Providence, (as all Men should do) but are content to rest wholly upon it; believing Foresight, and Thoughts of the Future, to bring more Anxiety than Profit. They are Wise, as some Men subsist from Hand to Mouth; they think it sufficient to live to Day, and to make Provision for the present Moment. All this perhaps may be good Philosophy in Private Cases; but for the whole Body of a State to go by such Rules, must needs be very dangerous.

Prince,  
c. 3.

*Machiavel says, The Romans could never relish the Saying, that is so frequent in the Mouths of our Politicians; To enjoy the present benefits of Time. They either provided gain*

gainst, or Fronted a Danger; and seldom let themselves be overtaken by it: He says likewise, *That things which are discover'd at a distance, (which is done only by Prudent Men) produce little Mischief, but what is easily averted: But when, through Ignorance or Inadvertency, they come to that Height, that every one discerns them, there is no Room for any Remedy, and the Disease is incurable.*

Cardinal Richlien says, *It is the Duty of Ministers of State, to Represent to their Masters, That it is more necessary to consider the Future, than the Present; and that Distempers are like the Enemies of a State, against whom Prudence obliges to march, rather than tarry till they are come, to drive 'em out again; that those who do not follow this Method, will fall into great Confusions, which it will be very difficult to remedy afterwards.* But he lays down, *That it is a common thing among weak Men, to drive off time, and to chuse the preserving their Ease for a Month, rather than to deprive themselves of it for a while, to avoid the Trouble of many Years; which they do not consider, because they see only what is present, and do not anticipate Time by a wise Providence.* He farther adds, *That Ministers, who never consider to morrow, live happily for themselves; but others live unhappily under them.*

Testament  
Politique  
du Card-  
nal Rich-  
lien. P.2.  
Cap. 4. 1

We have here cited the Authorities of two very able Men, both in the Theory and Practice of State Affairs; to show how dangerous their Measures are, who consult nothing but their present Ease, who love Palliating Remedies, and who are for removing from 'em the Evil Day at as great a distance as they can.

If we should ever fall into such Hands, they will not care with what Debts and Payments they load Future Times, so they may come at a little ready Money. They will give large *Premiums* and Interest, never considering who must pay the Reckoning at last. They will set afoot high Duties, never weighing how the People's Trade and Manufactures are thereby affected. They will not mind how profusely they waste the Nation's Treasure; Negligence and Prodigality, being pleasant and easie for the present time, tho' afterwards the Parents of Infinite Care and Trouble.

Constancy in denying unreasonable Suits, Thrift for the Publick, promoting Foreign Traffick, Improving the Revenues granted, keeping the Ships of War in good Repair, laying up Stores, making Schemes for better Government, retrenching all needless Expences, providing against Wars to come, making good Leagues Abroad, al-

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laying Heats and Animosities at Home, and putting Impediments in the way of any Power that grows too fast, are so many Seeds which Great and Able States-men, are always Sowing, without a Prospect to Reap in many Years, but the Harvest comes at last; and under the Conduct of such Ministers Nations Thrive and Flourish: Whereas, such as proceed upon that narrow Notion of *Enjoying the present benefits of Time*; tho' they may thereby do their own Work, and make their own Fortunes, yet without doubt, they will Ruin whatever Government they undertake to Guide.

If in after Ages, they who are trusted with the Administration here, should be thus careless and unforeseeing, it will be the Duty of such as represent the People, by frequent and serious Inquiries into the State of the Nation, and by plain Speeches, to rowse up the Men of Business from a Lethargy, that may prove so Fatal; for undoubtedly, any part of the Legislative Authority may call upon the Executive Power, to make Provision against Future Evils.

*Fifthly, That they look narrowly into the Income and Expence of the Kingdom, and examine which way Immense Debts have been contracted, and how that Money has been dispos'd of, which the Nation has already granted.*

The last Duke of *Buckingham* had many Designs to put the Affairs of his Estate in Order; and to this End he consulted several sorts of Men: His wise and true Friends laid before him, That no ways would be so effectual, as to look into his Accounts, to employ honest Stewards, and to live within Compass. But there was another Set of People, in whom he more delighted, who made him believe they would put his Business into such a Posture, that no Negligence, nor no Profusion should do him any hurt. In short, they told him directly, That they would procure for him the Philosophers Stone. He hearken'd to 'em, minded none of his Affairs, he let his Servants do what they pleas'd, and would put no Limits to his Expences. But the Consequence and Conclusion of all was, That His Graces evil Counsellors became Rich, and he grew Poor.

In the same manner, if in some future Reign we should fall into the Hands of bad Ministers, they will tell the Prince, that they can get for Him the *Magisterium* (and indeed it would prove a kind of Philosophers Stone, if they can so concert matters, as to obtain all the supplies they shall insist on) they will perswade Him they can maintain His Crown and Dignity out of a Mine of new Projects, never to be exhausted, and upon

upon this View they will advise Him, first, to give *them* very large Sums to buy Limbeckes, Crucibles, and Charcoal ; for Utensils must be had, and Workmen must be paid ; they will promote the making Exorbitant Grants, and giving away the Crown Lands upon this Notion, That 'tis sowing a little to reap much. They will conceal pernicious Pensions under the dark Veil of *Secret Service*. An Article that hides all. But the *Estimates of the Charge of the War* will be the best shelter they can possibly have for their Profusions of any kind, where they may insert *Items* never to be disprov'd, and never to be understood. Finding how much it turns to their own Account to have an Ample Revenue to range in, they will persuade their Prince to ask all Things, and to spare nothing : And if such Bad Men as have been here describ'd should ever come to be trusted, they will make the Body Politick faint and look pale with continual Opening of its Veins ; they will leave the Crown bare, the Exchequer empty, and all the Revenues Anticipated ; they will distress the Gentry, and begger the Common People ; and having thus enrich'd themselves, and impoverish'd all other Degrees of Men, they will reduce the Nation to be naked and defenceless, hardly able to support it self at



home, much less in a Condition to undergo another Foreign War.

If at any time hereafter, such Men as have been here painted out, should be suffer'd to entangle our Matters, to dissipate our Treasure, and to waste the Commonwealth, where will be the Money, the Fleet, and Arms, that may be necessary, in case the French should ever break the Peace, and attempt to possess themselves of *Spain*, and the *West-Indies*?

If by the Giddy, or rather frantick Conduct of Beardless Politicians, lifted perhaps up from the meanest Obscurity, and set in a manner to hold the Reins, our Affairs should hereafter be brought so low, (which God forbid) as that we must sit still, while those Dominions fall into a Power already but too Dreadful, how can Universal Monarchy be avoided? And if *Spain* should happen to be thus lost, we are not only hurt in a point of Empire, the most important of all, but the whole Trade of *England* will be cut up by the very Roots.

It may be laid down for a certain Truth, that no Man of a great Fortune, was ever undone in a few Years, but he was Cheat-ed of much more, than he was able to Spend: And this is yet more true, if the Man had Parts, and a good Uunderstanding. Private Men are Ruin'd, when those about 'em are Unfaith-

Unfaithful, and are to Profit by their Destruction; and if they have no trusty Servant, that will put them in Mind of their Condition.

The same holds in the Affairs of a whole Nation. When a Public, that was once clear and easy, is overwhelm'd with Debts; when this happens among a People that have been always willing to give, and in a Ministry that has never been backward to ask, when all Occasions have been supply'd to their full demand, when the Prince is wise, and without any Expensive Pleasures; when such a Countrey does labour under Difficulties almost insuperable, and when in some future Reign all this shall be our Case, Mankind will entertain an Opinion that the Administration is not right; the World will be inclin'd to think, that such as shall then govern in the Revenue want either Fidelity or Skill; it will be thought that they have not at any time laid before their Master a true State of his Affairs; it will be believ'd that they have never contriv'd his Expences with Care and Wisdom, and that they have not endeavour'd by grave and wholesome Councils to moderate his Bounties.

The Liberality of a Prince, the most extended we can imagin, will yet oblige but a very few; and to give it a constant Supply

ply, vast Numbers must be harrass'd. Besides, among the Vulgar, Frugality in a Court does in some Measure commute for high Taxes. Liberality is Noble in rich and quiet Times, but it will hardly be thought just, when what is given is to be in a manner the last drop of Blood in the Subjects Veins. Not to value their Treasure has been always the Fault of Great and Heroick minds, of which many had been ruin'd every Moment, but that they had grave and honest Ministers ready to keep 'em within Bounds by wholsom Advices, rugged Truths, and severe Virtue. And so the Duke of *Sully* proceeded with his Master *Harry* the 4<sup>th</sup>. When a Prince is in his Nature too Bountiful, it is a Duty incumbent upon such as serve Him, with all Humility to beg, That in his high Wisdom he would consider how hardly that is gather'd, which they shall see so lightly given: They ought rather to quit their Posts, than to sign or fix the Seal to immoderate Gifts. But those Hands must be very clean themselves, which are held up to Kings with humble Prayers, that they would have Compassion on their People.

'Tis true, War is a devouring Monster, and to feed it will very much disorder the Revenues of a Country: And yet we see *France* has been able for Nine Years to engage

gage all the Strongest Part of *Europe*, to have all the while Land Armies, consisting of above three hundred Thousand Men, and to maintain a Fleet as numerous, and more expensive than that of *England*: And after all this, they have been in a Condition to make larger Expences of all kinds (as is said) than in any two Years during the War; and wee see 'em now in a Posture to meditate higher Designs than ever. That they did bear up so long against the Confederate Strength, that they have been able Annually to expend such an Immense Treasure for upward now of ten Years, and that they are not at present quite exhausted and impoverish'd, must without doubt proceed from the good Conduct of those to whom the Management of their Affairs has been intrusted. No Man is indur'd under that Monarchy to perform the Functions and Offices of the State in an ignorant and careless manner. The Ministers there are more frugal for their Master than in their own Concerns; they do not make too much hast to be Rich; they are contented that a Great Fortune should be the Recompence of many Services, and of long Merit. They have not let the Crown Lands of *France* be as it were a Derelict, *Et primi Occupantis*: We do not observe it has been so order'd in that Kingdom, that both the Body of the  
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the People and the Public too are Poor at one and the same Instant; their Ministers have not suffer'd the Commonwealth to be consum'd by Usurious Contracts with the Common Lenders; and by their Care and Wisdom they have obtain'd such Credit, even under a Despotick Power, that they have not been forc'd all along to pay above 7 per Cent. Interest for Money lent the King; whereas 40 per Cent. has been paid for mighty Sums in one Free Government: so that upon the whole Matter, 'tis evident enough, that *this Devouring Monster War is to be fed* where the Men of Business are Honest, Foreseeing and Frugal for the State.

Mix'd Governments, among many other Excellencies, have this Advantage, that a good Administration may be obtain'd by any one part of the Constitution, that will set it self strongly to so good a Work; Kings can at all times set things right, if the Business of their Wars do not compel 'em to be often Absent. Either of the Houses, when they have set themselves to inquire into, and correct Disorders, have been terrible to the most Bold, Subtile, and most Powerful Statesmen, that ever went about to undo a People, or to mislead a Prince.

If in any future Reign, the Treasure of this Kingdom should be mis-manag'd, and profusely wasted; and if Debts, hardly to be

be waded through, should be contracted; the Representatives of the People may, by looking strictly into all these Matters, perhaps immediately lessen the publick Engagements, at least they may put some Stop to the farther Progress of the Mischief.

In such a Juncture, good Men will think it their Duty, to see whether this Debt is not to be lessen'd, by reviewing former Accompts; they will examine, whether the Sums already granted were not sufficient to pay off all the Forces we have had at Land and Sea: They will inquire from whence such a high Article of Arrears proceeds: They will see how so many Fonds come to be Deficient, and whether such Deficiencies have not been occasion'd by some ill Conduct in those, who have manag'd the respective Branches: They will inform themselves, which way the many Millions are gone, which the People have paid: They will desire to know, what Necessities could compel the Men of Business to give such large *Premiums*, and high Interest; and whether the Promoters of a Council so pernicious, did not lend their own Money; and whether they have not been Parties deeply concern'd themselves in all usurious Contracts: They will inquire upon what Consideration, and for what Services, immoderate Grants of Lands and Money have been  
been

been made, and they will do it the more strictly; if, when such Grants were pass'd, it should happen that the Nation was indebted, and paid heavy Taxes.

The Representatives of the People can look into all these things; and, no Doubt, it is a Duty which they owe their Country, that has trusted 'em with so unlimited a disposal of their Fortunes.

To prevent Mismanagement in the Revenue of this Kingdom, it seems necessary that a Law should be made, to put the Lords of the Treasury under such an Oath, as the Lord High Treasurer of *England* takes; for it appears an Absurdity in our Government, that the meanest Officer concern'd in the King's Revenue, should be sworn to a true, and faithful Discharge of his Trust; and that the Treasury, who are trusted with the whole, whose Authority is so boundless, and who have it so much in their Power, to hurt the Nation, should be under no Oath at all. Some Objections there are against this; but he who considers 'em well, will find 'em of no weight, and that those Necessities which have broken into, and over-rul'd the Ancient Course of the Exchequer, might have been avoided by Care and Conduct.

If in future Times *England* should have any Grounds to doubt, that the Treasure of the Public has been Imbezzel'd; if prodigious Fortunes, rais'd in ten Years by obscure Men, who have had no Dealings but with the Court, should Minister Occasion of Suspicion; if Resumptions should be thought fit, we mean in Cases where Persons of no Merit have been enrich'd with the Kingdom's Spoils; if it should be thought reasonable to see whether any thing is to be sav'd in an immense Debt, out of the unwarrantable Gains which the Lenders have made; if it should be judg'd expedient to inquire into any Mal-Administration in those through whose Hands the Revenue passes; if it should be deem'd necessary Thrift to look into all Pensions; if it should be thought reasonable fairly and impartially to state the Accompt of so many Millions given and expended, so great and difficult a Work as a Strict Inquiry into all these Matters will prove, cannot be enter'd upon, and brought to a good Conclusion, but by the united Wisdom of the Nation.

No other Power can face that Strong League, which will be made between Fellow Criminals, to save one another. Ordinary Remedies prevail but little against stubborn and inveterate Diseases: If therefore our Affairs should be ever in disorder, the  
Legisla-



Legislative Authority can bring the most effectual Helps to set us right.

And in such a Case, peradventure, it may be thought advisable to promote a Bill, That such sort of Abuses as have been here described, and all other Male-administration of the like kind, may be inquir'd into by Committees of both Houses, to sit in the Interval of Parliament, with all requisite Powers, without Salaries, and to be chosen by Ballot. And supposing past Errors to be too big for Correction, yet so Awfull an Authority, and the fear that it will from time to time be renew'd, may, for the future, be some Check to the growing Corruptions of the Age.

All the Premises consider'd, we submit it to better Judgments, whether it is not the Duty of such as represent their Country, To *look narrowly into the Income and Expence of the Kingdom, and to examin which way immense Debts have been contracted, and how that Money has been dispos'd of, which the Nation has already granted.*

Sixthly, That They should hold a Strong Hand over the Men of Business, calling those to an Account, who either through Folly, or upon some wicked Design, pursue destructive Measures. Helvidius Priscus, after the Example of his Father-in-law Petus Thrasea in the Philosophy he made use of to fit himself for the Service of his Commonwealth

wealth, follow'd the Opinion of the Stoick, who plac'd all Good and Evil in Honesty or Dishonesty, accounting the Gifts of Fortune, such as high Birth, Power and Wealth, to be but things indifferent towards the constituting of Happiness, which they define to be internal only in the Mind.

But tho' *Aristides, Socrates, Phocion, Publicola, Cincinnatus, Attilius Regulus*, and many others, have been great Men under a constant and willing Poverty; yet, without doubt, Nobility and Riches help good Spirits on of their way, and set 'em forward: He that is high Born, his Perfections may be sooner taken notice of, as standing upon an Eminence; and he that has Wealth need not be troubled with Private and Domestic Cares, and may devote all his Time and Thoughts to the Service of his Country.

*Machiavel* says, that a Prince, who intends to invade the Constitution of a Free People, takes this Course: *To subvert all, to turn every thing Toppie Turvie, and make all things new. To alter the Magistracy, create new Titles, Elect new Persons, confer new Authorities, advance the Poor, and impoverish the Rich. That what is said of David, may be said of him: He filled the Hungry with good Things, and the Rich he has sent empty away. Besides, it is his Interest to*

*Discourses on Livy, lib. 1. C. 25.*

U

build

## Of Private mens Duty in the

build new Cities, to shift the Inhabitants from one place to another; in a Word, so to Toss and Transpose every thing, that there be no Honour, Wealth, nor Preferment in the whole Province, but what is ownable to him.

Some of these Courses were taken by Henry the 3d. in France; but his chief aim was to introduce new Persons into such Offices and Dignities of the State, as were fill'd before with the Nobility and Princes of the Blood. He rais'd out of the Dust obscure Persons, who might owe to him only their Wealth and Honor, and who might look upon him as their second Creator: These paid him a blind Obedience; they never consider'd what was for the Publick Good, what was Reasonable, Safe, Expedient, Just, or Honest, but in all things did as they were commanded; with such a Sett of Men this dark Prince gave the first Mortal Wound to the Liberties of France; He plac'd them so high as to overlook the old Gentry, who being weaken'd and depress'd, had neither the Interest nor the Courage to preserve their Ancient Form of Government.

He has been follow'd in these Steps by all the French Kings his Successors; so that under that Monarchy, in every Reign since, we have hardly seen any but the Creatures meerly of the Prince's Favour, and quite new Men upon the Stage of Business, and such

such have in a manner ingross'd all the Employments of Profit, Trust and Honor.

We grant that in a well constituted Government, which is upon a right Foot indeed, neither Wealth nor Titles, and nothing but Virtue and Abilities, should prefer a Man to the Honors and Employments of his Country. But when the Times are too corrupt to admit of such Measures, the Question will be, Who with most safety are to be rely'd on, they whose Fortunes are made, or they who are to make their Fortunes? They who have a Satiety of Titles, or they whose Ambition may prompt 'em to attempt any thing to advance Themselves?

In all likelihood Countreys (whose deprav'd Manners will not allow 'em to lift up Virtue in Distress, and which in truth cannot find such Men to serve em, as were *Aristides*, *Socrates*, and those other Heroes, whom we newly mention'd;) should desire to see themselves rul'd in the subordinate Parts of Government, by the best Hands that can be possibly got: If 'tis to be come at, they should endeavour to have Places of great Honor and high Trust, fill'd with Persons, whose Birth, Estates, and other Circumstances, seem, in Humane Probability, to set 'em at least above the common Temptations of the World.

He who has a good Stake, will be afraid to engage in desperate Councils; he who has a large Estate will not consent to have the Laws subverted, which are his firmest Security; for where the Sword governs, Lands at best are held but under a precarious Title. They who are well Born will desire to preserve that Constitution, of which they and their Ancestors have always been a Part: Instead of Governing and making a Figure in their Country, in all appearance they will be loath to become the contemptible Clients and Dependants of some Favourite or Minister, whom Chance or Partiality shall set above his Betters.

But they who come into a Government, with a design to build a Family, and make a Fortune; who are to get all, and can lose nothing, who are chiefly recommended by their Boldness to Undertake, and readiness to Comply, whom no Councils fright, and whom no Measures shock; such Men are indeed the proper Instruments for introducing Arbitrary Power, but can hardly be thought fit Ministers in any Nation, that is desirous to preserve its Freedom.

Whoever looks over our Histories, will find, that all the Attempts which were heretofore made upon the Liberties of *England*, have been form'd by such Persons, as have been here describ'd.

Most

Most of our former Princes having had Designs of Absolute Dominion, and finding that the Men of Fortune and Figure would rather obstruct, than promote their Intentions, thought it more conducing to their Ends to be serv'd by another sort of People, and did therefore bring into the Management of their Affairs all along a Sett of Ministers, Weak, Ambitious, Light, Designing, Rash, Unskilfull in the Arts of wise Administration, and vers'd in nothing but Craft and Tricks; but at the Head of these they had always some one that was to be the Forlorn Hope, and who would venture to go greater Lengths than any of his Companions: And for this Post they generally chose a Pushing Man of a Bold Spirit, a ready Wit, a Fluent Tongue, obscure and low in the World, and such a One whom Fortune could hardly leave in a worse Condition than she found him. Nor was it difficult to find Persons of this Character, who would hazard their Heads, to compass Power, Wealth, and Greatness. And tho' they could not arrive at Unlimited Monarchy, the Philosophers Stone, our former Statesmen have so much hunted after, yet in the Search of it they found several other good Things; we mean, good for themselves, that is to say, Titles and Great Estates. 'Tis true, many of 'em have been

interrupted in their Course, and the weight of the People has born 'em down at last. But a Man of a wretched Beginning, never heard of before, when he sees himself lifted up high, seldom thinks of the Laws, Impeachments, and the Ax. He hopes to elude Justice; that the Power which set him on, will bring him off; and that he may be defended by his Numbers, and a Corrupted Majority devoted to him; or as his Predecessors have done, that he may at last retire full of Wealth and Crimes, and that his Guilt will be cover'd in the fresher Offences of those who are to Succeed him: Or Men of this Stamp, when they have got all they can, may think to be forgiven by changing Sides; and that it will be time enough to become good Patriots, when they are no longer suffer'd to hurt the Commonwealth; for the Arms of the Public have been but too open to embrace such a sort of Penitents.

Upon these, or the like Hopes, the *Cathari* and *Catalines* of former Times have presum'd to attack the Liberties of *England*. It must therefore be a Duty incumbent upon such as represent their Country, *To hold a Strong hand over the Men of Business.*

Twould

Twould be endless to enumerate all the Dangers that may befall a Free Government, if it should have at the Head of its Affairs a Minister of a bold and Enterprizing Spirit, who, from a low Degree, aspires to the highest Greatness, and whose Ambition is not restrain'd by any Private or Publick Considerations.

If in some future Reigns it should be our Case to have such a Man in a Station, and with the Power of doing much Hurt, all such as desire to preserve their Civil Rights, should with undaunted Courage set themselves to stop him in his Career, and to intercept him in his Growth.

*Machiavel says, There is one Rule insal-Prince;*  
*lible to Princes in the Election of such as are* <sup>c. 22.</sup>  
*to serve 'em. When you observe your Officer*  
*more careful of himself than of you, and all*  
*his Actions and Designs pointing at his own*  
*Interest and Advantage, that Man will never*  
*be a good Minister.*

We shall beg the Reader's Pardon for <sup>lib. c.</sup> one short Digression in this Place, and it <sup>22.</sup> is to take notice of another fine Remark of the same Author, who says, *The Actions of a new Prince are liable to a stricter Observation, than if he were Hereditary; and when they are known to be Virtuous, gain more upon People, and oblige them farther than Antiquity of Blood, because Men are more affect-*



ed with present than pass'd things. But to return to our Matter.

Testament  
Politique  
du Cardinal Rich-  
lieu, p. 2.  
C. 3.

The *Spaniards* were in a flourishing Condition in *Richlieu's* time: And in the beginning of his Ministry the Affairs of *France* were in great Disorder: He wholly attributes the Prosperity of *Spain* to this Principle (running through all their Councils at that time, and prevailing with all their Ministers) of preferring the Publick Good to Private Interest; and the contrary obtaining in *France*, he says, was the Cause of all their Disorders. So that we may justly think the present Greatness of the *French* has taken its Rise from this Noble Principle, having gotten, there, deeper Footing now than it had heretofore.

Ministers, whose Chief Aim, in all they do, is their own Greatness, can neither be good for Prince nor People. And when they consult their Private Interest more than the Public Good, 'tis, in many Instances, apparent to all the World; as for Example.

*First*, When they take no Care of their Master's Revenue. For in all Countreys, and in all Ages, bad Statesmen have thriven best under Princes plung'd in Debts and Difficulties.

*Secondly*,

*Secondly*, When they have made a false Step, and do not own it, and recede, but rather call in the Prince's Authority, and all his more immediate Dependants, to help 'em out, and to countenance their Errors, 'tis a Sign they have more regard to themselves, than to his Honor.

*Thirdly*, When they enter upon new and desperate Councils, which if they succeed well, will redound to their proper Glory; and if they should have a bad Event, may hazzard his Ruin; 'tis a plain Mark that they are ready to sacrifice his Safety to their own Vanity or Ambition.

*Fourthly*, When they conceal from him Truths which he ought to know; when they do not acquaint him with the State of his Affairs, nor with the true Condition of the Nation; when they do not endeavour to moderate his Expences; and when they do not quit, when sound Councils cannot prevail, 'tis an evident Proof, That they prefer keeping up their Interest, as they call it, and holding their Post and Employments, to all other Considerations whatsoever.

*Fifthly*, When they are ready to do any thing, let it be never so hurtful to their Master, provided it square with the Interest and Measures of the Party, of which they are at the Head, and by whom they are buoy'd

buoy'd up; 'Tis a Mark that they aim at, being independant even of the Prince himfelfe, and that they think to fubfift more by the Strength of their own Faction, than by his Favour.

*Sixtly*, When Man to Man, and *fingly*, they are willing to own any Errors, but fay at the fame time, that they were againft this, and that, accusing their Brethren of the State for every Mifcarriage, 'tis a Sign that provided they themfelves are well thought on, they do not care what Opini- on the People entertain of the whole Go- vrnment.

*Seventhly*, When they are for propofing difhonorable and unjuft Shifts to raife Mo- ney, rather than to take the Pains of form- ing before hand better Schemes for Ways and Means, 'tis a Sign that they prefer the Momentary Arts of recommending themfelves to all Thoughts whatfoever, and that they confult more their own eafe than the Publick Good. 'Tis likewise an Evi- dence that they are not of Richlieu's mind,

*Testament  
Politique,  
p. 2. c. 4.*

who fays, *That publick Administration takes up the Thoughts of Judicious Minifters, inso- much that the perpetual Meditations they are oblig'd to make, to forefee and prevent the Evils that may happen, deprives them of all manner of Reft and Contentement, excepting that which they receive in feeing many Sleep quietly, rely- ing*

*ing on their Watchings, and live happy by their Misery.*

*Eighthly*, When contrary to the Constitution of the Land, they promote Councils which tend to the keeping up an Arm'd Force, 'tis a sign, that not daring to trust the Laws, they would have their Proceedings maintain'd another way; that they desire such an Impunity as the Sword has seldom fail'd to give bad Ministers in other Countries. 'Tis a Mark that their own Safety is their principal Object, and that they had rather the Nation should be burthen'd with Taxes, and have the Form of Government alter'd, and that the Prince should lose his Subjects Hearts, than venture themselves before a Free and angry People.

We have given some of the Marks, which selfish and designing Statesmen may be known by hereafter. And if in future times it should be our Case, to see Persons of this Character upon the Stage of Business, we must rowse up the Vigour of our Ancient Constitution, we must awaken all the Laws, and direct 'em boldly to the Heads of such a dangerous sort of Men.

*Machiavel* says, *That they who govern'd* *Discourses*  
*the State of Florence, from Anno 1434, to* *on Livy.*  
*1494, were wont to say, That it was necessary* *lib. 2. c. 1.*  
*every*

every five Years to review the State, for otherwise it would be very hard to maintain it: They call'd reviewing the State, reducing the People to the same Terror and Awe as they had upon 'em of old, when every Man was punish'd according to his Crime, let his Quality be what it would.

He lays down likewise, That Kingdoms as well as Commonwealths, have often occasion to be reduc'd to their first Principles: Which, he says, was done in France by the Parliaments, who reviv'd the Ancient Government as often as they oppos'd the King in his Arrests, and as often as they call'd great Delinquents to account, whose Crimes, if they are suffer'd to grow, cannot be reform'd but with Disorder, if not the Dissolution of the whole Government.

For want of pursuing some such like Courses, the French have lost their old Constitution, and are now under the absolute Sway of a single Person; and that we in England continue still to be a free People, is without doubt chiefly owing to that Power, which our Ancestors have from time to time exerted, of impeaching such of the great Ones, as they saw entering upon Measures, which plainly tended to introduce unlimited Dominion.

We

We have been hitherto preserv'd by pulling down such Men, as were setting themselves and their Master above the Laws; and we shall transmit to Posterity our Civil Rights untouch'd and untainted, if we do not lose our wonted Courage.

If therefore, in any future Reign, it should be seen, that the Ministers waste the Kingdom's Treasure, that they misgovern or misapply it, that they break into appropriated Fonds; that they give Advices which invade Property, and which, in their Consequences, tend to disaffect the People. And lastly, that to secure themselves they promote one Council, which must end in the subversion of all the Laws; if these things should come to appear, they who represent their Country will not be afraid to attack these bold and high Crimes with Complaints, Addresses and Impeachments; for if this be omitted, the Impunity such Men have found will engage so many new Offenders, that at last, by their Number, they grow safe, and above Correction; and when this happens (as it has appear'd in the instance of *France*) the Liberties of a Country are intirely lost.

When

When Matters are become unquiet, by ill Conduct, discerning Princes, like Wise Men who have a Law-suit, desire to piece things up as soon as possible, and to remove the Bone of Dissention; as seeing full well, That Troubles make the common People Inquisitive, that Inquiry gives 'em Knowledge; and that when they have Knowledge, they are very hard to Govern.

But ill Ministers often think that the best Course to save themselves, is yet farther to embroil their Masters business, not considering, that the more things grow disturb'd, the greater Necessity there will be of sacrificing them to appease the People's Anger.

Statesmen should take great Care how they contract Publick Hatred: For both Good and Bad Kings desert 'em at last, and with just Reason; for he who has not Judgment, Conduct and Wisdom enough to avoid being odious, deserves not to be protected by his Prince, to his own Hurt and Danger.

Is there any Instance of a Wise, Just, and Good King (Reigning so long as to have his Virtues known) who had not the Hearts and Affection of his Subjects? When Plots are form'd against such Princes, are they not presently defeated?

feated? And does not all Mankind detest the Conspirators? And let some Flatterers say what they will, the Vulgar are not impatient of any Rule, that is tolerably fair and easie; at bottom they love the Splendor of a Court, and are fond of Regal Power; so that Kings, who will but stoop the least to be Popular, are doated upon, and Idolis'd in every Countrey.

The same thing holds in relation to Ministers, if they are honest, if they have a Superior Genius, if they do not make too much hast to be rich, if they are notoriously seen to prefer the Common Welfare before their own Private Interest, if they are Affable and Industrious in doing good Offices, if by their Actions 'tis known that they do not desire to hold their Stations upon any ignoble Terms, if they are not Haughty, Arrogant, and Insolent, they may Rule the State without Clamors, they may grow Grey in their Dignities and Offices, the best Part of Mankind will be constantly of their Side. And if they are at any time attack'd by Private Malice upon some Disobligations or Disappointment, their Enemies will not be able to do 'em any hurt: Clouded they may be for a while, but they will soon shine out with fresher Lustre. If by Inadvertency, and through the Frailty of humane



mane Nature, they have made false Steps, and committed small Faults, the General Voice will be ready to excuse 'em, and their Perfections shall be put in the Ballances, and outweigh their Errors.

But here it may be objected, that *Rich-lieu*, who was undoubtedly one of the Greatest Men that ever undertook the Guidance of a State, and who had very near all the good Qualities necessary for one to whom the Reins of Empire are committed, did, notwithstanding, lie under continual Accusations, Popular Anger, and Conspiracies against his Person. To which we answer, That this Cardinal was a good Minister for the *French* King, but not for *France*. He had all along Designs to make his Master Absolute. 'Tis true, he endeavour'd, by his Sagacity, Care, and Deep Foresight, to make the *French* as great and happy as a Country can possibly be under an unlimited Dominion: However, his Foundation was not sound at bottom, nor honest to Humane kind: He was therefore, from time to time, harass'd, interrupted and perplex'd by the few good Patriots that remain'd, who had still an Eye towards their ancient Constitution: Some indeed joyn'd with these to oppose him, who did not act upon so right a Principle.

But

But when the Ministers in the Measures they take to promote their Master's Greatness, consider their Countries Freedom, when at one and the same time they are Trusty and Impartial Servants to Prince and Country both, when they duly Contemplate how unwise and wrong it is ever to let them have a divided Interest; Such States Men as do all this, stand like Rocks against whom the Waves, stir'd and mov'd forward by vulgar Breath, beat in Vain. They are safe, Rever'd by the best sort, and the Darlings of the People; Such need not fear the scanning of their Actions, Popular Anger, nor the secret Machinations of discontented Persons; Their Innocence is their sure Guard, Arm'd with which, they are not apprehensive of *Impeachments.*

From what has been here said peradventure it will appear, that mix'd Governments are not to be long preserved under their old Form, unless such as represent their Country *Do hold a strong hand over the Men of Business, calling those to an Account, who either through Folly or upon some wicked Design, pursue Destructive Measures.*

But this high Cordial is not to be us'd upon every slight Occasion; 'twas never intended by our Ancestors to encounter

stempers better Cur'd another way, and to be then only Administred when the Body Politick was sick at Heart. Nothing can be Admir'd and Awful that at every turn is expos'd to common View; *Impeachments* are the Laws Supreme Sword which should be Drawn only to cut off great Offences; It should hang high, with the Scabard on, over the Heads and in the View of such as meddle in Matters of State, and when 'tis unsheath'd, it should be in a Way and Manner so very Terrible, as to make all Offenders Tremble.

If in Times to come, our Affairs should happen to be under an ill Administration, the Calamities that must thereby fall upon all Degrees of Men (those excepted who shall have enrich'd themselves by the Publick Spoils) will stir up the Legislative Authority to Interpose in looking after our future Safety.

And at such a season perhaps it will be thought the Sublimeſt Wisdom of all, not to be angry with Persons but to mend Things, and that it will not Import much tho the Criminal scape unpunish'd, so the Fault can be Corrected. The remorse and shame of having, may be, in a few Years ruin'd a Rich and Flourishing People (for so the Case may happen) will be Punishment enough to those who have left in 'em any seeds of Honour. Such

Such therefore as mean their Country well in an unhappy Juncture of this Nature, when they go to give Affairs a better Complexion, should in all likelihood begin their Work by Determining and Pronouncing **What Councils have been directly against the Law, what Advices have Tended to Impoverish the Crown and Kingdom, and what Practices have Wasted the Nations Treasure.** And when in this Solemn Manner they have Condemn'd the Offences, if they think fit, the Offenders may be reach'd with Ease.

If we should ever have a Set of Statesmen whose Offences will compel the Nation to Accuse them, they will endeavour to cover their own Faults by recriminating upon the Proceedings of former times. If they are Charg'd with wasting the Publick Treasure, with giving away the Crown-Lands, with aiming at Arbitrary Power, and to Govern by the Sword, they will be so Audacious to think they stand justify'd by answering, *The same things were heretofore done.* But they ought to make this Reflection, that King *Charles* was in danger to loose his Crown, and that King *James* actually

actually lost it; because his Ministers persw'd Measures destructive to the Kingdom.

And now in a few Words to Re-capitulate the whole Matter of this long Section; If such as represent the People are Uncorrupt, Unbiass'd and Disinterested. If they diligently attend the Nation's Service. If they carefully watch Encroachments upon the Constitution. If they make Provision against future Evils. If they look Narrowly into the Debts and Expences of the Nation. If they hold a strong Hand over the Men of Business. And if in this Manner *Private Persons perform their Duty to the Publick*, we shall not fail in all succeeding Times, to see a *steady Course of Honesty and Wisdom in such as are trusted with the Administration of Affairs*. For it may be laid down for a certain Maxim, That States-Men will hardly be Negligent, Corrupt or Arbitrary, when they are over-look'd with careful Eyes by so Considerable a Part of the Constitution.

And where Things are well Administer'd *That Country will always increase in Wealth and Power*. Have we not before our Eyes the Example of *Spain*, labouring under Publick and Private Wants, occasion'd by nothing but a long Series of Misgovernment? What has preserv'd the *Venetians* for thirteen Centuries against such  
Potent

Potent Leagues as have been frequently form'd against 'em, but that the goodness of their Constitution has enabl'd them to do great things with a very little? Would People under a Tiranny, or indeed under a better Form of Government ill manag'd, have defended themselves with such Courage as *Venice* and *Holland* have done? Did ever Countries fight so Bravely for their Oppressors, as Nations that have contend-ed in the Defence of their own Liberties? Where Matters are in a tottering Condition, do not the People grow sullen and loath to venture their Stocks out of their sight? Is it not seen that at such a time Men hoard their Mony up which should Circulate in Trade? When the Subjects are under Apprehensions that ill Conduct at home will at last produce Wars, Dangers and Invasions from abroad, have they not in all Ages at such a Season inter-mitted their Foreign Traffick, Manu-factures and other Business? What begets general Industry, but hopes to have Property preserv'd? Is it not evident that tho here and there a Private Man accumulates great Riches under an Absolute Monarchy, yet that the whole Body of the People is always poor and miserable in Countries so Govern'd? What encourages Men, with infinite Care, Labour, and Hazzard, to  
ga-

gather private Wealth, which enriches the Publick at last, but the hopes that Stability of Affairs, prudent Conduct, and just Administration, may produce Peace, Security, and lasting Empire? Where Men have a Prospect of all this, Strangers resort thither with their Wealth and Stocks, whereas Merchants and other Cautious Persons abandon Countries, whose Follies and Corruptions subject 'em to continual Changes and frequent Revolutions, so that peradventure upon solid Reasons and very just Grounds, we may lay down, That nothing more Contributes to make a Nation Gainers in the general Ballance of Trade, than good Laws well observ'd, and a constant Course of Honest and steddy Government.

As Trade and Riches have their Principal Foundation in the Liberty and Laws of a Country, so when those great Springs go right, they set in Motion the Engine of a Common-Wealth, tho some other Wheels may happen to be out of Order.

To have the Course of Law and Courts of Judicature proceed uncorruptly, is such a Remainder of Strength and Health, as may in time help to recover the other sickly Parts of a Constitution.

So that a Nation is not deprav'd beyond all hope of Cure, which has in the Chief Seats of Judgment, Men of deep Learning,

ing, Probity, Moderation and Integrity.

*Testament  
Politique  
Part. 2.  
Chap. 10.*

We shall Conclude this last Section with some Advices which *Richlieu* directs to *Lewis* the 13<sup>th</sup>. " Unless Princes use  
" their utmost Endeavours to regulate the  
" divers Orders of their State ; If they are  
" Negligent in the Choice of a good Council ; If they dispise their wholeſom Advice, unless they take a particular Care  
" to become ſuch that their Example may  
" prove a ſpeaking Voice ; If they are Negligent in Eſtabliſhing the Reign of God,  
" that of Reason, and that of Juſtice together. If they fail to protect Innocence,  
" to recompence Signal Services to the Publick, and to puniſh Diſobedience, and  
" the Crimes which trouble the Order, the Discipline, and Safety of States ; unless  
" they apply themſelves to foreſee and prevent the Evils that may happen, and to  
" divert by careful Negotiations the Storms which Clouds drive before them from a  
" greater Diſtance than is thought ; If Favour hinders them from making a  
" good choice of thoſe they Honour with great Employments, and with the Principal Offices of the Kingdom ; If on all  
" Occaſions they do not prefer Publick Intereſt to Private Advantages, tho otherwiſe never ſo good Livers, they will  
" be found more guilty than thoſe who  
actu-



“actually transgress the Commands and  
“Laws of God, it being certain that to  
“omit what we are oblig’d to do, and  
“to commit what we ought not to do, is  
“the same thing.

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*FINIS.*

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